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Abstract 
Entry and Exit of Plants into UK Manufacturing Industries, 1974-97 
By Parastoo Hassaszadeh 
Empirical work in relation to the entry and exit of plants in UK manufacturing 
industries has been affected by a lack of information available to researchers. This thesis 
provides evidence on the entry and exit of plants in UK manufacturing industries during 
the 1974-97 period, using the newly released ARD dataset. In order to provide a better 
understanding of entry and exit of plants the following aspects were investigated: 1) the 
magnitude of plant entry and exit in UK manufacturing sectors during the 1974-97 
period; 2) the determinants of the entry decision; and 3) the determinants of the exit 
decision. 
The findings revealed that UK manufacturing industries were characterised by a high 
level of dynamics. Competition was intense and was increasing especially towards the 
end of the 1990s period. Therefore, the notion of "creative destruction" appeared to be 
of particular relevance in UK manufacturing industries. In studying the entry decision, 
new plants were divided into three categories: 1) those opened by domestic de-novo 
firms; 2) those opened by domestic incumbents; and 3) those opened by foreign firms. It 
was found that: 1) different types of entrants showed significant differences in their 
entry behaviour; 2) both industrial and geographical specific factors affect the entry 
decision; 3) the role played by the industry life cycle could not be ignored, as the effect 
of some factors on entry significantly differed across the two different stages of the 
industry life cycle; and 4) fundamental differences between the northern and southern 
regions of the UK significantly affected the impact of given factors on entry. In 
studying the exit decision the most important findings were: 1) the role that the age of a 
plant played in determining the impact of some variables on its risk of closure; and 2) 
the positive impact of change in ownership on the risk of closure of plants. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Entry and exit are among the most important forces that determine the overall 
competitiveness of industries. According to Stigler (1968), "competition may be the 
spice of life, but in economics it has been more nearly the main dish" (p. 5). Therefore, 
the main focus of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the determinants of 
plant opening and closure in UK manufacturing industries during the 1974-97 period. In 
order to carry out this task, this thesis investigates three main aspects of these two 
phenomenon: 1) it studies the performance of the firm population in UK manufacturing 
sectors during the 1974-97 period by analysing the components of firm turnover, which 
includes birth, death, growth and ultimate decline; 2) it provides a detailed study of 
plant opening decisions by (a) dividing the entrants into three different categories, based 
on certain characteristics; (b) looking at both the industrial and geographical factors that 
affect plant opening decisions; and (c) taking into account the stage in the industry life 
cycle when new entry occurs and the fundamental differences between the northern and 
southern regions of the UK; and 3) it studies the exit decision at plant level and 
examines the impact of various plant, industry, owner-enterprise, time and regional 
specific factors on this decision. 
Previous empirical work in relation to entry and exit of plants in UK manufacturing 
industries has been affected by a lack of information available to researchers. This type 
of analysis has not been done for the UK manufacturing sectors as a whole, neither 
covering a long period of time. However, for the first time in the UK, the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) has provided researchers with micro-based panel plant level 
data that provides various geographical, ownership, industrial and financial (such as 
sales and cost) information for plants in the manufacturing sector over a prolonged 
period of time. This data is contained in the Annual Respondent Database (ARD). 
1 
According to Caves (1998): "...although research on the turnover of business units has 
a long tradition, primary data on the ful l population of business units (firms or 
establishments) present in nations' markets were inaccessible until recently. Only in the 
past decade have economics picked the locks on the doors of numerous national census 
bureaus and organized the primary records so that the births, deaths and life trajectories 
of individual business units can be traced". Using data from the Canadian Census of 
Manufacturers, Baldwin (1995) provided a comprehensive study which analysed birth, 
death, growth and decline of the firm population in Canadian manufacturing industries 
over the 1970-82 period. However, such a study has not been carried out for the 
population of firms in UK manufacturing sectors. In an attempt to fill this gap, Chapter 
3 provides such an analysis for UK manufacturing plants over the 1974-97 period. 
The next step towards acquiring a better understanding of the determinants of plant 
turnover is to study the entry and exit decisions separately and to determine the 
importance of various factors on these decisions. Previous empirical work that has been 
done on the entry decision for the UK manufacturing industries either: 1) took a cross 
section of industries over a period of time and tried to explain their entry variations 
using some industry specific variables (e.g. Gorecki, 1975; Geroski, 1991a); or 2) 
looked at the spatial determinants of new firm formations (Ashcroft et al. 1991; Love, 
1996). However, the industrial and spatial factors are equally important in the formation 
of new businesses and, according to Audretsch and Fritsch (1999): "...the ambiguous 
findings in the regional economic literature is the result of ignoring the role that 
industrial organization plays". Therefore, it is important to study these two aspects side 
by side. 
At the same time, there exists a wide range of literature, in relation to the structural 
changes that affects industries as they go through various stages of their life cycle (Gort 
2 
and Klepper, 1982; Hoff, 1997; Agarwal, 1998). According to Agarwal and Gort (1996) 
these observed structural changes in industries affect entry of new firms in two distinct 
ways: 1) it changes the value of the explanatory variables, such as the attributes of the 
industry; and 2) it changes the value of the parameters that relate entry to the 
explanatory variables. 
The stage of the industry life cycle is not the only factor that can affect the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and entry. The fundamental differences 
between the northern and the southern regions of the UK, in a wide range of aspects 
such as regional growth, unemployment, rates of return on capital and new firm 
formation (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Love 1996; Martin, 1997; Harris and Andrew, 
2000), can also affect the type of entrants and their magnitude in these regions. 
Therefore, i f one wishes to study the plant entry decision comprehensively, it is 
necessary to take into account the industrial specific factors, the geographical specific 
factors, the stage of the industry life cycle and the geographical division between the 
north and the south of the UK, all of which affect the entry decision of plants. In the 
current study, the data provided by the ARE) is used in order to obtain information 
regarding the characteristics of the industries and regions into which plants entered1. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4 entrants are divided into three different categories: 1) those 
opened by domestic de-novo firms; 2) those opened by domestic incumbents; 3) those 
opened by foreign firms. Next, using the GMM method of estimation, the entry rate for 
each group of entrants, into a specific industry, region and year is separately modelled. 
The explanatory variables in the models include industry specific factors and 
geographical specific factors. The stage of the industry life cycle and the geographical 
' The ARD provides information regarding the region in which plants are located. However, the regional specific 
factors are obtained from Regional Trends (various issues). 
3 
division between the north and the south of UK are controlled for, by using two dummy 
variables. 
With regard to plant exit previous empirical work, in terms of the determinants of exit 
for UK manufacturing industries, has also suffered from a lack of comprehensive data. 
These studies either looked at the determinants of exit at an industry level (Hamilton, 
1985) or at a spatial level (Love, 1996). Therefore, they took an aggregate measure of 
exit (such as gross exit or exit rate) at an industry or spatial level and explained its 
variations using some industry or geographical specific factors. However, plant and 
owner-enterprise specific factors often play a much more important role vis-a-vis the 
industry or spatial specific factors. Therefore, a suitable model has to take into account 
all of these factors. Using a logit model, Deily (1991) looked at the plant and firms 
specific factors that affected the closure decision of 19 firms in the UK steel casting 
industry during the 1977-87 period. However, this study was carried out for only a 
limited number of firms. 
The model that seems most capable of accommodating all these factors is the hazard 
model, which has been used to model exit in various studies for other countries (Boeri 
and Bellman, 1995; Mata et al. 1995). McCloughan and Stone (1998) used a hazard 
model in order to examine the exit decision of a selected number of foreign 
manufacturing plants in the UK Northern region. Disney et al. (1999) used the data 
contained in the ARD in order to study the exit decision of plants. However, they were a 
number of shortcomings related to the latter study2. 
2 They used establishments rather than plants as their units of analysis. They also used the selected file contained in 
the ARD, which was biased towards the large establishments and they did not weight the data to make it a 
representative of the entire population of the manufacturing plants. Finally, the number of variables that they used 
was limited, as they only studied the impact of employment size, initial size, output growth and cohort dummies on 
the hazard of plant closure. 
4 
Therefore, Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the exit decision of plants. It uses a 
weighted selected number of plants in the manufacturing sectors and employs a time-
varying covariates hazard model in order to study their exit decision. The hazard model 
accommodates a range of plant specific, industry specific and owner-enterprise specific 
factors. 
The study's conclusions and recommendations are to be found in Chapter 6. 
5 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Thurik and Audretsch (1996), "the modern industrial organisation is 
characterised by a tremendous degree of turbulence. It is an organisation of industry 
with firms in motion, where a massive number of new firms enter each year, where only 
a subset survive for any length of time, and where an even smaller subset can ultimately 
challenge and displace the incumbent large enterprises" (pp. 150-151). Therefore, 
according to them, entry and exit are amongst the most important forces that shape the 
dynamics of industrial organization. They further stated that there are three important 
dimensions in the dynamics of industrial organization; time, space and industry. As the 
study of industrial organization shifts towards a more dynamic analysis, research has to 
focus on a variety of new influences such as time and space, along side the traditional 
industrial characteristics. Therefore, this chapter reviews the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature, paying attention to the various factors within these dimensions, 
which have been found to have an impact on entry and exit decisions. 
In terms of factors that determine entry, Dean et al. (1993) divided them into supply 
and demand side factors. According to them, research investigating the differences in 
firm formation, across the geographical regions, usually looks at the supply side (or 
push) factors. These factors explore the non-materialistic incentives in starting up a new 
venture. On the other hand, those studies that examine the variations in firm formation, 
across industries, look at the demand side (or pull) factors, which are the monetary 
motivation in forming a new business. However, in this study, factors determining entry 
are going to be divided into industrial specific factors and geographical specific factors. 
The reason is that even at the spatial level there are variables that influence entry, 
6 
through their impact on demand. This includes variables such as personal wealth or 
population density, both of which give rise to demand in the local market. According to 
Audretsch and Fritsch (1999), the industrial specific and geographical specific factors 
are equally important, in terms of their impact on the process of firm formation, and 
failure in taking account of either of them results in biased estimates. 
In terms of factors that influence the exit decision, they are sub-divided into three 
major categories; plant specific factors, owner-enterprise specific factors and industry 
specific factors. 
Therefore, Section 2.2 reviews the previous literature on the entry decision. Section 
2.2.1 considers what differentiates between entries of different groups of entrants, based 
on certain attributes. These include entry of foreign firms, as opposed to domestic firms; 
entry of de-novo firms, as opposed to the already existing firms; and entry of small 
firms, as opposed to large firms. Factors that have been found to have an influence on 
entry decisions are divided into industrial specific and geographical specific factors. 
Section 2.2.2 reviews the previous theoretical and empirical literature, in relation to the 
impact of industrial specific factors on entry. The industrial specific factors are further 
divided into the following sub-categories: 1) those that were found to be an inducement 
to entry are reviewed in Section 2.2.2.1; 2) those that were found to be an impediment to 
entry are reviewed in Section 2.2.2.2; 3) those that have had an ambiguous effect on 
entry, in terms of being an inducement or an impediment are reviewed in Section 
2.2.2.3; and 4) the impact of the industry's life cycle are reviewed in Section 2.2.2.4. 
The impediments to entry, which were reviewed in Section 2.2.2.2, are further divided 
into: 1) structural entry barriers, examined in Section 2.2.2.2.1; and 2) behavioural (or 
strategic) entry barriers, examined in Section 2.2.2.2.2. Section 2.2.3 reviews the 
previous literature, regarding the impact of geographical specific factors on entry. 
Finally, Section 2.3 examines those factors that have been found to influence exit 
decisions. These are sub-divided into three categories: 1) plant specific factors, studied 
in Section 2.3.1; 2) owner-enterprise specific factors, studied in Section 2.3.2; and 3) 
industry specific factors, studied in Section 2.3.31. 
2.2 Entry 
2.2.1 Entry of different kinds of entrants 
New entrants do not form a homogenous group, but rather have different attributes. 
Not only do they vary in size, but also they vary in terms of their ownership status (they 
can be owned by a foreign firm, as opposed to a domestic firm, or they can belong to a 
new firm, as opposed to an existing firm). According to Khemani and Shapiro (1988), 
ignoring the heterogeneity of entrants results in a biased estimate of the height of any 
entry barrier. Therefore, various studies have attempted to differentiate between 
entrants, based on these attributes. They typically have found that different kinds of 
entrants respond differently to the same industrial specific variables and show different 
entry behaviour. Given this, it is necessary to make a distinction between different kinds 
of entrants, i f one wishes to study entry decisions. 
Foreign entry versus domestic entry: An important cause of heterogeneity between 
entrants is their country of ownership, i.e. whether they are owned by a foreign 
enterprise or by a domestic enterprise. Caves (1971) explained that due to the 
advantages that foreign owned firms possess, it is easier for them to overcome various 
1 Note that, in studying exit decisions, geographical and time specific factors also have been taken into account. 
However, that is done by including dummy variables, in the regression model used in Chapter 5. 
structural entry barriers2. He explains that i f economies of scale are significant, but only 
present in one stage of production, then a foreign firm can carry out that stage at a single 
site and transfer the rest to its subsidiaries. Similarly, i f a product differentiation barrier 
is present and created through patenting, then a foreign firm can use its knowledge in 
order to serve its markets across national boundaries. On the other hand, for markets 
where product differentiation is created through advertising, not only does present 
advertising can spill across national boundaries, but also previous advertising creates 
some accumulation of knowledge about marketing of the product and adapting it 
according to consumers' tastes. Finally, in those markets for which a large amount of 
start-up capital is required, and a high absolute cost barrier is present, there could be a 
high capital charge on borrowers i f a large amount of capital is required. In this case, 
foreign firms have the advantage of buying factors of production either in the host or the 
home country, while domestic entrants have to chose only from one set of factor prices 
in their home country. 
Having these advantages, foreign firms tend to enter industries that have high entry 
barriers. Therefore, the threat that incumbents encounter from the foreign entrants can 
be more serious than that from domestic entrants. Gorecki (1976), Khemani and Shapiro 
(1988) and Geroski (1991a) have made the distinction between foreign and domestic 
entrants and found significant differences between them regarding their entry behaviour. 
Overall, these results showed that domestic entrants were more sensitive to various 
sources of entry barriers than were foreign entrants. 
De-novo entry versus entry by already existing firms: Hines (1957) argued that a 
certain types of entrants possess certain advantages in terms of being able to overcome 
2 Structural entry barriers will be explained in Section 2.2.2.2.1. 
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various sources of entry barriers. He made the distinction between entry by new firms 
(de-novo entry) and entry by already established firms. He argued that entry by 
established firms occurs more often than entry by new firms. However, the established 
firms are, in almost all respects, superior to the new firms, in terms of their ability to 
overcome various sources of entry barriers. 
Khemani and Shapiro (1988) divided entrants into de-novo entrants, entry by already 
existing firms into the same industry and entry by already existing firms into a different 
industry. They concluded also that de-novo entrants are those that are the most sensitive 
to entry barriers. Mata (1993) made the distinction between de-novo entrants and entry 
by already existing firms. He further divided entry by the already existing firms into 
expansion, extension and purely diversifying entry3. He found that prospective de-novo 
entrants were deterred from entry into industries, which have high entry barriers and 
even where a large number of established firms entered. 
Dunne et al. (1988) looked at the relative importance of different types of entrants, in 
terms of their gross number, employment share, survival and growth in US 
manufacturing industries. They found that de-novo entrants were high in absolute 
number, but accounted for a very small share of the industry's employment. They also 
had a lower survival rate than had other types of entrants and it took longer for them to 
reach the average size of incumbents. On the other hand, entry via acquisition or 
diversification occurred less, but their share of employment was higher and their growth 
was faster, relative to other types of entrants. 
3 If entry was in the same five-digit sector it was an extension entry. If it was into a different five-digit, but the same 
three-digit sector it was an expansion entry. Finally, if it was into a different three-digit sector, it was a purely 
diversifying entry. 
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Small-scale versus large-scale entry: Carlsson (1989) argued that small firm entry is 
a distinct phenomenon, in comparison with large firm entry, and small entrants behave 
differently than do their larger counterparts. Therefore, Acs and Audretsch (1989b) 
looked at the entry of small and large entrants separately and found significant 
differences in their entry decisions. They found that small-scale entrants usually 
operated in market niches, where they were less responsive to aggregate industry factors, 
such as industry profit and growth. However, they were deterred from entry into capital-
intensive industries. On the other hand, profit and growth tended to affect large-scale 
entry positively. 
Making the same distinction between entrants, Acs and Audretsch (1989a) found that 
small entrants were deterred from entry into concentrated industries, which had a high 
level of human capital and a high research and development intensity. At the same time, 
large entrants were more attracted towards concentrated industries and were not 
hindered by a high technology environment. Finally, Mata (1991) looked at the impact 
of sunk costs on the entry of small and large firms. He found that large-scale entry 
responded negatively to the magnitude of sunk costs and positively to the industry's 
growth. On the other hand, small entrants were attracted into industries with high levels 
of past profits. Overall, he concluded that large entrants were in a position of relative 
superiority vis-a-vis small entrants. 
2.2.2 Industrial specific factors 
2.2.2.1 Inducements to entry 
Perceived profitability: Von der Fehr (1992) explained that entrants usually take 
present profits as a signal for post-entry profits because market prices are not a good 
indicator of future profits. High prices can be a result of either high costs or high 
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demand, while entry is profitable only in the latter case. At the same time, getting 
information about prices, output or costs for outsiders is not easy and establishing price 
and output values are not always possible, unless the exact shape of the cost function is 
known. However, information about profits is more readily available e.g. through tax 
registers or dividend reports. Therefore, entrants usually take past or present profits as a 
proxy for future profits. Knowing this fact, established firms sometimes tend to 
manipulate their profits. They prefer to throw away profit and tolerate slack, in order to 
deter entry and protect their future long-run profits. 
An important and interesting fact about profits is that they are affected by various 
factors. This can be better explained by going back to the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm. The traditional SCP framework assumed a causal relationship 
running from structure through conduct to performance. Within this framework finding 
the effect of concentration, which is an important element of the market structure on 
profitability measured by price (marginal) cost margins, became a common practice. 
Cowling and Waterson (1976) set up an explicit theoretical model to explain the effect 
of structure on performance. They showed that i f the profit equation for firm i is 
where n denotes profit, p denotes market price, X denotes output, c denotes the 
variable cost of production, and F denotes the fixed cost of production and the market's 
inverse demand function is calculated according to the following equation; 
(1) 7ti=pXi-C\ ••(X,)-Fi 
(2) p=f(X)=f(Xi+X2+... + XN) 
then the first order profit maximization condition for firm i yields 
(3) = p + Xif'(X) 
dX 
-c'(Xi) = 0. 
dXl dX, 
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Cowling and Waterson assumed the existence of unequal sized firms, indicated by 
different marginal cost functions. Multiplying both sides of equation (3) by Xt and 
summing over N (number of firms), after some algebraic manipulation we obtain: 
pX x> p X ^ r> 
where 
^x? dx> 
1=1 
Assuming that firms have a constant marginal cost, equal to their average variable 
cost, the left side of the equation (4) wi l l be equal to the ratio of profits plus fixed costs 
(K+ F), divided by revenue (R). On the other hand, the first term on the right side of 
equation (4) wi l l be equal to the Herfindahl measure of concentration. Therefore, the 
relationship can be rewritten as 
(5) (n + F)/R=-H(l + n)/r] = -(v2+ 1)(1+JU)/NT] 
where H is the Herfindahl measure of concentration, TJ is the price elasticity of demand 
and v is the coefficient of variation in output. This relationship explicitly shows that 
concentration and the reaction of other firms, to the firm's output change, have a 
positive effect on the level of profits in an industry. In contrast, higher price elasticity of 
demand tends to lower profitability, at the industry level. Clarke and Davis (1982) 
further extended this model and found that both concentration and profits are co-
determined by N, TJ , a, vc. The equation that they obtained was as follows: 
n/R = (H(1- a ) / r j ) + ( a / N ) 
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where 
H = ± + { I - A T 1 ^ 1 2 ^ 
N [ ( l - a ) J N 
where v c is the coefficient of variation in marginal cost, due to efficiency differentials, 
and a is the degree of collusion. An important implication of their model was the 
positive effect of v c on concentration and, consequently, on profits. This means that the 
greater the efficiency differentials between firms, indicated by different efficient levels 
of output, the higher is the coefficient of variation and, consequently, concentration and 
the profit revenue ratio. Therefore, it is possible to decompose the effect of market 
power and efficiency on profits. I f there is no degree of collusion (a = 0), then the level 
of profits obtained is a result of efficiency. However, by putting 0 <a< 1 one wil l have 
the level of profits, as a result of the joined effect of efficiency and market power. The 
difference between the two values is the pure effect of market power. This is in 
accordance with Demestz's (1973) proposition. He suggested that when some firms are 
more efficient and able to produce larger output and the size of the market is not very 
large, then the existence of a handful of efficient firms could satisfy demand. Therefore, 
this results in higher than normal profits, larger market shares and, consequently, higher 
concentration. 
Overall, these models suggest that profitability in an industry is affected by various 
parameters and this could have an ambiguous effect of profitability on entry. The higher 
the level of profitability, the more attractive is the market for entrants. However, more 
profitable industries are also more concentrated ones, with fiercer retaliatory reaction 
from incumbents. Thus there is a conflicting effect of profitability on entry. This 
relationship was also investigated and confirmed by Kessides (1990). 
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The empirical work, regarding the effect of industry's profitability on entry, has mainly 
been based on the model developed by Orr (1974). This model takes the following 
general form; 
E=fi(if-F)+ n 
Therefore, based on a cross section of industries entry variations across them were 
explained by variations in the expected post-entry profits, minus the fixed costs of entry. 
However, the obtained coefficients were not usually large in value. Geroski (1995) 
explained that the profit variations across industries are mainly affected by the structural 
characteristics of the industries e.g. entry barriers. These structural characteristics are 
certain attributes of the markets and are stable over time. This means that most of the 
variations of profitability are across industries rather than over time variations. On the 
other hand, entry variations are more of a transitory nature and do not persist for a long 
time. The major source of entry variations is time variant factors such as demand 
shocks. They may affect certain industries for a short while, but they do not persist for a 
long time and as soon as the shock is over entry wil l go back to their normal level. 
Therefore, the correlation between entry and profitability, with different sources of 
variations, is not strong. 
The following studies found that profits had a positive impact on entry (Orr, 1974; 
Harris, 1976; Dunne and Roberts, 1991; Schwalbach, 1991). Dividing the entrants into 
different categories, Geroski (1991a) found that only domestic entry responded to 
expected post-entry profits, while Gorecki (1976) found no such impact. Khemani and 
Shapiro (1988) found that both domestic and foreign entrants responded positively to 
industry profits. However, within the category of domestic entrants, de-novo entrants 
and entry by incumbents into the same industry in which they were already operating, 
responded positively, and diversifying entrants were insensitive to the industry's profits. 
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Mata (1993) found that industry profit only had a positive impact on expansion entry4, 
while Khemani and Shapiro (1986) found a positive impact only for de-novo entry. 
Looking at entry via plant creation versus plant acquisition, Baldwin and Gorecki 
(1987) found that industry profitability had no impact on the entry of either group. 
Dividing entrants based on their entry size, Acs and Audretsch (1989b) found that only 
entrants with employment larger than 250 responded positively to industry profits, while 
Acs and Audretsch (1989a) did not find such an impact. 
Industries' growth rate of demand: Siegfried and Evans (1994) explained that 
entrants not only look at past profits, but also at the trend in profits or growth of industry 
demand, in order to infer future profits. I f they believe that demand is going to grow 
faster than that expected by incumbents, then they enter, despite the already existing low 
levels of profits. This is because in an industry with high growth of demand, increases in 
output due to entry are not going to depress prices as much as in case of stable demand. 
However, growth in demand might not be enough to attract new entrants, as they might 
expect a more aggressive response from incumbents, who expect future demand to 
lessen. In any case, i f an increase in demand is unanticipated and incumbents do not 
have enough time to adjust their output, then short-run profits can attract entry. 
Growth has been found to have a positive impact on entry in the following studies 
(Orr, 1974; Hause and Du Rietz, 1984; Highfield and Smiley, 1987; Chappell et al. 
1990; Schwalbach, 1991; Mayer and Chappell, 1992). Gorecki (1975) found that foreign 
entry responded positively to industry growth while despite expectations, Geroski 
(1991a) found that domestic entry responded negatively to growth (although the effect 
was only marginally significant). Khemani and Shapiro (1988) found that growth had a 
4 This is explained in the last footnote. 
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positive impact on the entry of all different kinds of domestic entrants, but not for 
foreign entrants. Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) found that industry growth only 
encourages entry by domestic de-novo entrants. Finally, Acs and Audretsch (1989a) and 
Acs and Audretsch (1989b) both found a positive impact of growth on entrants, with 
different sizes. 
Exit (the replacement effect): There are two possible reasons to believe that the entry 
of firms can be caused by the exit of others from the market: a replacement effect and a 
resource release. Studying inter-industry differences in entry and exit for US 
manufacturing industries, Austin and Rosenbaum (1990) and Evans and Siegfried 
(1992) tested for the replacement effect. The reason, proposed by Evans and Siegfried, 
for the replacement effect was that previous exit leaves room in the market, which 
attracts new entrants. The second explanation for the causal relationship running from 
exit to entry is resource release. Brown et al. (1990) made the analogy between firms in 
an industry and 'trees of the forest'. They stated that exit feeds back into entry by freeing 
resources for more efficient new entrants. Storey and Jones (1987) considered this 
possibility, with respect to physical assets, in the sense that more second hand 
equipment wil l be available and at a cheaper price, when exit is frequent. According to 
Love (1996), another possibility is that exit releases entrepreneurial resources, which 
encourages self-employment. 
Industry size: Geroski (1991a) proposed that the positive impact of industry size on 
entry could be due to two factors: 1) large industries have more potential niches for 
entrants to fit into; and 2) it is easier for firms to reach the Minimum Efficient Scale 
(MES) in larger industries, without provoking a reaction from other incumbents. 
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Industry size has been found to affect entry positively in various empirical studies e.g. 
Orr (1974), Khemani and Shapiro (1986), Chappell et al. (1990) and Mayer and 
Chappell (1992). Gorecki (1975) found that industry size affected the entry of both 
foreign and domestic firms positively. Khemani and Shapiro (1988), in their sample, 
also found that industry size had a positive impact on all the different types of entrants. 
Existence of fringe firms (small firms) in industry: Dunne et al. (1988) showed that 
high entry and exit are due mainly to large movements amongst the small firms in and 
out of an industry. This effect is tested in the work of Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) 
and Fotopoulos and Spence (1998). They both found that the existence of small firms in 
an industry had a positive impact on entry. Therefore, they concluded that existence of 
fringe firms indicates the potential for successful displacement of firms by entrants, 
which subsequently increases entry. 
2.2.2.2 Impediments to entry 
A common definition of entry barriers does not exist in the literature. Bain (1968) 
defines the condition of entry as "the extent to which, in the long-run, established firms 
can elevate prices above the minimal average costs of production and 
distribution.. .without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry" (p. 252). He then 
calls this level of price the 'limit price'. Therefore, the appropriate test according to his 
definition is whether prices are above minimal average costs, after entry has ceased. 
Stigler (1968) defines barriers to entry "as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of 
output), which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry, but is not borne 
by firms already in the industry" (p. 67). Similarly, Baumol et al. (1982) defines an entry 
barrier as "anything that requires an expenditure by a new entrant into an industry, but 
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imposes no equivalent cost upon an incumbent" (p. 282). In both the Stigler and Baumol 
et al.'s definitions of entry barrier, the notion of cost asymmetry post-entry between 
entrants and incumbents is emphasised. 
Weizsacker (1980) defines an entry barrier in a similar way as that proposed by Stigler, 
except that he argues that the cost differentials post-entry are a barrier only i f they result 
in a loss of social welfare. Ferguson (1974) defines a barrier to entry as "factors that 
make entry unprofitable, while permitting established firms to set prices above marginal 
cost, and to persistently earn monopoly profits" (p. 10). He, therefore, adds another 
aspect to Bain's definition: the exercise of market power. Gilbert (1989) defines a 
barrier to entry as a rent that is derived from incumbency. He states that entry barriers 
exist only i f the profit that an incumbent firm is earning is greater than what it would 
earn i f we were to transfer its capital into the next best alternative use. In his definition, 
therefore, the emphasis is on the advantage of incumbency, rather than the 
disadvantages related to entry. 
Geroski (1991c) argues that different views about the nature of barriers facing entrants 
depend on different ideas about the reason for the observed turnover occurring in an 
industry. I f entry is just a 'hit and run' process, in which entrants take their chance in the 
markets, then there is no stable long-run equilibrium market structure involving a fixed 
number of incumbents, protected from outsiders by certain characteristics of the 
environment. However, i f entry is considered as a process of trial and error in which 
entrants evaluate their abilities and cannot survive, unless they prove their superiority, 
then entry barriers are a set of skills that must be mastered or some scarce assets that 
must be obtained, in order to make entry profitable. In this case, entrants have to incur a 
certain amount of costs to reach a level of output that makes them profitable in the long-
run. Once that is reached, no further expenditure is necessary. 
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Despite the controversy over the definition of entry barrier, they have been divided into 
two major sub-categories in the literature: structural entry barriers and behavioural entry 
barriers. 
2.2.2.2.1 Structural entry barriers 
Bain (1956) introduced structural entry barriers as the deterministic components of the 
condition of entry and market structure. According to him, the absolute cost advantage 
of established firms, economies of scale and product differentiation are three major 
structural characteristics that determine the overall height of entry barriers and, 
subsequently, the condition of entry. Therefore, these three main sources together with 
the extent of multi-plant operation in an industry are explained, in the following 
paragraphs, as the major structural entry barriers. 
Absolute cost advantage of incumbent firms: Bain (1956) states that "an absolute 
cost advantage exists i f the prospective unit costs of production of potential entrant 
firms are generally, and more or less at any common scale of operations, higher than 
those of established firms" (p. 144). According to Bain, the principal potential sources 
of the absolute cost advantage, on the side of the incumbent firms, are as follows: 1) i f 
incumbent firms have superior production techniques and, therefore, are able to either 
deny their use to entrants or charge them for their use, which in both cases wil l raise the 
entrants' cost. The control of techniques is also possible through patents and secrecy; 2) 
i f incumbents can obtain factors of production, especially capital, on more favourable 
terms than entrants; and 3) strategic factor supplies, such as natural-resource raw 
materials, might be owned or controlled by incumbents, so that entrants are denied 
access, or have to use inferior materials or purchase these materials from incumbents at 
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a premium price. Bain states that these asymmetries result in barriers being higher for 
entrants. 
Weizsacker (1980) has a different view regarding the sources of absolute cost 
advantage. According to him, not all the sources introduced by Bain are entry barriers. 
Superior efficiency and lower cost supplies of natural resources are differential rents, 
which are compatible with perfect competition and optimal allocation of the resources; 
they are therefore not entry barriers. On the other hand, cost advantages that are 
associated with a monopoly position are a barrier, as in this case the supply of output is 
restricted compared to the social optimum. However, i f the restriction of supply and 
price above cost is an incentive for greater technical progress, then it is not a barrier. 
Capital cost advantage, according to Yip (1982), can be a barrier in itself. Bain (1956) 
mentioned that having peripheral access to factors of production, especially capital, 
could create post-entry cost asymmetries between entrants and incumbents. However, 
Baumol and Willig (1981) showed that capital expenditure could be a barrier, only i f the 
expenditure is sunk, as it cannot be recovered in the case of an unsuccessful entry. On 
the other hand, fixed costs of entry do not constitute a barrier. Eaton and Lipsey (1980) 
identified capital durability, as a source for sunk costs, while Mata (1991) introduced 
capital specificity as another source. According to Mata, specificity of capital is a source 
for sunk costs, as once it takes a specific form it is costly to be transferred to another 
use. On the other hand, durability of capital is a source for sunk costs as once resources 
are committed to durable capital in a particular form, they have to operate until the end 
of the capital's life, in order for their cost to be recovered. 
The following studies found that capital requirement had a negative impact on entry: 
Orr (1974), Khemani and Shapiro (1986), Chappell et al. (1990), Kessides (1990) and 
Dunne and Roberts (1991). Using data from 36 countries, Gschwandtner and Lambson 
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(2002) found that industries with a higher level of sunk costs had significantly lower 
number of entrants. However, Highfield and Smiley (1987) found no such significant 
impact. Gorecki (1975) found that only domestic entrants are deterred from entry into 
industries with high capital intensity. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) and Mata (1993) 
both observed that capital had a negative impact on entry by de-novo firms. Acs and 
Audretsch (1989b) found that capital requirements have a negative impact only on the 
entry of smaller size entrants, while Acs and Audretsch (1989a) found that capital 
expenditure had no significant impact on the entry of either group of entrants of 
different size. 
Economies of large scale: Bain (1956) introduced economies of scale as another 
major source for entry barriers. He argued that i f the Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) in 
a market is relatively large, compared to the total size of the market, then entrants may 
expect higher than average costs, i f they enter below MES, or lower prices post-entry, i f 
they enter at the MES level. In this case, established firms are able to raise their prices 
above the minimum average cost, without attracting entry. The degree that incumbents 
can elevate their prices above minimum average costs is the extent of the barrier to entry 
created through the existence of economies of scale. Ferguson (1974) explains that some 
inputs are available only in 'lumpy units'. Therefore, entrants have to incur these costs i f 
they want to produce at any level of output greater than zero. This might cause their 
average cost curve to lie to the right of the demand curve, at any level of output, making 
entry unprofitable, while incumbents are exercising market power or even enjoying 
super-normal profits. 
Whether or not economies of scale create a barrier to entry has caused controversy. 
Stigler (1968) defines an entry barrier as "a cost of production (at some or every rate of 
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output) that must be bome by a firm which seeks to enter an industry, but is not borne 
by firms already in the industry" (p. 67). According to him, barriers exist only i f there is 
a post-entry asymmetry in costs between entrants and incumbents. Once entrants have 
invested in an efficient plant there wi l l be no difference in costs post-entry, and without 
such a difference there is no real barrier to entry. 
In the model introduced by Dixit (1980), established firms choose a pre-entry level of 
capacity in order to deter entry, although they do not employ threats that they wil l not 
rationally execute. Schmalensee (1981) built on the model of Dixit and showed that i f a 
threat is credible and demand is concave, then the pre-entry present value of the excess 
monopoly profits that can be shielded from entry does not exceed even 1% (due to the 
existence of economies of scale). Therefore, he concluded that the degree of barriers 
created through existence of economies of scale is generally unimportant. However, 
Schmalensee explained that economies of scale could become a significant barrier if: 1) 
products are more differentiated, or markets are regional rather than national. In these 
cases, competition becomes more localized, therefore as the size of the markets reduces, 
this results in an increase in the MES relative to the total size of the market; and 2) 
economies of scale in advertising are important. Perrakis and Warskett (1986) extended 
the model of Schmalensee but assume that demand is uncertain, due to the normal 
business cycle. In their model, the upper boundary on profits, introduced in 
Schmalensee's model, no longer holds. The larger the MES relative to the total size of 
the market, the more the upper boundary is shifted upwards. Therefore, they support 
Schmalensee's results that economies of scale are a barrier, but not his conclusion that 
economies of scale produce unimportant barriers. 
Various empirical studies have found economies of scale to be an important barrier to 
entry (Harris, 1976; Hause and Du Rietz, 1984; Khemani and Shapiro, 1986; Mayer and 
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Chappell, 1992). However, Highfield and Smiley (1987) did not find any significant 
impact of scale economies on entry. Similarly, looking at entry by plant creation versus 
plant acquisition, Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) did not find any significant impact of 
economies of scale on both of these categories. Mata (1993) found that the presence of 
economies of scale in an industry affected de-novo, extension and expansion entry 
negatively. However, the impact on purely diversifying entry was positive. Khemani and 
Shapiro (1988) found that the only category of entrants that responded negatively to 
economies of scale was the de-novo entrants (although reasons for this were not 
discussed by the authors). 
Product differentiation advantage: The third major source of structural entry 
barriers, according to Bain (1956), is a product differentiation advantage on the side of 
incumbents. He explains that "buyers may have a preference, transitory or permanent, 
for some or all established products, as compared to new-entrant products, and this may 
in essence create some barrier to entry" (p. 114). He further explains that as a result of 
product differentiation sellers have some authority over their prices. Therefore, they can 
raise their price without losing all the customers, or decrease their price without 
attracting all the buyers away from substitute products. Consumer's preferences over the 
established products might place new entrants at a disadvantage when compared with 
the established firms. In this case, new entrants might have to tolerate lower prices or 
higher costs, compared to other established brands, until their brand or product gains 
consumers' acceptance. 
At this point, one might ask the question why entrants cannot produce the same 
product as incumbents. According to Church and Ware (2000), there are two reasons 
that precludes entrants from doing so: 1) legal impediments and asymmetries of 
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information regarding product quality or characteristics; and 2) fixed costs of entry and 
price competition post-entry. Church and Ware explain that the lack of information 
about quality, character and the attributes of the products, gives an important weight to 
any mechanism that allow entrants to obtain information. Legal impediments (like 
trademarks) provide consumers with such information. In addition, trademarks stop 
others from copying a firm's product; make it possible for consumers to differentiate 
between different products; and create incentives for firms to differentiate and maintain 
reputation and create brand loyalty. At the same time, the existence of product 
differentiation can create a barrier to entry, by reducing the size of the market and 
therefore enhancing the effect of economies of scale. In this case, the existence of 
products that appeal to consumers, due to their characteristics, or products that have 
high cross-elasticity of demand with the entrant's product, can create an entry barrier. In 
the first case, it is due to the limited market niches available, which makes entry 
unprofitable, and in the second case it is due to the presence of post-entry price 
competition. 
With regard to the empirical literature that looks at the effect of product differentiation 
on entry, advertising has been used mainly as a proxy for the degree of product 
differentiation. Comanor and Wilson (1967) believe that advertising is both a source and 
a symptom of product differentiation. However, it has been argued that this is a poor 
proxy and it can have a dubious effect on entry. Nelson (1970) shows that creating 
product differentiation and decreasing cross elasticity of demand is one possible effect 
of advertising. However, advertising can be informative and acquaint consumers about 
alternative products in the market and so can be an inducement to entry. The empirical 
work in this area wil l be explained in Section 2.2.2.3, which looks at the effect of 
advertising on entry. 
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Multi-plant operation: According to Duetsch (1984), the existence of multi-plant 
firms affects entry in two possible ways: 1) i f the average cost of a multi-plant firm is 
lower than that of a single-plant firm, then entrants would suffer a cost disadvantage i f 
they are to produce only one product line, or serve a single region. Looking at the effect 
of absolute cost advantage on entry, it was explained that raising the start-up capital in 
order to enter at the MES level is a barrier to entry. However, capital costs can be a 
more serious barrier, i f it has to be raised in order to set up a multi-plant firm, as 
entering as a single-plant firm could place entrants in a disadvantaged position, 
compared to the multi-plant incumbents; and 2) even i f multi-plant firms do not possess 
any potential cost advantage, potential entrants might fear a price reduction by multi-
plant firms, in order to deter their entry into the market. Therefore, entry into a segment 
of the market or into a product line is considered riskier for entrants, as multi-plant 
firms might reduce their prices, be involved in more intense product promotion, or 
indulge in any other activity, in order to deter entry. The negative impact of multi-plant 
operations on entry has been found in Duetsch (1984) and Mayer and Chappell (1992). 
However, Khemani and Shapiro (1988) found that only de-novo entry is negatively 
affected by the existence of multi-plant operations in industries. 
2.2.2.2.2 Behavioural (or Strategic) entry barriers 
Salop (1979) classified entry barriers into two sub-groups: innocent entry barriers, 
which are a result of innocent profit maximisation by incumbents, and strategic entry 
barriers, which are specifically erected to reduce entry. Church and Ware (2000) explain 
that the profitability of entry depends on the nature of competition post-entry and, 
therefore, on the behaviour of the incumbents. As a result, the pre-entry behaviour of 
incumbents can increase the height of entry barriers or reduce the profitability of entry. 
26 
Geroski (1995) argued that the immediate response of incumbents to entry is selective 
and they do not deter all kinds of entry. The reason is that entry deterring activities are 
usually costly and survival is difficult for the majority of entrants who exit only a short 
time after entry. Therefore, incumbents invest on entry deterring activities only i f the 
threat from the entrants is serious. The two major behavioural barriers used by the 
incumbents are binding commitments and limit pricing, which wil l be explained next in 
this section. 
Binding commitments: Bain introduced the notion of limit-price or, equivalently, 
limit-output, which was defined as the maximum level of price required to make entry 
unprofitable. His limit-price model was based on the assumption that entrants believe 
that incumbents will sustain their output level, even after entry occurs. Similarly, within 
a game theoretic framework, Sylos-Labini (1962) also postulated that entrants take the 
pre-entry level of output as a proxy for the post-entry level, and believe that incumbents 
wil l not increase their output post-entry. At the same time, established firms maintain 
this level of output, even after entry takes place. Both Bain and Sylos-Labini postulated 
that entrants believe that the established firms wil l maintain their level of output. 
However, as wi l l be explained shortly, this assumption is not valid, unless one brings 
the notion of binding commitments into it. Binding commitments by the established 
firms generally guarantee negative post-entry profit for the entrant. 
The notion of threat and commitment was introduced by Schelling (1960): 
"...commitment is a strategic move, a move that induces the other player to choose in 
one's favour. It constrains the other player's choice, by affecting his expectations" (p. 
122). He further explained that "like the ordinary commitment, the threat is a surrender 
of choice...the threat and the commitment are both motivated by the possibility that a 
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rational second player can be constrained, by his knowledge that the first player has 
altered his own incentive structure. Like an ordinary commitment, a threat can constrain 
the other player only insofar as it carries to the other player at least some appearance of 
obligation" (p. 123). Salop (1979) explained that established firms might possess a pre-
entry asymmetry advantage, as they have committed resources before entrants. This 
gives them a first mover advantage which creates a fundamental base for them to 
strategically deter entry. As a result, established firms are able to choose a level of 
capacity or commitment before entry takes place. One of the predominant binding 
commitment strategies that is used is the creation of excess capacity. 
Needham (1969) showed that the assumption that Sylos-Labini (1962) made might not 
hold and the monopolist, post-entry, might increase its level of output. In this case the 
monopolist can use excess capacity in order to intimidate entrants and make them 
believe that the output level is going to be increased post-entry. At the same time, i f 
entrants believe that the post-entry output level of the monopolist is equal to its pre-
entry capacity then entry can be deterred. Needham proposed a new limit price level as 
the highest pre-entry price that makes entry unprofitable, after taking account of both the 
monopolist and the entrant's reaction. However, in this case entry is deterred only i f 
entrants believe that the monopolist is going to increase its output. 
Spence (1977) applied the concept of advanced commitment and argued that investing 
in excess capacity is a barrier to entry, partly because it is irreversible and presents a 
pre-emptive commitment to the industry. In this case, entry is deterred only i f existing 
firms have enough capacity to make entry unprofitable. Dixit (1980) in his model 
showed that the irrecoverable choice of investment (e.g. building excess capacity), by a 
monopolist can change its post-entry marginal cost and therefore the post-entry 
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equilibrium. In this case, the monopolist can use this privilege to exercise limited 
leadership. 
Von Ungern-Sternberg (1988) explored an alternative reason for holding excess 
capacity by a dominant firm, to maintain its economic relation with other upstream (or 
downstream) companies. He explained that companies usually have to invest a certain 
amount of specific sunk cost into their relationship with the dominant firm. However, 
before making any commitments, they need some kind of guarantee from the dominant 
firm to make sure that it is not going to act opportunistically, when these costs are 
incurred. By acting opportunistically, Von Ungern-Sternberg meant that the established 
firms would not suddenly decrease their demands (or their supplies) at given prices. In 
this case, investment in creating excess capacity can be an effective means of giving the 
upstream (or downstream) firms the assurance they require. In terms of empirical work, 
Hilke (1984) and Mathis and Koscianski (1996) found a negative impact of excess 
capacity on entry. 
Limit pricing: Gaskins (1971) explained that limit pricing is exercised when the 
incumbents keep prices at such a low level that the entrants' profitability, post-entry, 
falls below their opportunity costs. However, Geroski et al. (1990) explained that limit 
pricing can be exercised only when entrants believe that the incumbents are not going to 
maximise their short-run profit. In terms of the empirical work, both Hannan (1979) and 
Masson and Shannan (1986) found that in their sample limit pricing was used in order to 
deter entry. However, Smiley (1988) found no such evidence. 
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2.2.2.3 Inducements or impediments to entry 
Advertising intensity: Generally there is a lack of consensus over the anti-competitive 
effects of advertising, in both the empirical and the theoretical literature. The issue is 
whether there is a mechanism in which firms can exercise market power through 
advertising. Bain (1956) introduced advertising expenditure as a source for product 
differentiation. He stated that "product differentiation is by differences in the design or 
physical quality of competing products, by efforts of the sellers to distinguish their 
products through packaging, branding, and the offering of auxiliary services to buyers, 
and by advertising and sales promotional efforts" (p. 114). Behind Bain's theory there 
was an asymmetry regarding the response of consumers to advertising efforts by 
established firms and new entrants that was not explained. Schmalensee (1974) 
suggested that the main source of asymmetry is 'product appeal and promotional skills' 
of the incumbents. I f new entrants are able to produce equally effective advertising and 
equally desirable products, then there is no difference between the established firms and 
entrants, in the marginal effect of their advertising. According to Schmalensee, the main 
reason for the anti-competitive effects of advertising is demand asymmetries. However, 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) referred to the effect of experience of consumers with the 
established product and the rewards from past advertising, as other reasons for the 
asymmetric effects of advertising for established firms and new entrants. They explained 
that the degree of experience that consumers have with a specific product causes 
differential responses to advertising by established firms and new entrants. 
On the other hand, Nelson (1970) looked at the effect of advertising on the cross 
elasticity of demand. He explained that adverting is a way of conveying information to 
the consumers and therefore increasing their knowledge about the existence of 
alternative products. This means that advertising can increase the cross elasticity of 
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demand. Schmalensee (1976) in his model found that advertising neither raises entry 
barriers nor facilitates collusion. 
The empirical work regarding the effect of advertising on entry is also controversial. 
Hirschey (1981) and Duetsch (1984) found no significant impact of advertising on entry. 
On the other hand, Orr (1974), Duetsch (1975), Khemani and Shapiro (1986), Chappell 
et al. (1990) and Rosenbaum (1993) found that advertising had a negative impact on 
entry. In terms of the effect of advertising on different groups of entrants, Gorecki 
(1975) found a negative impact of advertising only on entry by domestic firms; Khemani 
and Shapiro (1988) found that advertising had a negative impact on entry by de-novo 
firms and already existing firms entering the same industry. However, Mata (1993) 
found a positive impact of advertising on expansion entry and a negative impact on 
purely diversifying entry. 
R&D intensity: The impact of research and development (R&D) activities on entry 
has also been a subject of controversy, both in theoretical and empirical work. Mueller 
and Tilton (1969) explained that R&D could constitute a barrier to entry. According to 
them, the R&D barrier has two chief components: the first component is "the extent of 
economies of scale in the R&D process" and the second component is "the 
accumulation of patents and know-how on the part of incumbent firms" (p. 578). At the 
same time, Acs and Audretsch (1989b) argued that small firms in highly R&D intensive 
industries are able to compensate for their size disadvantage, by the strategy of product 
innovation and by carving out a niche for themselves. Therefore, R&D intensive 
industries could facilitate the entry of small firms. 
Among those who have produced empirical studies on the R&D effect on entry are: 
Orr (1974), who found that it had a negative impact on entry; Baldwin and Gorecki 
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(1987), who also found that R&D had a negative impact, but only on entry through plant 
creation; Gorecki (1975), who found that only domestic entrants were negatively 
affected by R&D intensity; and Mata (1993), who found that R&D had a negative 
impact on entry of both de-novo and diversifying entrants. On the other hand, Highfield 
and Smiley (1987) found R&D had a positive impact on entry; while Acs and Audretsch 
(1989a) found that high R&D intensity, in the industries in their sample, encourages 
both entry by small and large firms. On the contrary, Shapiro and Khemani (1987) did 
not find any significant impact of R&D on entry. Clearly the evidence is very mixed. 
Concentration: Seller concentration has been found to have two contrary effects on 
entry. Yip (1982) argued that high seller concentration could thwart entry, as the 
possibility for oligopolistic coordination is higher in highly concentrated industries. On 
the other hand, it might form an inducement i f entrants survive the reaction barrier 
posed by incumbents and subsequently enjoy a less competitive and more protected 
environment. He concluded that whether concentration acts as a barrier or as an 
inducement to entry depends on the entrants' resources, compared to those of 
incumbents. For weak entrants, the reaction effect can outweigh the inducement effect, 
while for the stronger entrants it may have the opposite effect. 
Orr (1974), Chappell et al. (1990) and Mayer and Chappell (1992) found a negative 
impact on entry by seller concentration. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) also found a 
negative impact of concentration, but only on de-novo entry. On the other hand, Duetsch 
(1975) and Harris (1976) found that concentration had a positive impact on entry. 
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2.2.2.4 The impact of the industry life cycle 
Gort and Klepper (1982) explored how markets evolve through the various stages of 
their life cycle. According to them, when a product is first introduced there is a large 
amount of external information available, which motivates new firms to enter the 
market and exploit it. As the number of entrants increases, prices are reduced and 
subsequently output increases. At the same time the incumbents' knowledge tends to 
replace external knowledge. This pushes the most inefficient firms out of the industry, 
leaving net entry to reduce over time. Agarwal (1998) tested this theory and found that 
this pattern existed across a wide range of products. He found that as a result of this 
evolutionary pattern, the attributes of the markets, in terms of availability of 
information, innovative activity and structural characteristics tend to change, as they go 
through various stages. 
Hoff (1997) focused on the role of imperfect information, as a barrier to entry into 
infant industries. He explained that early entrants take more risk, in the sense that they 
are accessing a market that no other firm has experienced before. As markets evolve, 
due to the success or failure of the early entrants, more realistic information becomes 
available to the new entrants. Therefore, according to Hoff, the basic source of 
asymmetry is a learning spill over which substantially varies for early and late entrants. 
Horvath et al. (2001) explained that in the early stage of the industry's life cycle entry is 
delayed, as potential entrants are accumulating information. Subsequently, due to 
observing the performance of incumbents, new entrants with increased knowledge are 
encouraged to participate in the market. 
Besides the availability of information, the nature of innovative activities also tends to 
vary in the various phases of the industry's life cycle. With special reference to the 
technologically progressive industries Klepper (1996) showed how the nature of 
33 
innovative activities varies as an industry matures. He explained that upon the birth of a 
new industry a large amount of entry takes place, and the rate of product innovation is 
high and firms' shares in the market vary rapidly. As the market matures, the rate of 
entry decreases, due to the emergence of a dominant design, and innovative activity 
takes on the form of improvement through process innovation. As a result, the number 
of firms decreases and the rate and diversity of product innovation ultimately declines. 
Following the same line of argument, Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) explain that the 
main reason behind the non-monotonic trend in the number of firms (first increasing and 
then decreasing) is the changes in the nature of innovative activities across the two 
stages. In the first stage, innovation fuels entry, while in the second stage entrants fail to 
innovate and therefore exit. 
McGahan and Silverman (2001) showed that in the mature phase of the industry's life 
cycle, there was no evidence that there is a shift from product to process innovation. 
However, they showed that in the mature phase industry's leaders are more engaged in 
diversifying and reinvesting in innovations. Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) showed that 
the shift in innovative activities is accompanied by an increasing level of concentration. 
They explained that along side the decrease in population size market size also 
increases, which shows a positive association between concentration and market size. 
In general, the models described above show that from the formative to the mature 
stage of the industry's life cycle substantial changes occurs to the structural 
characteristics of markets. Agarwal and Gort (1996) explained that the observed 
structural changes in industries, as they go through the various stages of their life cycle, 
effect entry of new firms in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it changes the value of 
the explanatory variables, such as the attributes of the industry, while at the same time it 
changes the value of the parameters that relate entry to the explanatory variables. In 
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addition, Agarwal and Gort showed that the presumed positive correlation between 
entry and exit depends on the stage of their life cycle. By dividing the life cycle into five 
different stages they found that the positive association between entry and exit exists 
only in the second stage of the life cycle. Based on these differences, one might also 
expect significant differences in the type of entrants and their motives across the 
different stages of the industry life cycle. 
2.2.3 Geographical specific factors 
Geographical specific factors relate directly to the characteristics of the area in which 
the new firm is going to be established. The combination of a wide range of factors 
could make an area either an attractive location for investment or make it unprofitable. 
Keeble et al. (1993) provided a review of the literature in relation to the factors that 
cause differences in entry rates, across different geographical areas. In this section, a 
review of these factors wil l be provided. 
High demand in the local market: As firms usually tend to serve local markets their 
profitability can be directly related to local demand. In this case, a measure of potential 
demand, or the wealth of residents, can be a good indicator of a firms' future demand 
(Storey, 1982). Fritsch (1992) and Armington and Acs (2002) both found that high 
demand in the local market had a positive impact on the rate of formation of new firms. 
However, Berglund and Brannas (2001) found the effect of average income (a proxy for 
local demand) on entry of new manufacturing plants into the Swedish municipalities to 
be insignificant. In terms of the impact of demand in local market on foreign entry, 
Friedman et al. (1992) and Billington (1999) both found that the size of the host market 
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had a positive impact on foreign direct investment decisions. However, Scaperlanda and 
Mauer's (1969) found no such significant impact. 
Wealth of the individuals in the area: Start-up capital is the primary requirement to 
start a new business. Entrepreneurs can either provide the required capital themselves or 
they can borrow it. In any case, the higher the wealth of the residents in the area, the 
easier it is to provide start-up capital (Reynolds et al., 1994). Individual wealth in the 
local area is usually measured by the extent of house ownership. However, the effect of 
house ownership on firm formation can operate through two channels: a demand and a 
supply channel. The extent of home ownership can proxy future demand in the local 
market and/or it can be indicative of the extent of capital availability in the area. In the 
latter case, individuals might use their house ownership as collateral, in order to finance 
a new business and borrow the start-up capital (Storey, 1982 and Cross, 1981). 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) found that personal wealth at the local level had a 
positive impact on new firm formation. 
Existence of external economies of scale in the area: Based on the theory introduced 
by Krugman (1991a, 1991b), there can be a positive association between the existence 
of external economies of scale within a geographical boundary and the likelihood of 
new firm formation. In his theory, Krugman incorporated external economies of scale as 
an important factor that affected regional growth disparities. As one of the important 
sources for the regional growth disparities is the formation of new businesses, one can 
conclude that there is a positive association between the existence of external economies 
of scale and new firm formation. 
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According to Armstrong and Taylor (2000), external economies of scale arise from the 
geographical proximity of economic activities. They further explained that two sources 
contribute to the existence of external economies of scale: localised economies and 
agglomeration (urbanization) economies. The spatial concentration of related economic 
activities provides firms with the opportunity to take advantage of localised economies. 
An extreme scenario is when plants all belong to the same industry, which results in a 
localised industry. Firms find it profitable to build up their production facilities within a 
short distance of both suppliers and consumers as it facilitates any input-output 
exchanges. On the other hand, specialisation of an area happens when it is dominated by 
a particular industry or industries. However, according to Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) 
it is important to note that although a specialised area could result in a localised 
industry, the opposite does not necessarily have to be true. A localised industry could 
exist within a well-diversified area. 
Krugman (1991b) showed that manufacturing firms intend to take advantage of 
internal economies of scale, and so minimise their transportation costs. At the same 
time, they try to concentrate in those areas that have the larger demand. He also 
elaborated on Marshall's view on why firms localise: 1) localisation results in a highly 
specialised pooled labour market. This increases specialisation in the area, which results 
in higher productivity at the level of individual firms; 2) localization improves the 
production of the non-tradable specialised inputs. The reason is that when the 
production of an intermediate input is highly localised, it allows a larger number of 
small firms to produce it, rather than a few large firms. This results, subsequently, in the 
production of a more diversified intermediate input, at a lower cost; and 3) localization 
reduces information asymmetries, through the increase in technological spill-overs, as a 
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result of knowledge spilling over from high technology firms, and movements of highly 
skilled workers between companies. 
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Anselin et al. (1997) studied the relationship 
between knowledge spill over and innovative activity. Audretsch and Feldman found 
that, after controlling for the concentration of production, innovation was more 
concentrated in those regions with a higher level of knowledge spill over (through 
industry R&D), university research and skilled labour movements. Anselin et al. also 
found that across the US differences in university research had a positive impact on the 
innovative capacity of different States. 
In addition to the three reasons proposed by Krugman, Armstrong and Taylor (2000) 
referred to another reason for localization: a high level of job security for both 
employers and workers in the region (although this might be seen as a natural outcome 
of the pooled labour market). In case of losing their job, highly specialised workers 
could easily be employed in other firms and their knowledge is easily transferred to 
other companies. At the same time, employers face a larger population of skilled 
workers in the supply market from which to choose labour. 
Considering all the advantages discussed above, in relation to the localization of the 
industries or specialisation of the areas, one would expect a higher rate of entry in areas 
with a large number of plants belonging to the same industry. Garofoli (1994) and 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) both found that area specialization had a positive impact 
on new firm formation. However, with similarly convincing reasons, Gudgin (1978) 
argues that diversification in the area has a positive impact on the rate of firm formation. 
He explains that a high level of diversification in an area shows the variety of skills 
needed. This attracts a labour force having a wide range of knowledge and abilities and 
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gives rise to new firm formation. At the same time, it makes sure that any increase in 
demand wil l be exploited locally. 
The second source of external economies of scale is agglomeration economies. 
Henderson (1986) explained that an agglomeration (or density) effect is a result of the 
geographical concentration of a large number of economic activities. Therefore, it 
differs from localised economies in that it measures the degree of industrial 
concentration in an area across industries, rather than within industries. Armstrong and 
Taylor (2000) explain that agglomeration economies could result in a high concentration 
of facilities serving various industries. These facilities include: transport and commuting 
facilities; a large pool of labour with diversified skills; the provision of government 
services; legal and commercial services; market oriented activities; cultural and 
recreational activities and the clustering of organizations that invest highly in process 
and product innovation. Therefore, one would expect such regions to be attractive for 
those in pursuit of a good environment to start a new venture. Armington and Acs 
(2002) measured agglomeration economies by industrial density and found that it had a 
positive impact on entry. On the contrary, Guimaraes et al. (1998) found in their sample 
that new firm formation was affected negatively by the population density of an area (a 
proxy for the degree of agglomeration economies). The reason suggested was that a high 
density in an area indicates a high level of congestion, which can offset the positive 
effects of agglomeration economies on new firm formation. Dumais et al. (1997) also 
found that new firms preferred less concentrated regions. In terms of the impact of 
density on foreign entry, Billington (1999) found that it had a negative impact on foreign 
direct investments in the UK. 
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Size structure of the areas factories: Small firms have been found to be a better 
incubator for potential new firms than large firms (Cross, 1981). The major reason for 
this effect is that working for a small firm provides the opportunity for employees to 
familiarise themselves with a wide range of operational processes (Storey, 1982). As a 
result, they can obtain a wide range of task experience and have closer contact with the 
managers or the directors of the company, which also increases their confidence (Lloyd 
and Mason, 1984; Mason, 1991). Another reason, according to Storey (1982), is that job 
security is lower in small firms and therefore the fear of redundancy could trigger 
employees to set up their own businesses. Johnson and Cathcard (1979) referred to the 
pre-selection of companies by potential founders and discovered that they tended to 
choose smaller plants, which would give them a wide spectrum of experiences required 
for being an entrepreneur. However, less entrepreneurially minded workers choose 
larger companies, due to their higher job security. Various studies have found that 
regions with a large number of small plants have a higher rate of new firm formation 
than regions dominated by large plants (Fritsch, 1992; Garofoli, 1994; Fotopoulos and 
Spence, 1999). 
Occupational structure of the residents in an area: The likelihood of starting a new 
business is affected by an individual's skill level and experience (O'Farrel, 1986). The 
lack of availability of human capital could be an entry barrier, which must be overcome 
in order to start any business. The more skilled the entrepreneur, the easier this barrier 
can be breached (Fritsch, 1992). The level of skilled workers in an area is both an 
attraction and a generating force for new firms (Lloyd and Mason, 1984). However, 
Storey (1982) argues that this factor, or the intellect of individuals, is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for stimulating firm generation. He explains that innovators 
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usually work independently, while being a manager requires certain personal skills that 
they might not possess. The following studies have found that areas with high levels of 
skilled workers tend to have higher levels of firm formation: Fritsch (1992) and Keeble 
and Walker (1994). 
Unemployment: An individual's decision to become an entrepreneur, or to stay in 
employment, depends on the earnings associated with each choice. I f the expected 
earnings from being self-employed exceed that of being in employment (by a minimum 
threshold) then individuals go into self-employment (Creedy and Johnson, 1983). There 
are two conflicting hypothesis regarding the effect that unemployment has on new firm 
formation. Based on the recession (or push) effect, the shortage of alternative jobs in 
times of recession pushes individuals into starting their own businesses (Reynolds et al. 
1994). On the contrary, high unemployment in an area can be indicative of the lack of 
buoyancy of demand and, therefore, discourages individuals from starting their own 
business (Storey, 1982). 
In empirical work, unemployment has also been found to have a dubious effect on new 
firm formation (Fritsch, 1992; Garofolli, 1994; Guesnier, 1994; Reynolds et al., 1994; 
Armington and Acs, 2002). In terms of the impact of unemployment on foreign entry, 
Friedman et al. (1992) and Billington (1999) both found that an area's unemployment 
had a positive impact on FDI. Based on a wide review of the empirical evidence, Storey 
(1991) found that, ceteris paribus, in time series analysis unemployment has usually had 
a positive impact on new firm formation, while in the cross section analysis it has had a 
negative impact. Reconciliation of these two conflicting effects has not been successful. 
Armington and Acs (2002) explain that industries with a low level of capital required 
for start-up face a high rate of firm formation when there is higher unemployment, while 
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those industries that require a significant amount of start-up capital face the opposite. 
This shows that when studying the effect of unemployment on new firm formation, one 
has to take account of the structural differences across industries; otherwise regression 
results wi l l potentially be biased. 
The North-South division: A greater decline in manufacturing employment in the 
northern regions of the UK during the early 1980's was an important factor that 
contributed to the so-called 'North-South' divide. This caused inequality in industrial 
development and social well-being between the regions of the North and the South 
(Townsend, 1983). In the current study, the North includes the regions of the North, the 
North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, the West Midlands, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland; while the South includes the regions of the South East, the South 
West, East Anglia and the East Midlands. Various studies have found major differences 
between the regions of the North and South in a wide range of aspects, including 
regional growth, unemployment, rates of return on capital and new firm formation 
(Keeble and Walker, 1994; Martin, 1997; Harris and Andrew, 2000). These differences 
are a result of the socio-economic characteristics of the regions, which according to 
Gripaios et al. (2000) are based on industrial structure, population structure and the 
occupational structure of these regions. With a high proportion of employment being 
concentrated in traditional industries in the North, and in finance, the service sector and 
high technology industries in the South (especially the regions of South East and East 
Anglia), it is useful to make a distinction between them (as is done here in this study). 
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2.3 Exit 
2.3.1 Plant specific factors 
Country of ownership: Ownership status is expected to affect a plant's risk of 
closure. Caves (1996) explained that one of the reasons that firms expand across their 
national borders is to spread their business risk. The more they spread across their 
national borders and across product markets, the more successful they may be in 
spreading such risk. This also brings diversification gains for firms who are usually risk 
averse. Caves further explained that foreign investment could be particularly risky 
because: 1) national policies usually try to maximise national welfare and aim to remove 
monopoly profits from multi-national enterprises' (MNE) pockets and shift it towards 
domestic producers. Therefore, foreign investors can face a lack of support from the 
local government, which makes their investment riskier than that of domestic investors; 
and 2) the cost of obtaining information is always higher for foreign investors than for 
domestic investors. Even after investment in gathering information, MNEs have less 
knowledge than domestic producers regarding market conditions, consumers' taste and a 
variety of other factors. Based on this argument, one could expect that plants belonging 
to foreign enterprises are more prone to closure. Thus foreign enterprises when faced 
with any loss often prefer to close their overseas plants first. 
In terms of empirical work regarding this effect, McCloughan and Stone (1998) found 
no significant impact of foreign ownership on the survival of plants in the northern 
regions of England. However, Colombo and Delmastro (2000) found that in the Italian 
metalworking industry foreign ownership had a significant positive impact on closure 
decisions. 
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Change in ownership: In order to explain the effects that a change of ownership has 
on the survival of plants, it is necessary to understand the possible reasons behind any 
acquisition decision. Within the neoclassical tradition, Mead (1968) proposed that the 
main reason behind any takeover is to increase the profitability of companies when they 
are not making sufficient profits. Therefore, i f managers are not able to produce a 
product for which there is sufficient demand, or are not able to reduce their costs of 
production, or are sacrificing profits to finance their growth, then replacement of the old 
management by one which is more efficient and profit-minded could increase the value 
of the company's shares. In the same vein, Manne (1965) maintained that there is a 
positive association between managerial efficiency and prices of the company's shares. 
When a company is poorly managed and is not making enough returns for the 
shareholders, then the poor management has to be replaced. 
The above theories basically assume that takeovers happen so that an inefficient plant 
can be turned around and achieve a better performance. This should therefore increase 
the life duration of an acquired plant. However, the empirical work tends to prove the 
opposite. Studying takeover decisions in the US in the 1960s and the 1970s Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987) and Matsusaka (1993) found that the target firms were extraordinary 
profitable, prior to being acquired, with no gain in profitability post-acquisition. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) also found that acquired small size plants, in their 
sample of the US plants over the 1957-77 period, were significantly more profitable pre-
acquisition. Using the US Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995) found that, over the 1977-87 period, the target plants not only did not 
exhibit poor performance but also had a higher than average productivity. The majority 
of the acquired plants in their sample experienced improvements in productivity post-
acquisition and for those that did not their productivity fell towards the industry's 
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average, while still remaining above it. Therefore, they proposed that acquisitions are 
geared towards gaining operating efficiency, rather than improving management. 
Treating change in ownership as an exogenous variable, McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) 
found that plants that changed ownership had a higher probability of survival post-
acquisition, relative to those that did not change ownership. However, once change in 
ownership was treated as an endogenous variable and the size and productivity of plant 
were taken into account (as a composite variable with change in ownership dummy), it 
had a positive impact on the risk of closure. This meant that change of ownership had a 
negative impact on the risk of closure of the larger and the more productive plants. 
The above discussion on the impact of change of ownership ignores acquisitions by 
foreign companies. Foreign acquisition is considered a way of acquiring capacity in a 
host country. However, foreign firms have the choice of entering the host country either 
by setting up a new plant (greenfield entry) or by acquiring the already existing plants 
(brownfield entry). Caves (1996) explained that foreign entry, through acquisition, 
might possess some advantages over greenfield investment. The main reason is that by 
entry through acquisition, a foreign enterprise can rely on the pre-existing relationships 
with suppliers and consumers and also depend on the expertise of the existing 
personnel, who are familiar with local market conditions. Therefore, entry through 
acquisition is a low risk strategy for quick entry, in which the MNEs can benefit from 
the local ongoing management. However, greenfield entrants face more risk and are a 
slower mode of entry. Caves {op. cit.) pointed out one reason for choosing greenfield 
entry as the mode of entry, namely familiarity with the product line. Hennart and Park 
(1993) studied the mode of entry of Japanese firms when entering the US markets. They 
found that Japanese investors preferred greenfield entry, when they wanted to produce a 
product that they were already producing in their home market. In this case, they tended 
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to choose more R&D intensive industries as they could transfer their technological 
advantages more efficiently. On the other hand, they entered through acquisition i f the 
target industry was characterised either by high growth, or high concentration and low 
growth. The reason was that in the case of high growth it is a quicker way to enter and 
exploit profitable opportunities, while in the second case it would not add to the 
industry's capacity and therefore would not provoke a reaction from incumbents. 
Buckley and Casson (1998) compared various strategies for entering a foreign market 
and the situations in which a specific mode of entry becomes more favourable. They 
found that greenfield entry was more likely when entrants owned a specific type of 
technology but was less likely when the cost of buildings and also the cost of learning 
about the foreign market through experience was high. 
McCloughan and Stone (1998) produced five reasons why entry through acquisition 
could have less chance of success, compared to greenfield entry: 1) acquisition is 
usually a complicated process, which imposes a variety of transactional and post-
acquisition problems on the parent company. Therefore, there is always concern over the 
compatibility between the parent firm and the acquired plant (Besanko et al. 1996); 2) 
acquisitions are usually a means of reducing capacity in an industry; 3) managerial links 
between the parent company and the oversees subsidiaries tend to be stronger, when the 
mode of entry is greenfield (Li, 1995); 4) unlike the acquired plant, new plants are more 
likely to be equipped with the latest technologies; and 5) new plants can benefit from 
more financial aid from the host government in order to cover their fixed costs of 
construction, training and infrastructure modifications. 
In terms of empirical work regarding these effects, McCloughan and Stone (1998) 
found that greenfield entrants faced significantly longer life duration than brownfield 
entrants. However, when they took account of the age of the acquired plants, the older 
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plants that were taken over by foreign firms had longer life duration than the younger 
plants. Li (1995) looked at the survival of foreign plants in the US computer and 
pharmaceutical industry, during the 1974-89 period, and found that acquired entrants 
had a significantly higher probability of exit. Harris and Robinson (2002) looked at the 
performance of UK plants that were acquired by a foreign enterprise over the 1987-92 
period. They found that foreign enterprises acquired the most productive plants, or in 
another words they 'cherry-picked' plants. They also found that plants that were 
acquired in this period were almost twice as productive as those plants that were not 
acquired. However, they found that the productivity of the acquired plants declined post-
acquisition. The reason for this effect was the possible difficulties associated with the 
assimilation of the acquired plant into the new organization, which can reduce a plant's 
chances of survival. 
Multi-unit versus single-unit plants: Models have been constructed that try to 
explain who exit first in a declining industry: multi-plant or single-plant firms. Reynolds 
(1988) showed that in a declining industry, large multi-plant firms close down their 
plants before smaller firms in order to reduce their capacity during industrial downturns 
without needing to totally close down. In such cases, the large multi-plant firms do so by 
first closing their highest cost branch plants. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) also 
showed that in a declining industry large multi-plant firms are the first to reduce their 
capacity, due to their lower marginal revenue. In their model, which assumes continuous 
capacity adjustment, a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium exists, in which the largest 
of several equally efficient firms reduces its capacity until it reaches the market share of 
the next smaller firm. Baden-Fuller (1989) showed that a well-capitalised, diversified, 
multi-plant firm is more likely to close its branch plants than a single-plant firm, as it 
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has a lower sunk cost of closure. The reason is that a multi-plant firm can re-deploy 
those factors of production, released due to closure of other plants, in the ongoing plants 
and stay in production without being have to incur re-entry sunk costs. 
On the other hand, Whinston (1988) showed that the pattern of capacity reduction is 
not as simple to explain, as it depends on a variety of factors such as industry structure 
and market decline. Therefore, there might be a variety of situations in which large 
multi-plant firms are not necessarily the first to reduce their capacity. 
Empirical work mainly supports the hypothesis that multi-unit plants are more likely to 
be closed, than single-unit plants. Baden-Fuller (1988) found that in the UK steel-
casting industry the majority of plants that were closed between 1979 and 1983 
belonged to multi-plant enterprises. Colombo and Delmastro (2000) also found that 
plant closure had a direct relation with multi-plant status since for a multi-plant firm 
plant closure neither means exit from the product market nor dissolution of the firm. 
Similarly, Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Mata et al. (1995) found that single-
plant de-novo firms had less likelihood of failure. 
On the other hand, Audretsch (1994) found that before taking account of the size of the 
plants belonging to a multi-plant enterprise, single-plant units were more likely to be 
closed than multi-plant units. This was due to the fact that multi-plant units had a higher 
start-up size than single-plant units. However, once the size of the plants was controlled, 
multi-plant units had a higher probability of closure. Therefore, the associated negative 
impact could be due to the discrepancy in the start-up size of the multi-unit plants 
relative to the single-unit plants, rather than their ownership status. Disney et al. (1999) 
found that age was also an important factor in determining the likelihood of closure of 
multi-unit and single-unit plants. In their study, young single-unit plants were more 
likely to survive initially but after a year they were less likely to do so. Looking at the 
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closures implemented by UK multi-locational firms, Watts and Kirkham (1999) found 
that certain characteristics of plants like size and location (in terms of distance from the 
head office and other plants) significantly affected the closure decision. In this vein, 
Dunne et al. (1989) found that in US manufacturing between 1967 and 1982, small 
plants belonging to a multi-plant firm were more likely to be closed than small single-
plant units, although it was the opposite for large plants. Therefore, one can conclude 
that the size of a multi-plant unit is also a deterministic factor in its closure decision. 
Start-up size, current size and age: In the model developed by Jovanovic (1982), 
which was called the 'noisy' selection model, firms enter an industry without knowing 
the value of the parameters that determine the distribution of their profits. This means 
that they are unaware of their ability to compete effectively and initially face a cost 
disadvantage, as they usually enter below minimum efficient scale. As they continue 
operating, i f they are efficient, they can grow and survive, otherwise they decline and 
fail. Ericson and Pakes (1995) modified this model and allowed for firms to learn about 
the value of the parameters that determined their profitability. An important parameter 
was their ability to compete, which could be improved by investing. 
The implication of the above models is that the more firms grow from their initial size 
and the longer they stay in operation, the higher is their chance of survival in the longer 
run. Geroski (1995) represents this as a stylised fact that "both firm size and age are 
correlated with the survival of entrants" (p. 434). He further explained that turnover and 
exit are the by-products of a process in which firms adjust themselves to the turbulent 
environment, through information acquisition. At the same time, not only is information 
costly and some entrants under-invest in information gathering, but also in the presence 
of a changing market environment the type of action that they need to take in order to 
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survive also changes. This clearly shows that the ability of entrants in learning about 
their changing environment directly affects their growth and, consequently, their 
survival. Therefore, the slower their process of learning, the more likely they are to 
decline in size and eventually exit. At the same time, as learning comes with age, the 
latter has an impact on growth and survival. 
Based on the theory of strategic niches for small firms, suggested by Porter (1979), 
growth in not a necessary condition for the survival of small firms. Small firms can stay 
small and still survive, as long as they can find a strategic niche in the market in which 
to operate. Based on the theoretical and empirical work of Dhawan (2001), small firms 
in US manufacturing over the 1970-89 period faced a higher risk of closure due to 
uncertainties in the market and problems associated with raising capital. However, they 
were more efficient due to their simple hierarchical decision making structure, allowing 
them to find market niches to operate in. Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) reconciled the 
two views, regarding the impact of size and growth on survival. They contended that the 
relationship between size and risk varies under different technological conditions and 
also across different stages of the industries' life cycle. In technology intensive 
industries and in mature stages of the life cycle, the positive relationship between size 
and survival might not hold. The reason is that in the mature stages of the life cycle in 
technology intensive industries entry is more about filling market niches rather than 
radical changes, which to a large extent can offset the positive effect of size on survival. 
Among those who have produced empirical work on this subject, the following have 
found that size and age have a positive impact on survival: Dunne et al. (1989), 
Audretsch (1994), Mata and Portugal (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Boeri 
and Bellman (1995) and Doms et al. (1995). Mata et al. (1995) found that initial size 
had a positive impact and current size a negative impact on a plant's closure. The reason 
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for this effect, according to them, was that small plants that managed to survive grew 
faster than large plants, which resulted in positive associations between initial size and 
closure. In any case, the more a plant grew from its initial size, the lower was its chance 
of closure. Disney et al. (1999) looked at the effect of initial size and current size, in 
conjunction with the age of plants. They found that initial size positively affected 
closure, while current size negatively affected it. However, a higher growth from the 
initial size had a negative impact on closure. After taking account of the age of plants, 
they found that initial size had less impact on closures. However, the negative 
association between growth and closure grew stronger with the age of plants. 
Exit barriers: According to Caves and Porter (1976) these affect the behaviour of 
firms because they persistently impose sub-normal profits. The major sources of exit 
barriers, according to them, are durable and specific assets (DSAs) that might be 
attached to a particular company, productive activity or combination of both. They 
further divided the DSAs into tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, joint 
production and managerial behaviour. Tangible DSAs were defined as physical inputs 
(like capital) or non-physical inputs (like a specialised labour force) that are attached to 
a firm, due to either being specific to a productive activity or due to a non-terminable 
long contract for the life of that asset. On the other hand, intangible DSAs are those that 
can be traded through franchising arrangements or the sale of trademarks. The effect of 
DSAs on firm behaviour can also be through jointness in production. This occurs when 
physical productivity of an input depends on its joint use with other inputs. Finally, 
managerial behaviour can also be a source for DSAs, when the specific skills of a 
manager have less value elsewhere. Between the sources of DSAs proposed by Caves 
and Porter (op. cit.), tangible fixed assets have been subject to most attention, in the 
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theoretical and empirical literature. Eaton and Lipsey (1980) identified capital durability 
as a major source for sunk costs. Mata (1991) also referred to capital durability and 
specificity as the sources for sunk costs. He explained that capital specificity creates 
sunk costs, because once capital is committed to a specific use it is difficult to be 
transferred to another use. Capital durability is also another source, because firms must 
operate until the end of the capital's life. Dixit (1989) showed that the sunk component 
of the costs creates a barrier for both the entry and exit of firms. In this case, firms think 
longer before they commit resources and once they enter, in case of any losses, they wait 
longer before they exit. Within a game theoretic framework Garella and Richelle (1999) 
showed that the existence of sunk costs affects both the size and composition of 
industries. In the absence of re-entry costs, which are mainly sunk costs, the firm with 
the larger average cost is the first one to exit. However, i f re-entry turns out to be 
unprofitable, due to the existence of re-entry costs, the one with a smaller average cost 
exits first. In terms of empirical work, Colombo and Demlastro (2001) found that the 
effect of advance technologies on firm survival depends on the characteristics of those 
technologies. However, ceteris paribus, plants that are employing sizable product 
specific technologies are less likely to close. Audretsch (1994) and Doms et al. (1995) 
both found that sunk costs had a negative impact on plant closure. 
Profitability, productivity or efficiency of firms: According to Hudson (1990) the 
main reason for exit is unprofitability. Even in the case when future expected profits are 
positive, i f liquidity falls below zero firms cannot survive long enough to realise the net 
positive future profits. Cuthbertson and Hudson (1996) showed that compulsory 
liquidations were mainly the result of low profitability, due to an increase in labour costs 
or costs of material inputs. Amongst the early empirical studies, Dunne and Roberts 
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(1991) and Mayer and Chappell (1992) were among the only studies that found a 
negative impact of price-cost margins on exit. However, these were found to be 
insignificant by Boeri and Bellmann (1995) and Kleijweg and Lever (1996). 
Evans and Siegfried (1992) found that direct measures of profitability, like price-cost 
margins, are not significantly correlated with exit. The reason is that they are highly 
correlated with the magnitude of sunk costs. Therefore, a better estimator in this case 
seems to be either total factor productivity or efficiency. In a study by Oulton (2000) for 
UK manufacturing plants over the 1973-89 period, he showed that plants that were 
closed had lower productivity than survivors. Aw et al. (2001) also found that in 
Taiwanese manufacturing over the 1981-91 period, firms that exited were less 
productive than survivors. Similar results were found by Doms et al. (1995), which led 
them to conclude that firms close their less productive (or less efficient) plants first. 
2.3.2 Owner-enterprise specific factors 
Size of the multi-plant firms: It is important to note that the decision to close a 
certain multi-unit plant is not only affected by certain characteristics of the plant, but 
also by the characteristics of the owner enterprise. In relation to this, Liberman (1990) 
found that after controlling for the size of plants, their probability of closure increased as 
the owner firm's capacity share of the industry increased. The reason was that, ceteris 
paribus, large firms cut capacity by a greater percentage than small firms. Chen (2002) 
argued that the chances of closure for a multi-unit plant can either be lower or higher, 
depending on the strategies that the multi-plant organization chooses in reducing its 
capacity. It might also be possible that the multi-plant firm reduces capacity across all 
plants, through mutual coordination, which in this case increases the chances of survival 
for all its plants. Chen also found empirical support for his proposition, when studying 
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the life duration of plants belonging to the US petroleum refining industry, over the 
1981-86 period. 
2.3.3 Industry specific factors 
Entry (the displacement effect): The causal relationship running from entry to exit 
can be due to two effects: a displacement effect and the effect of age and size on plant 
survival. Gabzewicz and Thisse (1980) brought theoretical justification for the 
displacement effect. They showed there is an upper boundary on the number of firms, 
which can compete in any market. When this upper boundary is reached, any further 
entry results in the exit of already existing firms. Shapiro and Khemani (1987) suggested 
two reasons for the possible displacement of incumbents by new entrants: 1) to the 
extent that cost heterogeneity exists within an industry, lower cost entrants can displace 
higher cost incumbents; and 2) even i f cost heterogeneity does not exist, investment in 
durable and specific assets creates a first mover advantage and a barrier to entry, which 
also reduces the possibilities for future displacement. 
Audretsch (1995) stated that new entrants are always contributing to the exit of those 
in the next period. He introduced the notion of a 'revolving door', and explained that 
there is a close match between the identity of the exitors and the entrants of the previous 
period. There are two reasons for this effect: age and size, as newer plants are both 
younger and more likely to be smaller than incumbents (Dunne et al. 1988; Audretsch, 
1994). Dunne et al. (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994), Baldwin (1995), Boeri and 
Bellman (1995) and Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) all found a positive impact of (lagged) 
entry on exit. 
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Growth in demand: Due to the profitable opportunities that demand growth creates in 
markets, it can have a negative impact on exit. In fast growing industries, because of the 
room created in the market, there are more opportunities for firms to raise their market 
share, without posing any loss on other incumbents and provoking retaliatory reaction 
from them. 
Theories that study the effect of demand fluctuations on profitability are controversial. 
On the one hand, some show that profits increase during times of economic boom, while 
the others show that during recession industry profits increase. Within a game theoretic 
framework, Green and Porter (1984) showed that industries' profit margins have a pro-
cyclical behaviour, while Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) showed the opposite. Machin 
and Van Reenen (1993) studied the effect of aggregate business fluctuations on 
profitability for large UK companies, during the 1970s and 1980s. They found that firm-
level profitability dropped sharply, during the 1980-81 recession, therefore showing a 
strong pro-cyclical behaviour. 
However, McDonald (1999) found that for Australian manufacturing firms during the 
1984-93 period, the effect of business cycles on profitability was dependent on the 
structural characteristics of industries. In more concentrated industries, profitability 
showed a pro-cyclical behaviour, while in less concentrated industries it showed a 
counter-cyclical behaviour. This reveals that the manner in which growth affects the 
profitability of firms and, consequently, their exit might depend on the structural 
characteristics of the markets, which evolves through various stages of the industries' 
life cycle. 
Based on the evolutionary theory of the life cycle proposed by Gort and Klepper 
(1982), infant industries have a higher turnover of firms. This is due to a high level of 
uncertainty and imperfection of information, regarding the characteristics of the product, 
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market demand and various other parameters. As industries mature, the market 
stabilises, information becomes more available, firm turnover decreases and, 
consequently, concentration increases. This can have different implications for the effect 
of growth on the profitability of firms populating these industries. 
The empirical evidence regarding the direct effect of growth on exit is varied. Boeri 
and Bellman (1995) found that growth had an insignificant impact on exit. Audretsch 
(1994) found that, in the short run, growth had a negative impact on exit but in the long 
run it had no significant impact. Mata et al (1995) found that in industries with high 
growth firms tended to last longer. However, when they also took account of entry, they 
found that plants operating in industries characterised with high growth and high entry 
faced a higher hazard rate. Mata and Portugal (1994) found that in faster growing 
industries firms survived longer. Finally, Disney et al. (1999) found that the age of 
plants had to be taken into account, i f one wishes to study the effect of industry growth 
on exit. Before taking account of age, growth had no impact on exit, but once it was 
entered into the model as a joint age-demand variable, the effect became significant. 
They found that industry growth has a positive impact on exit, which reduced with the 
age of plants. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the theoretical and empirical literature, in relation to the factors that 
determine entry and exit of plants, was reviewed. The conclusion that can be drawn is 
that, in the majority of cases, the theoretical literature does not provide us with "stylised 
facts" in relation to the impact of a given factor on entry/exit. Some factors can have a 
contradictory impact on entry/exit, which have been supported by a convincing line of 
arguments. Similarly, empirical findings in relation to the impact of given factors on 
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entry/exit varied from one study to the other. This can also result from differences in the 
data that is used, the time period under study, different structural characteristics of the 
sampled industries or a wide range of other factors. 
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Chapter 3: Entry, Exit, Survival and Growth of Plants in UK 
Manufacturing Industries, 1974-97 
3.1 Introduction 
The process of entry and exit of firms has long been the focus of attention by 
economists. In line with the contestability theory, Baumol et al. (1982) describes entry 
as a disciplinary force in which only the mere threat of it can limit monopoly profits. On 
the other hand, some believe that entrants only operate on the fringe of industry and that 
they wil l exit shortly after entry, without having much impact on total manufacturing 
output. In this regard, entry is known as a 'hit and run process' and entrants are 
considered to be unimportant, and not making much contribution to industry's 
productivity. One such view is held by Shepherd (1984), who criticises the 
contestability theory and suggests that entry is a secondary force to internal conditions 
in determining the extent of competition. Which theory best describes the process of 
entry and exit in the UK manufacturing industries, depends on what can be discovered 
by empirical work. 
Due to the lack of a comprehensive dataset, it had not been possible, previously, to 
capture the ful l magnitude and impact of these two market phenomena at the total 
manufacturing level. However, for the first time in the UK, the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) has provided the researchers with a comprehensive plant level dataset, 
which contains a wide range of information on plants in the UK manufacturing 
industries from 1974 onwards. Using this dataset, it is possible to get a more 
comprehensive picture of the dynamics of entry and exit in the UK manufacturing 
industries. 
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter can be divided into the following sections. 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the dataset and its associated strengths and 
weaknesses. Section 3.3.1 explains the way entry and exit are defined in our study. The 
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industry aggregation level, at which entry and exit are calculated, is explained in 
Section 3.3.2. In order to capture the immediate magnitude of the entrants and the 
exitors, Section 3.3.3 provides annual (short-run) entry, exit and net entry rates for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, over the 1974-97 period. In Section 3.3.4, entry and 
exit rate variations, across the four-digit manufacturing industries, over the 1974-97 
period are examined. Section 3.3.5 tests for the existence of a consistent ranking of the 
four-digit manufacturing industries or years, over the 1974-97 period, in terms of the 
magnitude of their annual entry/exit rates. The post entry experience of the cohorts of 
entrants, that entered the manufacturing sector between 1974-97, is studied in Section 
3.3.6. This is done by measuring their associated exit rate and hazard rate in each year 
following entry. In Section 3.3.7, the contribution of plants of different ages to total 
closures in each year are examined. Section 3.3.8 compares the post-entry experience of 
new plants and incumbents. 
In Section 3.3.9, the post-entry growth of entrants is assessed, by looking at the 
average size of the surviving plants (measured in real gross value added), the overall 
size of the cohort of entrants, and average share of the cohort of entrants (from total 
manufacturing plants and real gross value added) in each year following entry. In 
addition, the accumulated share of entrants from the total manufacturing real gross 
value added, during the 1974-97 period, is noted. In Section 3.3.10 accumulated/long-
run entry and exit rates are compared with the average annual/short-run rates in order to 
capture the long-run impact of entry and exit. Finally, Section 3.4 supplies the 
conclusion drawn from the findings in this chapter. 
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3.2 Data 
The major source of data in this thesis comes from the individual records of the 
Annual Census of Production (ACOP), which is contained in the Annual Business 
Inquiry Respondent Database (ARD) 1 . A full description of the ARD is given in Oulton 
(1997), of which the important features are highlighted here. The structure of the ARD 
is mapped out in Figure 3.1. In the ARD an enterprise is defined as an ultimate entity 
that owns one or more local units2. The way to identify it is through the enterprise group 
reference number (EntGRefNum), which is assigned to all the local units under a 
common ownership. As is shown in Figure 3.1, local units A, B, C and D are owned by 
the same enterprise and, therefore, have the same EntGRefNum, which is equal to 111. 
This identifier also makes it possible to locate any change of ownership (as that results 
in a change in this reference number3). 
Figure 3.1 Structure of the A C O P Respondent Database (the A R D ) 
Enterprise 
Establishment/Local Unit A 
LURefNum = 333 
EstGRefNum = 333 
EntGRefNum = 111 
Child Child 
Local unit C Local unit D 
LURefNum = 555 LURefNum = 666 
EstGRefNum = 333 EstGRefNum = 333 
EntGRefNum =111 EntGRefNum =111 
1 Except in Chapter 4, where some geographical specific variables have been collected from Regional Trends (see 
Regional Trends, various issues). 
2 A local unit in the ARD refers to a plant at a single location. 
3 In case of a single-plant unit, there are no other plants belonging to the owner enterprise, while for a multi-plant unit 
there is at least one other plant that is owned by the same enterprise. 
Establishment/Local Unit B 
LURefNum = 444 
EstGRefNum = 444 
EntGRefNum =111 
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An establishment is a local unit that supplies the answers to the questions on the 
census form (for the ACOP inquiry) for itself as well as for all the other local units for 
which it is responsible. A unique identifier, termed the establishment group reference 
number (EstGRefNum), is assigned to all the local units that are under its control. The 
ARE) contains data on all the establishments that are potentially within the scope of 
ACOP enquiry. However, establishments can be further divided into two broad 
categories, those that have actually been selected for the ACOP inquiry (contained in 
the 'selected file') and those that have not been selected (contained in the 'non-selected 
file). The (stratified) selection criteria is based upon the employment of establishments 
and is mainly biased towards large establishments4. 
Both the selected and non-selected files hold various information such as: the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC80, SIC68 and SIC92), country of ownership, 
postcode, geographical region, and employment. However, the selected file holds some 
additional financial information, mainly regarding output and cost. The number of 
selected establishments varies between 14-19,000 per year and the non-selected are over 
100,000. As the unit of analysis here is the local unit rather than the establishment, the 
information provided by the establishments has to be spread across all the local units, on 
whose behalf they are reporting. The way to do this is by multiplying a weight (called 
unit weight, which varies between 0 and 1) by the provided figures5. 
4 Establishments with more than 500 employees are all included in the selected file, while sampling has been applied 
to smaller establishments. This way selection frame becomes mainly biased towards choosing large establishments. 
Therefore, in any analysis based on the selected file, weights wil l be used in order to make these establishments 
representative of the entire population of the establishments in the manufacturing industries. The reason for using 
weights and also the details of how weights are calculated are provided in the Appendix to this chapter. 
5 The higher the share of a local unit from the provided figures, the larger is its corresponding unit weight. Therefore, 
in case of a local unit that answers a census form only for itself, the associated unit weight is equal to 1. Hence, the 
unit weight simply is the employment share of a local unit from the total employment of the establishment. 
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Finally, a local unit (LU) in the ARD relates to a plant at a single location. Having a 
local unit reference number (LURefNum) makes it possible to trace a plant over time 
and find out the exact year that it opened and ultimately closed. This identifier remains 
the same i f that particular plant changes ownership, or location, or i f it stops and then 
restarts production after a few years. 
Based on the definition of the local units and establishments, a local unit can then be 
divided into three distinct categories. First, local units that return a census form only for 
themselves and, therefore, are a local unit as well as an establishment; second, those 
local units that report information, not only for themselves but also on behalf of some 
other local units under their control which, therefore, makes the local unit also 
"parents"; and third, local units that are under the control of an establishment and, 
therefore, are a local unit and a "child". The simplest case is a local unit that returns a 
census form only for itself (therefore is also an establishment) and is owned by an 
enterprise, which does not own any other plants. In Figure 3.1, local unit A is an 
establishment and a "parent" because it answers the census form not only for itself but 
also on behalf of the local units C and D. In this case local units C and D have the same 
EstGRefNum (333) as local unit A (the EstGRefNum is equal to the LURefNum of the 
local unit A) and are a "child" to it. On the other hand, local unit B provides information 
for the ACOP inquiry only for itself and, therefore, is a local unit as well as an 
establishment. 
There is an important issue regarding the nature of the ARD and that relates to the 
sampling frame, which did not remain the same during the 1974-97 period. Prior to 
1984 the sampling frame, based on the establishment employment, was as follow: 
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1-19 (not sampled) 
20-49 ( l i n 4 ) 
50-99 (1 in 2) 
100+ (1 in 1) 
In 1984 there was a change in business registration, based on the VAT register, to take 
a fuller account of smaller size plants. As a result, the sampling frame changed to 
1-19 (not sampled) 
20+ (in England) (1 in 2) 
20+ (excluding England) (1 in 1) 
In 1985, sampling again altered to the pre-1984 frame and, therefore, the total number 
of sampled establishments decreased. 
In 1989 sampling increased to 
1-19 (not sampled) 
20+ (in England) (1 in 2) 
20+ (excluding England) (1 in 1) 
In 1990 sampling decreased to 
1-19 (not sampled) 
20-49 (1 in 4) 
50-99 (1 in 2) 
100+ (1 in 1) 
In 1993 sampling changed to 
20-49 (1 in 5) 
50-99 (1 in 2) 
100+ (1 in 1) 
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In 1994 there was a change to IDBR registration (Inter Departmental Business 
Register), which increased the overall number of contributors in the ACOP universe. 
During this process of change, especially in 1984 and 1994, it was not possible to match 
the plant identifier before and after change for many small plants. Therefore, a number 
of plant openings and closures seem to be taking place, which was due to ONS losing 
track of the already existing plants. These changes have to be taken into account, when 
carrying out the analysis in the next sections. 
3.3 Empirical work 
3.3.1 Defining entry and exit 
Entry and exit in our study relates to the setting up of new plant (new capacity) and 
ceasing production at an ongoing plant (this can be done either by a new enterprise, 
called a "Greenfield" entrant, or by an existing enterprise6). 
It might be argued that this is not the best way to measure entry and exit; rather they 
should be measured at firm (enterprise) level, as it is the firm rather than the plant that 
makes these decisions. Baldwin (1995) proposed two reasons for why one should look 
at the entry and the exit of plants rather than firms. These reasons were as follows: 1) as 
firms might operate more than one plant it is better to consider entry and exit at plant 
level and 2) it is the fate of plants that determines fate of a firm and also it is the 
introduction of new plant (new capacity) rather than a new firm that drives super normal 
profits down7. 
6 The way to identify an enterprise in the ARD is through the enterprise group reference number, which was 
explained in Section 3.2. 
7 One could look at firm entry and exit, but it would be a different exercise. 
64 
3.3.2 Industry aggregation level 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, plants are the units of analysis in this study. Entry and 
exit can be measured either at the level of the manufacturing sector as a whole, or for 
individual industries. In the first case 'entry' is defined as the opening of a plant in the 
manufacturing sector and 'exit' as closure; and in the second case 'entry' is defined as 
the opening of a plant in a particular manufacturing industry and 'exit' as closure8. In 
this chapter in order to provide a broader overview, entry and exit mainly at the total 
manufacturing level wi l l be examined. 
3.3.3 Annual (short-run) entry and exit rates for total manufacturing 
Before the analysis of the figures can take place, it needs to be decided whether to use 
either the selected and non-selected file (the entire population of plants in 
manufacturing), or only the selected file. As was explained in Section 3.2, two major 
changes to the registration of plants occurred: one in 1984 (change to VAT registration) 
and one in 1994 (change to IDBR registration), which resulted in many small plants 
being identified. However, in this process plants were assigned new identifiers and in 
some cases it was not possible to match the plant identities before and after the change. 
This is expected to affect the magnitude of the entry and exit measures. The reason is 
that the way in which entry and exit are identified in this study is through the plant 
identifier (LURefNum 9). Entry occurs i f a new LURefNum appears in a given year and 
exit takes place i f an existing LURefNum no longer exists. Given these changes, one 
might observe additional entry and exit, which is not truly due to opening and closure of 
8 I f firms are the units of analysis, then different levels of industry aggregation captures different aspects of entry and 
exit. When entry is measured at the total manufacturing level it only captures entry by outsiders, while entry into a 
particular industry may come from firms already existing in manufacturing. Similarly, exit from the manufacturing 
industries means total closure of firms, while exit from a particular industry can be by a firm that is still operating in 
other industries. Therefore, when entry and exit are added up across the individual industries, it is unlikely to be the 
same as when entry and exit are measured for the manufacturing industries as a whole. The lower the industry 
aggregation level, the higher is the frequency of entry and exit. 
9 Explained in Section 3.2. 
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plants. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the extent to which these changes affect 
entry and exit measures, using the entire population and the selected file. 
First, using both the selected and non-selected file (the entire population), annual 
(short-run) entry, exit and net entry rates are calculated, at the total manufacturing level, 
for the 1974-97 period (see Table 3.1); these rates are measured both in terms of the 
actual number of plants and their employment. Annual entry rates, shown in column (1), 
Table 3.1 Annual entry, exit and net entry rates, measured in terms of number of plants and 
employment, using both the selected and non-selected file, over the 1974-97 period (figures are 
percentages) 
Entry rate Exi t rate Net entry rate 
Y e a r Plants Employment Plants Employment Plants Employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1974 11.7 3.2 4.9 1.3 6.8 1.9 
1975 7.5 2.0 5.6 2.2 1.9 -0.2 
1976 6.7 1.8 4.3 2.0 2.4 -0.2 
1977 4.1 1.1 3.4 2.1 0.7 -1.0 
1978 3.6 1.1 3.5 2.1 0.1 -1.0 
1979 1.9 0.7 2.5 1.5 -0.6 -0.8 
1980 3.5 1.8 4.0 2.4 -0.5 -0.6 
1981 3.1 1.4 4.1 4.3 -1.0 -2.9 
1982 3.9 1.6 9.1 4.0 -5.2 -2.4 
1983 3.0 1.3 3.9 3.4 -0.9 -2.1 
1984 62.9 10.2 52.5 10.3 10.4 -0.1 
1985 61.6 8.9 59.7 10.0 1.9 -1.1 
1986 15.9 4.1 12.5 4.4 3.4 -0.3 
1987 16.4 4.7 14.0 5.1 2.4 -0.4 
1988 17.7 4.4 14.8 5.2 2.9 -0.8 
1989 24.2 4.9 22.4 5.7 1.8 -0.8 
1990 13.7 3.8 16.6 5.6 -2.9 -1.8 
1991 10.5 3.4 12.9 5.3 -2.4 -1.9 
1992 36.1 6.8 31.2 7.3 4.9 -0.5 
1993 32.7 5.4 38.5 9.6 -5.8 -4.2 
1994 25.1 10.9 15.0 7.8 10.1 3.1 
1995 33.7 18.2 20.9 9.6 12.8 8.6 
1996 14.6 7.4 20.5 13.4 -5.9 -6.0 
1997 16.6 12.7 17.8 21.4 -1.2 -8.7 
Mean 18.0 5.1 16.4 6.1 1.6 -1.0 
are calculated as the total number of plants that exist in the manufacturing sector in year 
t, but did not exist in year t-1, divided by the total number of plants in the 
manufacturing sector in year t. Annual exit rates, shown in column (3), are measured as 
the total number of plants that existed in the manufacturing sector in year t-1, but did 
not exist in year t, divided by the total number of plants in the manufacturing sector in 
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year t-1. The rates in columns (2) and (4) are calculated using the same definitions as in 
column (1) and (3), respectively, but in terms of the employment of plants. Finally, the 
net entry rates are measured as the difference between the entry and the exit rates. 
Initially, the comparisons of the columns reveals that entry and exit rates are greater 
when expressed in terms of the number of plants than in employment i.e. on average 
entry rates are 3.5 and exit rates are 2.7 times higher. Overtime, entry and exit rates are 
increasing, but the trend is not smooth. There is a sudden increase in both entry and exit 
rates, in 1984-85 and from 1992 onwards, which is much more pronounced when 
expressed in terms of the number of plants. The reason for this (as was explained in the 
first paragraph of this section) is partly related to the nature of the ARD rather than 
market dynamics10. However, this problem mostly only relates to small size plants, 
which is evident when the rates in terms of number of plants and employment are 
compared. Taking 1984 as an example: the entry rate from 1983 increased by 59.9% 
and the exit rate by 48.6%, when measured by the number of plants, while the entry rate 
only increased by 8.9% and the exit rate by 6.9%, when measured in terms of 
employment. The net entry rate in 1984 was 10.4%, in terms of number of plants, while 
-0.10% in terms of employment. This means that although there was a net increase in 
number of plants in 1984, total manufacturing employment due to net entry actually 
decreased. 
There is not much consistency between the two measures in columns (5) and (6). 
While in some years the net entry rate is positive with regard to the number of plants, it 
is negative in terms of employment. On average, the entry and exit rates, between 1974-
1997, are 18.0% and 16.4%, in terms of plants, and 5.1% and 6.1%, in terms of 
employment, respectively. 
1 0 Note that the associated changes in the registration of plants take affect gradually. Therefore, although the change 
into IDBR registration was finished by 1994, from 1992 it started affecting the registration of plants. 
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Next, entry and exit rates were calculated by using only the selected file. However, as 
was explained earlier, population weights have to be applied in order to make these 
plants representative of the entire manufacturing population. New entry, exit and net 
entry rates are presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Annual entry, exit and net entry rates, measured in terms of number of plants and 
employment, using the weighted selected file, over the 1974-97 period (figures are percentages) 
E n t r y rate Exi t rate Net entry rate 
Year Plants Employment Plants Employment Plants Employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1974 11.4 3.0 9.1 1.0 2.3 2.0 
1975 6.7 1.8 7.5 2.1 -0.8 -0.3 
1976 5.8 1.6 5.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 
1977 3.5 1.0 5.0 1.9 -1.5 -0.9 
1978 5.2 1.0 5.5 1.8 -0.3 -0.8 
1979 2.9 0.7 5.2 1.4 -2.3 -0.7 
1980 4.0 1.5 7.1 2.5 -3.1 -1.0 
1981 3.4 1.3 9.1 3.5 -5.7 -2.2 
1982 3.9 1.3 9.2 2.9 -5.3 -1.6 
1983 3.0 1.2 7.1 2.6 -4.1 -1.4 
1984 36.2 6.9 7.0 2.8 29.2 4.1 
1985 32.8 6.0 6.7 3.0 26.1 3.0 
1986 11.9 3.5 7.8 2.5 4.1 1.0 
1987 13.8 4.2 7.5 2.9 6.3 1.3 
1988 14.6 3.8 7.3 3.1 7.3 0.7 
1989 16.9 4.3 8.4 3.4 8.5 0.9 
1990 11.5 3.3 8.2 3.6 3.3 -0.3 
1991 9.0 3.1 8.9 3.5 0.1 -0.4 
1992 22.7 5.4 8.3 3.5 14.4 1.9 
1993 12.7 3.1 8.0 3.7 4.7 -0.6 
1994 31.7 10.4 14.0 6.7 17.7 3.7 
1995 33.6 17.4 16.2 7.6 17.4 9.8 
1996 13.1 6.9 25.1 12.5 -12.0 -5.6 
1997 14.6 11.9 31.3 24.1 -16.7 -12.2 
Mean 13.5 4.4 9.8 4.3 3.7 0.1 
It can be seen that by using the weighted selected file, the two major jumps in the 
rates are reduced, although they have not completely disappeared, especially for entry 
rates in terms of number of plants. Net entry rates in columns (5) and (6) are also more 
consistent in comparison with those in Table 3.2. From 1983 to 1984, the entry rate 
increased by 34.2%, when measured in number of plants, and by 6%, when measured in 
employment, while there is no major jump in exit rates. The net entry rate also 
increased, although the increase is more pronounced, when measured in numbers of 
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plants, than in terms of employment. Note that the subsequent changes in 1984 and 
1994 to the population of plants resulted in an increase in the entry and exit rates, since 
there was an artificial increase in the numerator due to an increase in the number of 
small size plants that entered and exited11. However, the denominators of the entry and 
exit rates (the entire population of the manufacturing plants) were not affected as much. 
Section 3.2 shows that sampling was carried out on the basis of establishment 
employment, which was mainly biased towards large establishments to the extent that 
the establishments with employment between 1 and 19 were exempted. This makes it 
clear that i f the selected file is going to be used it has to be weighted in order to be a 
representative of the entire population of the manufacturing plants and, also, that the 
weighted selected file is less affected by the changes that happened in the registration of 
plants, as it only contains a sampled number of small plants. Therefore, from now on 
the weighted selected file is going to be used in all the analyses. 
Annual entry and exit rates in Table 3.2 are plotted against time in Figures 3.2 and 
3.3. One can see that while both rates are increasing over time, the trend is smoother for 
exit rates and more volatile for entry rates. While entry rate (measured in number of 
plants) reduces significantly after 1985 (from 32.8% to 11.9%) it stays relatively high in 
comparison to the pre-1984 period. Post-1989 there is no specific trend in entry rates 
(measured in number of plants) as they are increasing in some years and decreasing in 
others. The importance of entry is much less, when measured in terms of employment. 
However, the post-1993 entry rate increased to the extent that in 1997 entrants account 
for 11.9% of total manufacturing employment. 
1 1 Entry rate is measured as the total number of plants/the employment of plants, that exist in year t in the 
manufacturing sector, but did not exist in year t -1 , divided by the total number of plants/employment in the 
manufacturing sector, in year t. Exit rate is measured as the total number of plants/the employment of plants, that 
existed in year t-1 in the manufacturing sector, but did not exist in year t, divided by the total number of 
plants/employment of the manufacturing sector, in year t -1 . 
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Figure 3.2 The annual entry and exit rates, measured in terms of the number of plants, 
using the weighted selected file, over the 1974-97 period 
40% 
35% 
• entry rate 
30% exit rate 
25% 
20% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
0% I 
CT r&> r& r & JP J§> & ^ r&t* rd <5 <3 N N N N 
Figure 3.3 The annual entry and exit rates, measured in terms of employment, using the 
weighted selected file, over the 1974-97 period 
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The same scenario repeats itself for exit rates (both in terms of number of plants and 
employment). Post-1993 the exit rate increases, although not as much when measured in 
terms of employment. The last two years are characterised by a significantly high exit 
rate, reaching a maximum of 31.3% in 1997, when measured in terms of the number of 
plants, and 24.1%, when measured in terms of employment. Overall, exit rates are more 
stable throughout 1974-97, in comparison with entry rates. On average, during 1974-97, 
the entrants accounted for 13.5% of the number of plants in the manufacturing sector 
and 4.4% of employment and the exitors for 9.8% of the number of plants and 4.3% of 
employment. 
This section demonstrates that: 1) both entry and exit rates in the UK manufacturing 
industries have been increasing, over the 1974-97 period. This shows that 
manufacturing was becoming more competitive over the period and more plants took 
their chance in various industries; 2) entry and exit rates are less important, when 
measured in terms of employment, rather than the stock of plants. This reveals that the 
high entry and exit rates were due, mainly, to the entry and exit of small plants. This 
result was also found by Dunne et al. (1988), when studying firm entry and exit in US 
manufacturing industries, over the 1963-82 period. They found that entry rates averaged 
between 41.4% and 51.8%, while their employment share ranged between 13.9% and 
18.8%. In the same way, exit rates averaged between 41.7% and 50%, while their 
employment share was between 14.8% and 19.5%. Schwalbach (1991) also found that 
in German manufacturing industries between 1983-85, entry and exit rates, measured in 
terms of number of entrants, averaged between 11.5% and 13.8%, while their market 
share averaged between 8.1% and 9.2%, respectively; and 3) exit rates, on average, over 
time were lower than entry rates, when measured in terms of number of plants, although 
there were equally important, when measured in terms of employment. This implies that 
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over the period in question, on average, a large number of small plants entered the 
manufacturing sector. On the other hand, the exiting plants were less in numbers and 
larger is terms of employment size. This is in line with the finding of Schwalbach {op. 
cit), who found that entrants and exitors are, on average, small, but exiting firms were 
larger than entrants. 
3.3.4 Annual (short-run) entry and exit rates variations, across the four-digit 
manufacturing industries, over the 1974-97 period 
In this section an attempt is made to discover which one of the industry specific, or 
time specific effects, has had the more significant impact on entry and exit rate 
variations, over the 1974-97 period. To do this, one needs to measure entry and exit 
rates at a lower level of aggregation. Therefore, though entry and exit rates are defined 
in the exactly the same way as in Section 3.3.3, in this section they are measured at the 
four-digit SIC manufacturing level. Correlations between entry ratet and entry ratet.„ are 
provided in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 and exit ratet and exit ratet.n in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, in 
which 'n ' refers to the number of lags in years12. Table 3.3 reports the correlation 
between entry ratet and entry ratet.n, when the entry rates are measured in terms of the 
number of plants and Table 3.4 reports the same correlation, but when entry rates are 
measured in terms of employment. Similarly, Table 3.5 reports the correlations between 
exit ratet and exit rate,.„, when the exit rates are measured in terms of the number of 
plants and Table 3.6 reports the same correlation, but when the exit rates are measured 
in terms of employment. A positive time series correlation in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
indicates that industries with higher/lower than average entry rate in one year, wil l tend 
to have higher/lower than average entry rate in a different year, while in Tables 3.5 and 
3.6 indicates that industries with higher/lower than average exit rate in one year wil l 
1 2 Therefore, n equal to 1 shows the correlation between entry rates (at the four-digit manufacturing level) of any two 
adjacent years. 
72 
o o o f N S O O N 00 o m 
o o o 00 o i n f N 00 f N 
O N o o o o © o •—1 © O 
— > © © © © 
1 
o o © © ' I © ' 
r ~ o O N O N 00 © r o <N t«-> O N s o 
00 o OO 00 O N S O f > f N 3 - f N r -
o s © o o o o O © o 
d © © © o © © © © ' © ' 
S O © _ __ s o f N o o © OO _ 
00 © 00 f N t n 00 O S m 
O N © '— 1 © © © © o © 
© ' © ' © © d d © d © 
o 
© o 
~-
O r r 
© m 
© 
d 
o O s m 
© © O S 
© 
© © 
© s o f N 
© O S 00 f -
© © 
© © © 
O S t m m 
© 
m 
O ©• 
d d © © 
o © © 
O — © f N r - m 
© « 00 © S O C \ 
© © © © © © 
— © o d d © 
© © 00 00 © S O 
o 1—1 i n © m 
© © *—> © © — - o 
— © d © © d d 
o c s S O m 
© • n r - © 
© © © © © 
© d © d d 
— © 
© — 
© d 
© 00 In r - © r - m 00 
© s o O S f N o o m © © 
© © © © © © © © 
d © © d d © © © 
© s o 
c > © 
O ~ -
© 
© q S O 
f N 
00 o © © 
O S r~-o 
o 
o r o © 
f N 
s o 
S O 
• n o 5 r o S O O O s r o o © 
— © d © © d d © © d d d © 
1 
© 
© 
© 
Ti-
r o 
f N 
o o 
CO 
© 
s o 
© 
i n o 
© 
O s 
© 
s o 
00 
© 
i n 
s o 
r -
o 
m 
00 o o 
© 
© 
© 
s o 
© 
© 
— d © © d d © d i © d © d d d 1 
o 
© 
© 
S O 
© 
f N 
o 
© 
© © 
f N 
s o 
© 
i n 
S O 
© 
S O 
o o 
f N 
f N 
o 
r o 
i n 
m 
o 
S O 
<N 
O 
s o 
O s 
r o 
s o 
f N 
© © © © © © © © © d d d d © 
© 
© 
© 
f N r o S O r - O S m t N CO 00 m 
© f N SO f N 00 m 
r N © © © f N © © © 
d © © d © © © © © © © d 
_ © OO o f N O s • n s o S O © 
00 © O s © > o r<-i s o o 
O s © f N © © © © © © © f N © 
— © © © © d d © © © © © © © © 
© — 
© d 
O S o o 
f N t N 
© O s f N 00 © — — — © 
o — — o © 
« © © d © 
© s o © f N O 
o -<r T J - so -g-
© tN o © © 
—'• d d © © 
>/1 © S O o 
5 3 r<-> S O f N s o o o f N S O O N f N o o f N 
© © © © © © © 
© © © © d © d d © © © © © 
s o © O N o o S O 5 > n S O ^ 1—1 O N O N f N o f N f N f N f N O N © 
© © f N © © O © © 
d d © " d © © © © © d d d © © 
© o 
© — 
© 
O N T T 
— s o 
© © 
© © 
5 5 
fN O 
© © 
^ 1 O N O N s © — m © > n © > n s o f > 
© © © © © tN © o o © — 
© © © © © © © © d o © 
r - © m f N © 00 00 S O f N f N O © r<1 > n © 
r - © f N ON r<-i f N r o S O f t f N S O 00 © © 
O s © o •—> • O O t N —* © © © 
© © d d d © © © d © © © © © © © © © 
m © 
f N O N 
o © 
© © 
O f > 
© © 
s o © o ON 00 f N ON 3 -* f N O N 00 O N r ~ - © o o t N f N i — i © f N o f N f N 00 t N m 00 © 
O s © o © © -^ © •—• © © © © © © © © © — © © 
1 
© 
i 
d d © © 
i 
© © d d d © © © © © 
i 
© 
i 
d © d 
O t N — 
© — © 
© O © 
S O s o 
o — 
s o O N 
o o O 
© © 
— © © © © © © © 
o 
© 
O N S O s o f N s n s o S O i n O S f N S O 
O N . — i © f N S O S O © o o • n • n 
© •—' © © © -^ © © © o o © © o © d © d d © © © © d © © d d 
00 • n f N ON f N • n i n i n m 00 ON s o t N 00 m f N o o O s f N O s O S 
f N 00 • n © ON m o f N s o • n o o m f N S O S O >o O S S O i n 
© © © o f N © t N *—' © © © © © © © © © 
© d d © © © © © © d d d d d d © © d d d © © © 
i n s o o f N f > t m S O t - OO O N © f N f«-> m S O 
00 00 00 00 00 o o 00 00 o o 00 O N O N O N O N O N O N O s O N 
O N O N O s O S O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N 
73 
r -
O N 
O N 
© 
© 
© 
—* 
N O 
O N 
O N 
© 
© 
© 
N O 
© 
i n 
O N 
O N 
O 
O 
o 
o o CO 
C N 
© © 
O N 
O N 
O O 
O 
f N N O o 
C N 
O N 
© 
— — : d d d 
co 
O N 
O N 
O 
O p t -
O N 
m 
f N 
f N 
N O 
o o 
d d © © 
C N 
O N 
O N 
O 
O 
O 
00 
o o o 
o 
o 
O N 
o 
r -o 
CO o 
CO 
— d d d © © 
O N 
O N 
O 
O 
O © 
CO 
f N 
o o 
i n 
o f N O 
t N 
N O 
f N 
CO 
© 
—" d d d d © ' © 
O 
O N 
O N 
O 
O 
O 
CO 
o i n p 
O N O N 
s 
o o 
o o 
O N 
O 
N O m 
© 
— d d d d d d d i 
O N 
O O 
O N 
O 
O 
O 
O N 
CO 
• n 
f N 
t - -
f N 
f N 
O N 
f N 
• n 
N O CN 
— d d d d d d © © 
O O 
O O 
O N 
O O p 
O O 
N O 
f N 
N O 
CO 
o 
o 
O N 
f N I N O o < n O N O © C N O 
— d d d d d d d © © 
! " » 
O O 
O N 
o o p 
o 
O N 
f N 
CO > o 
CO f N 
N O O N 
N O 
f N 
m 
CO 
© 
— d d d d d d d d © © 
N O 
o o 
O N 
O 
O p •* CO 
• n 
00 
O N 
> n 
f N 
o o 
O N 
O o 
• n 
r-> 
m 
o o 
O 
CO 
t N 
CO 
O O C N 
© 
— d d d d d d d d d d d • 
In 
O O 
O N 
O 
O O 
N O 
O O 
f N 
N O r -
f N 
o o r -
f N 
( N 00 
O 
f N 
O O 
o 
m 
CO 
f N 
o o f N O N o o © © 
— ' d d d d d d d d d d © © 
O O 
O N 
O 
O p 
N O 
O N 
r N 
f N 
f N 
f N 
O N 
• n 
r N 
o o 
CO f N 
o o o 
V O 
O N O 
f N 
N O o 
r -
t N 
f N 
f N o 
© o 
~ — d d d d d d d d d d d © © 
co 
O O 
O N 
O 
O p 
N O 
r t 
O 
o o o 
f N 
CO 
N O 
o r o O 
f N 
C I 
O 
CO 
f N 
o f N 
• n 
p 
o o 
O N 
O 
m 
© © 
— • d d d d d 
1 
d d d d d d d d d • 
CN 
o o 
O N 
O 
O p 
r N 
• n 
f N 
f N 
C N <N 
N O 
f N 
o 
( N 
o 
N O 
( N 
t N 
CO 
m 
O N 
O 
t N 
O N 
O 
o o 
N O 
f N 
o 
• n 
o 
• n 
o o 
© 
N O 
CO 
© 
o o 
f N 
© 
— d d d d d d d d d d d d d d • d 
o o 
O N 
O 
8 O C N N O 
o o 
CO 
© 
o 
o 
i n 
>/-> 
i n 
O N 
o O N • t 
f N o O 
m 
f N 
o 
C O 
t N 
o o o 
© 
f N o 
00 m 
© 
o d d d d d d d d d d d d © © © 
O 
o o 
O N 
O 
O p 
N O 
V I 
<N C N 
CO 
o r -o 
N O 
m 
© 
o 
CO 
N O 
O N 
o 
O O 
m r - O O o N O C N > n O N t N 
o o 
m 
f N 
© 
f N 
CO 
C N 
~ © © d d d d d d d _ d d d d d d d d 
O N 
r -
O N 
O 
O 
O 
N O 
C N 
C N 
O N 
m 
o 
CO 
o 
CO 
N O 
o 
m 
( N 
o 
f N 
t -
O N 
O 
N O 
o o 
o 
o 
N O o 
o 
r -
o 
co 
o § 
f N 
i n 
© 
i n 
C N 
© 
O N 
• n 
© 
— © © © d d d d d d d d d • d • d d • d • d d • 
o o r» 
O N 
O o p 
O N 
N O 
N O 
O 
O N 
CO CN 
CO 
!/"> c o 
o 
m o 
O N 
O 
m m f N 
o 
o o o f N 
« n 
CO o © 
o o 
© 
© 
N O 
O O 
© 
— © © © d d d d d d d d d d d d d © i © © 1 
O N 
O o o 
r -
co 
C N 
O N 
CO o 
C N 
C N 00 
C N 
O N CO 
© 
00 
r -
p -
N O 
N O 
•<* 
<N 
C I 
o o 
N O 
f N 
N O o 
O N 
N O 
O 
O N 
f N 
N O 
o o o N O o 
N O CO 
© 
© 
CN 
© 
© 
— o © © © d d d d d d d d d d d d d © © 
1 
© 
1 
N O r -
O N 
O O 
O 
m 
CO 
C N 
N O 
O N 
O N 
CO 
o o o o 
o o 
CN 
N O r -o 
N O r -
co 
f N 
N O 
f N 
O O 
CO 
i n 
f N 
f N 
m c i > n CO 
CO 
o o 
o f N 
O N f -O 
t N 
t N O 
N O 
CO 
N O 
O N © 
© 
" o © © © © d d d d d d d d d d d d d © d d 
i n r -
O N 
O O 
© 
N O o 
C N 
o O N C N co C N 
CN 
o 
C N 
s 
m 
o 
co o •* 
o o r - m o 
r -m o 
N O f N m o 00 N O 
o 
• n f > o 
N O 
o o o © 
o o 
f N 
© 
N O 
CO 
© 
© © © © © • d d • d d d d d d d d • d d 1 
d d d 
i 
© 
1 
O N 
O 
O 
O 
o o 
f N 
N O 
co 
CO 
O N 
<N 
O N 
o o 
C N 
CO 
CO 
N O o 
CO 
O N 
CN 
O N 
i n 
CN 
O N 
O N 
O 
O O 
co 
f N 
o o 
o o 
r«-> 
r<-> 
i n 
<N 
o o 
<N 
m o 
f N 
f N 
O N 
O 
m 
r -
» n i n o 
CO 
© i n 
C N 
© 
© 
© O O O © © o d d d d d d d d d d d d d © © © 
1 
O N 
i n f -
O N 
N O r--
O N 
r -r -
O N 
o o 
O N 
O N r -
O N 
o 
o o 
O N 
o o 
O N 
( N 
o o 
O N 
CO 
o o 
O N 
o o 
O N 
• n 
o o 
O N 
N O 
o o 
O N 
o o 
O N 
o o 
o o 
O N 
O N 
O O 
O N 
o 
O N 
O N 
O N 
O N 
f N 
O N 
O N 
m 
O N 
O N 
O N 
O N 
i n 
O N 
O N 
N O 
O N 
O N 
O N 
O N 
74 
Os 
Os 
VO 
O s 
O S 
Os 
Os 
Os 
Os 
c o os o\ 
CN 
O s 
O s 
O s 
O s 
O 
Os 
Os 
O s 
o o 
O s 
OO 
o o 
O s 
r-
o o 
O s 
v o 
00 
O s 
00 
O S 
00 
O s 
o 
o o 
O s 
Os r-
O s 
r-
O s 
t -r -
O s 
VO r-
O s 
O s 
O 
o o 
o © o 
o C O o C N 
© O 
— • O 1 
o v s v s 
o O s S O © »—< O 
o o" 
© 
c o 
© 
© ' 
© 
© 
© 
© 
© 
© 
© © © C N © 
r - v s 
S O © 
v s 
s o 
© 
C O © 
— 
© ' i o © © ' © 
© o o 
C O 
© 
V O 
C O 
O s 
r -© 
v s 
V O o 
o o 
C O 
C O 
o o 
© 
— © ' © © ' i © ' © ' © ' 
o © o 
V I 
C O 
C O C O 
v s . © 
C O 
© 
v s . 
© © 
VO 
© ©' 
i ©' ©' © ' 
1 
© ' © ' © ' 
1 
© © © 
o o 
C N 
r ~ o 
C O 
o 
o o 
s 
C O r-© 
s o 
s 
O s 
© 
— ' O © © ' ©• 
1 
©• 
1 
© ' ©' © ' 
© © © C O o 
S O 
S O O 
00 
© 
v s . 
© 
O s 
C N 
o o © © 
C N 
© 
O s 
— ©' ©' o i 
© ' • © ' ©• 
1 
© ' © ' ©' 
© © © 
C O 
C N 
C N © © 
© 
v s . © 
r -r -© 
C N 
O s © 
C N 
O s 
v s . 
o o o O s o © © C O © 
o ©' 
1 
©' ©' © ' © ' ©' ©' © ' • © 
© © © 
ITS 
v s o 
t -
C N © 
C O © © 
VO 
VO 
© 
C O 
v o © 
© 
s 
o o 
C N 
o 
© © © 
C N 
C N 
C O 
s 
C O 
— ©' ©' 
1 
© ' © ' ©' ©' 
1 
o © ' ©' © ' 
1 
© ' 
1 
o o © 
O s 
© O s © 
V I © © 
C O 
© © V I © 
C N 
C N © 
v s . 
© 
v s 
o o © 
O s 
© o © v s . © 
—• ©' 
1 
© ©' 
t 
© ' ©' © ©' © ' ©' © © © ' 
1 
o © © 
O s 
VO 
© 
C N 
v s © •* 
in 
C O VO 
C O 
VO <* © 
O s 
© 
o o 
© 
r-
v o © 
O S 
© 
v s . 
o 
v > 
s ©' 
1 
©' ©' ©' ©' o o 
1 
©' © © ' © ' © ' © ' 
© © © 
C O © C N r s | o 
O S 
o C N 
C N C O C N 
O S © V ) © 
00 
© 
C O © © o o © C O © © © 
S O 
C N 
© 
— ©' 
1 
©' ©' ©' ©• 
1 
©' ©' i © ©• © ' ©' i © ' © ' 
1 
© ' 
1 
© o o 
© 
i s C N © 
00 
s 
© © 
C O 
© 
00 © © 
v o 
C N 
C N C O 
o 
v s . V O 
C N 
O s 
S O O C O © 
t -
C N © © © 
~* ©° ©' i ©' © • © 1 
© © ©' i ©' 
1 
©' 
1 
© ' ©' © © 
i 
©• 
© © © 
O S r -© 
C N 
C O 
C N © 
O s © s 
© 
C N © 
r -
© 
C N 
V S . © 
C N r -© 
o o 
© © 
C O 
o o © 1 C N v s . O p ~ C O o © S O o o © 
— ' © ©' © © ' 
1 
© ©• ©' ©' • ©' ©' 
1 
o 
1 
© ©' © ' ©' 
1 
© © © 
O s 
© 
V I 
© © 
V ) 
C N 
© 
VO 
© 
C O 
C O 
o 
© 
C N 
v s 
v s © 
v s © © C O 
o o 
v o 
© 
r -
•>* o 
C N 
v s . o © 
v s 
o 
o o © © 
©' © 
1 
©' ©' i ©' © © ©• 
I 
©' © ' 
1 
©' © ' © 
I 
© • ©' © ' ©' 
© © © 
t -
VO © © 
o o 
C O 
C N 
r -© 
o o 
S O © 
C I 
C O 
C O 
C N 
C O 
v s © 
o o o © 
C N 3 C N o o C N © 00 © o 
V ) 
C N © 
O s 
© o o © C O 
© 
1 
©' © © ' ©' ©' ©" ©' ©' 
1 
©' ©' © ' © 
1 
©' 
1 
O © ©' © ' 
o © © 
v s 
C N s 00 t -© v s v s © • t O s o O s C O © s o s 
C N 
v s © 
C O 
C N 
C O 
C O 
r -© VO 
o 
V O © © 
C O © © 
C N 
o 
v i 
O 
v s 
r -© 
C O 
C N 
©' © 
1 
©' © © ' ©' © © ' ©' 
1 
o ©' o ©' 
1 
© ' 
1 
©' 
1 
©' 
1 
©' © ' © ' 
© © © S O C N 
S O 
- * 
C N 
r-
O s © 
© 
v s © 
C O 
© 
O s 
C N 
© 
o o 
VO 
C N 
C O 
s © 
VO 
© 
V O 
C N 
© C O o © 
S O © © 
C N 
C N © 
r -
© 
o o © © 
o o 
© s 
C N 
— © ' ©' © ' i © ©' © ' 
1 
©' ©• © ' ©' ©• ©' ©' ©' 
1 
© ' i © i © ©' © ' © ' 
00 
© 
C N 
c o 
v s 
C N 
00 
C O 
00 
C N 
© 
© 
O s 
v s 
© 
r -
C O © 
C O 
C O 
© 
C N 
00 
© 
C N 
O s V O 
© 
V ) 
© 
O s r~- C O r - v s o s 
© 
O s 
00 
© 
C O 
o 
r -© © 
C N 
C O © 
© © o o © ©' © ' © © ' © ' © 
1 
© ' © ' ©' © ' 
1 
 ©' 
i 
© ©' o © 
C N 
O s 
c o 
© 
C O 
CM 
C O 
C N 
s o 
© v s 
o 
© C O S O © 
V O 
o o 
© 
O s 
S O 
o 
V O 
C N 
V I 
C O 
o 
C N 
o © C N © o © 
C O 
C O 
© 
VO 
© 
v o 
C O © V ) o 
r - o 
C N 
s o 
C N 
©' © ' ©' ©' © © O ©' ©' © ©' ©' ©' ©' ©' o © o o © © ' 
3 o o v s s o o o © r - C O O s C N o v s . V ) C O C N 
00 C O CN O s V O C O C N © v s s o C N C O O S C O 
C O C O C O C N C O © © © © '—' C N © o o © © © © o ~-© © ' © ' © ' © ' © ' 
1 
© ' © ' © © ' © © ' © ' © ' 
1 
© ' © ' © ' © ' © ' © ' © © ' © 
v s v o r - o o O s © CN C O V ) S O r ~ o o O s © _ C N C O v s s o r -r - r - r - r - o o o o o o o o 00 o o o o o o o o o o O s O s O s O s O S O s O s O S 
O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O s O S O s O s O s 
75 
o s 
o s 
S O 
o s 
o s 
o s 
O S 
O s 
O S 
c i 
O S 
O S 
O S 
O S 
O S 
O S 
© 
O s 
O s 
O s 
o o 
O S 
o o 
O S 
r -
00 
O s 
s o 
O O 
O s 
m 
o o 
O s 
o o 
O S 
I N 
o o 
O s 
o o 
O s 
O 
o o 
O s 
O s 
r -
O s 
o o 
r -
O S 
O s 
S O 
O s 
O S 
o o o 
O <N 
O o o 
o o 
o o o 
2 
o <n 
o o 
— © 
§ 2 
S O O 
© © 
— o o o 
O — O S O o 
© i n r - s o 
— © d o © 
© C l O S s o 
o »n os 
© — O — 
— d o © 
O « » « ifl 
O o o c i O s O s 
o o o o © 
— © o © © 
so so 
s © 
© © 
S O C l cs i n 
o i n o\ '—1 
© o o c s > n o o c s o — © © - ~ 
— © © © 
© ©
© o 
© C l o © 
© s o — o o v O T f i / i m s o 
0 - O N N « m t O 
© © © © — . © — — © 
— © © © © o © o © 
O V I o\ V I 
© C S O O s 
© © — © 
— o © © 
© © C l S O p -
© S O © C l O s 
© © C l © © 
<-! O © O © 
O o o S O 
© i n o o 
© — ' C S 
Tf CS — . 
f - V> 
© o o 
© © © © 
c i CM 
o o s o 
© © 
d © 
I 
C S • * 
— c i 
— © 
© © 
r-- c s 
r - o 
o © 
© © 
5 — © 
© o 
© © 
•sf o o 
© © 
© © 
© •* 
r- — 
© o 
o © 
O s O s 
o © 
— o 
© o 
© 
© 
© 
cs * n O O O S 00 i n 
N O - N h t 
© © © © © — 
© c i C S f -
© — s o © 
© © © — 
— © © ' © 
© t ^ O O S O C S S O — ~ 
© O S O S C I C S O O T J — 
© • * © — — — o © 
— © © © ' © © ' o o 
o s o — u i N - • r - c \ t - « 
© o o i n s o s o c i c i r - ^ v o © — — o © o o o o 
— © ' © o d o © ' © ' © ' © ' © ' © © © 
S O C S s o C S O s 
m if c i c s o o 
© — © — — 
d © d © © 
— O S m i n O s 
s o i n © C l r -o © o — © 
O S C l 
C S — 
© O 
© © ' 
o n h t o o ^ s t o o O " * 
© — — s o c s o s o s o c s m 
© T J - C I C S © 0 0 — © © 
• n c s r - c s c i 
s o © c s o o r ~ 
— © © © — 
© d o d o 
o s 
© © s o r -
© i n 0O C l 
© c i cs cs 
— o d d 
© -~ o in o © cs c s s o © 
O ts1 - N N 
— © o d d 
o o 0 s 5 g 
© P © d 
© 
E © -
r— G\ 
C S P 
© © 
O S 
C l 
C l 
© 
O s 
m s o r - o o 
r - r» r ~ r ~ 
O s O s O s O s 
r— o o o o o o 
O s O S O S O s 
© © 
S O — o 
d © 
© — 
c i o s o © 
c i 
00 00 
O S O S 
s o „ 
o _ 
© 
i n — t C S C l • * 
— i s o © 3 — 
© © © © — 
© © © © © © 
S O O 
8 3 
© d 
• n s o 
o o o o 
o s o s 
• * t > O i n 
- • * 2 . " 1 N 
© © o © © 
© d o © © 
l O O O S © ' 
o o o o O O O S O S 
O S O s O S O s O S 
© 
o © 
Tt 
> n 
Cl 
—'• © 
© © © 
© 
C S 
s o © 
C l 
© d 
o © © 
C l © 00 
— © © © 
o o p o o cs 
> o 00 © © 
>ri cs © 
— d d d i d 
00 © © 
o o 
cs > o © >o © © © 
d 
i © d d d 
O S 
© 
o o 
v s 
© 
cs O S © O S © d © d d d 
© 
O S © 
p ~ r- O O C l cs cs 
d d d d d 
© s o 3 
cs o cs 
s o cs © 
Tt 
© 
© d © d © i 
( N cs © 
s o 
C l © O S © 
© © 
S O 
r-
d d © d d 
r-
c i © 
cs © © © © cs 
Cl cs © 
d d i d d d 
o © o 
cs 
o o 
C l 
© 
VI 
© 
00 
© 
© © © © d i 
S O 
© 
O s © © © 
CN 
C l 
O © 
© 
1 
d d • © d 
VI 
© 
© cs © 
O S © © © © C l o d d © d © i 
O S © 
C S 
C S 
© 
S O 
> o 
O 
o o cs © 
o 
© 
d © © © © 
O s 
v i © o o © cs © 
o o 
© 
cs 
C l © 
© i d • © © © • 
S O 
v s © © 
O S 
© 
cs 
C l © 
O S cs © 
d i © i © © © 
i n © 
o C l v-i © 
C l 
© o 
d d d © d 
s o 
CI © o o o © 
S O 
TI-
C S 
C S 
© 
© i d © d © 
•* cs © 
cs © cs s o C l 
C S 
o o © 
© • © © © © 
cs 
VI © © 
00 cs © 
o 
i n © 
C S cs © 
© 
1 
© i d © © 
CI cs © 
cs 
O S 
O S 
© o cs 
© 
1 
d d © © 
S O 
© 
00 
u-s o C l © 
> n 
C l 
© 
1 © © d © 
r - o 
c s i n 
© © 
© © 
cs C l Tt 
O S O s O S 
O s O s O S 
s - ^ 
S N V I 
P. © o m s o O S O s 
76 
tend to have higher/lower than average exit rate in a different year. Comparisons 
between the tables reveals that entry rates, when measured in terms of employment, 
have the highest correlation between any two years. However, in general the 
correlations are not very high and, therefore, these results indicate that entry/exit rate 
variations across the four-digit manufacturing industries, over the 1974-97 period, are 
due more to transitory rather than industry specific effects. On the contrary, Dunne et al. 
(1988) and Cable and Schwalbach (1991) found that entry and exit measures for 
industries, in their sample, tended to be stable over time (the most stable measure was 
the market share of entering and exiting firms). This led them to conclude that entry and 
exit differences, across industries and over time, were due mostly to the industry 
specific rather than time specific effects. 
3.3.5 The Kruskal-Wallis test for the existence of a consistent ranking of (i) four-
digit manufacturing industries or (ii) years, over the 1974-97 period, in terms of 
the magnitude of their annual entry/exit rates. 
Given that time specific factors have had a more significant impact on entry and exit 
variations, it is beneficial to statistically test, over the 1974-97 period: 1) whether there 
were certain four-digit manufacturing industries with entry rates consistently 
higher/lower than the average, or, with exit rates consistently higher/lower than the 
average and 2) whether, in certain years, entry rates across four-digit manufacturing 
industries are consistently higher/lower than the average, or, exit rates across four-digit 
manufacturing industries, are consistently higher/lower than the average. 
The null in the first hypothesis is that i f four-digit manufacturing industries, over the 
1974-97 period, are ranked, based on the magnitude of their annual entry/exit rates, 
there wil l be no specific order in the ranking. In other words, all industries could appear 
in any positions in the ranking list. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is that certain 
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industries always appear at the top of the ranking list and some others at the bottom. In 
the sample, there are 208 different four-digit manufacturing industries, followed over 24 
years. However, not all industries appear in all years, which leave one with 4963 annual 
entry/exit rates to rank. Ranking the annual entry/exit rates from the highest to the 
lowest (with the highest value having the rank 1 and the lowest value having the rank 
4963), the observed mean rank, by four-digit manufacturing industry, is then calculated. 
Next, based on the magnitude of their observed mean ranks, the four-digit 
manufacturing industries are ranked, but this time from the lowest to the highest (with 
the lowest observed mean rank having the rank 1 and the highest observed mean rank 
having the rank 208; this is shown for entry rates in Table 3.7 and for exit rates in Table 
1 "\ 
3.8 ). The optimum mean ranks in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are calculated based on the 
assumption that a perfectly consistent ranking exists across all the four-digit 
manufacturing industries. A perfectly consistent ranking could exist, i f a given industry, 
having an observed mean rank 'R', was occupying the R t h 24 positions in the first 
ranking list. 
For example, the process engineering contractors industry, in Table 3.7, has the lowest 
observed mean rank. This means, on average, that it has the highest entry rates over the 
1974-97 period. Assuming a perfectly consistent ranking, one would expect this 
industry to occupy the first 21 positions in the initial ranking list, which would result in 
an optimum mean rank of l l 1 4 . On the other hand, the electronic data processing 
equipment industry has the highest observed mean rank in Table 3.7. This means that it 
has the lowest observed entry rates, over the 1974-1997 period. I f a perfectly consistent 
ranking existed, this industry would have an optimum mean rank of 4951.5, as it would 
1 3 Due to the large number of industries, only the top ten industries with the highest and the ten with the lowest 
observed mean ranks are reported 
1 4 Having only 21 observations for the process engineering contractors industry, the average of 1,2,.., 21 would be 
equal to 11. This means that the expected mean rank would be equal to 11, if this industry always had the highest 
entry rates over the 1974-97 period and therefore, would occupy the first 21 positions in the first ranking list. 
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Table 3.7 Mean ranks of entry rates, by four-digit manufacturing industry 
Four digit manufacturing sector Number of Mean rank 
observations Rank Optimum Observed 
Industries with the ten highest entry rates 
Process engineering contractors 21 1 11.0 453.0 
Slaughterhouses 22 2 32.5 453.0 
Animal by-product processing 22 3 54.5 453.0 
Fur goods 16 4 73.5 453.0 
Photographic and cinematographic processing laboratories 9 5 86.0 453.0 
Chemical treatment of oils and fats 23 6 102.0 792.3 
Salt extraction and refining 23 7 125.0 844.1 
Spinning and weaving of flax, hemp & ramie 24 8 148.5 877.8 
Sugar and sugar by products 24 9 172.5 901.2 
Margarine and compound cooking fats 24 10 196.5 908.2 
Industries with the ten lowest entry rates 
Spectacles and unmounted lenses 24 199 4735.5 3521.0 
Alarms and signalling equipment 24 200 4759.5 3542.3 
Soft furnishings 24 201 4783.5 3547.9 
Heat and surface treatments of metals, inclusive sintering 24 202 4807.5 3564.5 
Sawmilling, plarining, etc. of wood 24 203 4831.5 3567.8 
Other building products of concrete, cement, plaster 24 204 4855.5 3599.7 
Ready mixed concrete 24 205 4879.5 3633.8 
Plastics building products 24 206 4903.5 3671.1 
Metal doors, windows, etc. 24 207 4927.5 3676.4 
Electronic data processing equipment 24 208 4951.5 3833.9 
Note: due to the large number of industries mean ranks are reported only for the ten industries with the 
highest and lowest entry rate. 
Table 3.8 Mean ranks of exit rates, by four-digit manufacturing industry 
Four digit manufacturing sector Number of Mean rank 
observations Rank Optimum Observed 
Industries with the ten highest exit rates 
Photographic and cinematographic processing laboratories 9 1 5.0 451.5 
Fur goods 16 2 18.0 451.5 
Process engineering contractors 21 3 37.5 451.5 
Slaughterhouses 22 4 59.5 451.5 
Animal by-product processing 22 5 81.5 451.5 
Chemical treatment of oils and fats 23 6 104.5 639.5 
Salt extraction and refining 23 7 128,0 1189.5 
Starch 24 8 151.5 1189.5 
Margarine and compound cooking fats 24 9 175.5 1233.8 
Motor cycles and parts 24 10 199.5 1273.0 
Industries with the ten lowest exit rates 
Electronic data processing equipment 24 199 4735.5 3359.6 
Women's and girl's light outwear, lingerie and infants' wear 24 200 4759.5 3422.8 
Machinery for working wood, rubber, plastics, leather, 24 201 4783.5 3423.4 
making paper, glass, bricks and similar materials; laundry 
and dry cleaning machinery 
Other building products of concrete, cement, plaster 24 202 4807.5 3440.1 
Extraction of stone, clay, sand & gravel 24 203 4831.5 3440.9 
Printing ink 24 204 4855.5 3467.6 
Compound animal feeds 24 205 4879.5 3469.0 
Spinning and doubling on the cotton system 24 206 4903.5 3548.4 
Soft drinks 24 207 4927.5 3642.8 
Sawmilling, planning, etc. of wood 24 208 4951.5 3938.7 
Note: Due to the large number of industries mean ranks are reported only for the ten industries with the 
highest and lowest exit rate. 
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occupy the last (208 t h) 24 positions in the initial ranking list 1 5. The observed and 
optimum mean ranks for the exit rates (shown in Table 3.8) are calculated in the same 
way as for the entry rates. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is implemented by comparing the observed mean ranks with 
an expected mean rank that would result i f a perfectly random ranking existed across all 
the four-digit manufacturing industries16. The chi-square test of the null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference between the observed and the expected mean ranks is 
1 7 
highly significant . Therefore, one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
consistent ranking of the four-digit manufacturing industries in terms of their entry/exit 
rates, over the 1974-1997 period. In other words, over the 1974-97 period, there were 
certain four-digit manufacturing industries with consistently higher/lower than average 
entry rates. Similarly, certain four-digit manufacturing industries have, consistently, 
higher/lower than average exit rates. 
In order to test the second hypothesis, the entry/exit rates for the four-digit 
manufacturing industries, over the 1974-1997 period (4963 observations), are ranked 
from the highest to the lowest (with the highest entry/exit rate having the rank 1 and the 
lowest having the rank 4963). However, on this occasion, the observed mean rank is 
calculated by year. Next, years are ranked, based on the value of their observed mean 
ranks (with the lowest observed mean rank having the rank 1 and the highest observed 
mean rank having the rank 24). The optimum mean rank is also calculated based on the 
assumption that a perfectly consistent ranking of the years exists across all the four-digit 
1 5 Having 24 observations for this industry, if it was to occupy the last 24 positions in the first ranking list, it would 
have an expected mean rank of 4951.5, which is equal to the average value of 4940, 4941,..., 4963. 
1 6 Note that the expected mean ranks are calculated based on the assumption that the null hypothesis is 
true (these values are not reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8). This means that i f the four-digit manufacturing 
industries were ranked based on the value of their entry/exit rates, over the 1974-97 period, there would 
be no specific order in the ranking and all industries would appear in all positions in the ranking list. 
1 7 The value of the x2 test of the null hypothesis of no consistency of the four-digit manufacturing industry's entry 
rates, over the 1974-97 period, is equal to 1198.507 and the associated p-value is equal to 0.000 (the degree of 
freedom is equal to 207). Similarly, the value of the x2 test of the null hypothesis of no consistency of the four-digit 
manufacturing industry's exit rates, over the 1974-97 period, is equal to 868.175 and the associated p-value is equal 
to 0.000 (the degree of freedom is equal to 207). 
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manufacturing industries. A perfectly consistent ranking could exist i f a given year, 
having an observed mean rank 'R', was occupying the R t h 208 positions in the first 
ranking list. 
Therefore, having a perfectly consistent ranking, one would expect the year with the 
highest entry/exit rate to occupy the 1 s t 208 places in the initial ranking list and, 
therefore, have an expected mean rank equal to 104.518 (The observed and the optimum 
mean ranks by year are reported in Tables 3.9 for the entry rates, and in Table 3.10 for 
the exit rates). The Kruskal-Wallis test is then implemented by comparing the observed 
mean ranks with an expected mean rank that would result i f a perfectly random ranking 
of years existed across all the four-digit manufacturing industries19. The p-value 
associated with the test of the null hypothesis, that there is no consistent ranking of the 
years, in terms of the entry/exit rates, is significant at better than the 1% level of 
significance. Therefore, one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between the observed and the expected mean ranks20. This means that certain 
years, in the sample (from 1974-97), were characterised with significantly higher/lower 
than average entry rates. Similarly, certain years were characterised with significantly 
higher/lower than average exit rates. 
In Table 3.9, it is evident that the highest entry rates are observed in the late 1970s 
(1977, 1978 and 1979) and the lowest entry rates in the late 1990s (1994, 1996, 1997, 
1995). Similarly, in Table 3.10 the highest exit rates are observed in the second half of 
the 1970s and the lowest exit rates in the late 1990s. This shows that entry and exit rates 
were higher in years of boom (during the late 1970s). However, the downturn in the 
1 8 The actual number of four-digit manufacturing industries in 1979 (the year with the highest observed mean rank) is 
equal to 207. Therefore the expected mean rank for that year is equal to 104, which is the average of 1, 2,..., 207. 
1 9 The expected mean ranks are not reported in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 
2 0 The value ofthe potest for the consistency of the entry rates, across the 1974-1997 period, is equal to 1224.119 and 
the associated p-value is equal to 0.000 (the degree of freedom is equal to 23). Similarly, the value of the x2 test for 
the consistency of the exit rates, across 1974-97 period, is equal to 1447.129 and the associated p-value is equal to 
0.000 (the degree of freedom is equal to 23). 
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Table 3.9 Mean ranks of entry rates, by year 
Year Number of observations Rank Mean rank 
Optimum Observed 
1979 207 1 104.0 1364.6 
1978 207 2 311.0 1503.4 
1977 207 3 518.0 1517.5 
1983 205 4 724.0 1623.6 
1981 207 5 930.0 1706.0 
1982 205 6 1136.0 1746.5 
1980 207 7 1342.0 1850.5 
1976 207 8 1549.0 2017.0 
1975 207 9 1756.0 2057.1 
1991 207 10 1963.0 2377.3 
1993 206 11 2169.5 2426.5 
1990 207 12 2376.0 2545.3 
1986 208 13 2583.5 2549.5 
1974 207 14 2791.0 2561.8 
1987 208 15 2998.5 2709.8 
1988 208 16 3206.5 2782.5 
1989 208 17 3414.5 2833.5 
1992 207 18 3622.0 2913.6 
1985 208 19 3829.5 2971.1 
1984 208 20 4037.5 3219.5 
1996 204 21 4243.5 3229.3 
1994 206 22 4448.5 3286.2 
1997 198 23 4650.5 3725.8 
1995 205 24 4852.0 3999.6 
Table 3.10 Mean ranks of exit rates, by year 
Year Number of observations Rank Mean rank 
Optimum Observed 
1974 207 1 104.0 1288.8 
1979 207 2 311.0 1551.0 
1978 207 3 518.0 1672.1 
1976 207 4 725.0 1674.7 
1977 207 5 932.0 1709.1 
1975 207 6 1139.0 1811.2 
1980 207 7 1346.0 2050.8 
1986 208 8 1553.5 2131.5 
1983 205 9 1760.0 2192.2 
1985 208 10 1966.5 2301.7 
1987 208 11 2174.5 2384.1 
1988 208 12 2382.5 2484.1 
1989 208 13 2590.5 2486.7 
1993 206 14 2798.0 2500.1 
1984 208 15 3004.0 2502.5 
1990 207 16 3210.5 2629.3 
1991 207 17 3418.0 2650.3 
1982 205 18 3625.0 2664.1 
1992 207 19 3832.0 2664.7 
1981 207 20 4039.0 2683.5 
1994 206 21 4245.5 3351.0 
1995 205 22 4451.5 3496.3 
1996 204 23 4657.0 4054.8 
1997 198 24 4861.5 4689.6 
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1990-2 years did not have an impact on the entry and the exit rates, as these years 
appear in the middle of the ranking list in both Tables21. 
The main findings of this section are as follows: 1) certain four-digit manufacturing 
industries were characterised with having consistently higher/lower than average entry 
rates, over the 1974-97 period, and certain industries with having consistently 
higher/lower than average exit rates; 2) certain years were characterised with having 
consistently higher/lower than average entry rates, across the four-digit manufacturing 
industries, and certain years with having consistently higher/lower than average exit 
rates and 3) over the 1974-97 period, the highest entry and exit rates were observed in 
the years of boom which could indicate that entry and exit may be pro-cyclical. 
3.3.6 Length of life of new plants 
In order to capture the more dynamic aspect of the entrants' life, it is useful to follow 
each cohort of entrants that entered during the 1974-97 period, over time, and calculate 
the proportion of plants that close in each year following entry. This is done by dividing 
the number of plants that close in each year following entry, by the total number of 
plants in that cohort in the initial year (Table 3.1122). Starting from the year 1974, out of 
4365 plants that opened in this year, 11.3% exit in the 1 s t year following entry, 8.1% in 
the 2 n d year, 6.9% in the 3 r d year and this continues until the 23 r d year (1997), when the 
exit rate is equal to 1.6%. It is evident that while almost 50% of entrants exit by the 7 t h 
2 1 Although changes in the registration of the plants in 1984 and 1994 resulted in an increase in the entry and the exit 
rates at the total manufacturing level, it did not have the same impact across the four-digit manufacturing industries. 
This is evident by comparison between Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.2. In Table 3.2 these years were characterised with a 
high entry and exit rates, while neither in Table 3.9 nor in Table 3.10 do they appear at the top of the ranking list. The 
reason is that these changes only affected industries with a large number of small plants and not all industries, which 
implies that the number of the four-digit manufacturing industries affected by the changes were less than the ones not 
affected. However, those affected were so populated by small plants, which increased the entry and exit rates at the 
total manufacturing level to a large extent. 
2 2 Figures in Table 3.11 are calculated using the weighted selected file. The number of plants that opened in a given 
year is weighted, in order to be a representative of the entire population of plants that opened in that year. Next, based 
on the information provided in the ARE), regarding the closure year of plants, the proportion of them that close each 
year following entry, are calculated. 
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year, the proportion of them that make it to 1997 is only 6.9%. This indicates that some 
93% of plants have exited, before the end of the period under study. Moving to the year 
1975, out of 2608 plants that opened in this year, 8.8% survive for just 1 year, 5.6% for 
just two years, 12% for just 3 years and this continues until the 22 n d year (1997), when 
6.5% of plants close. A similar pattern to that in the 1974 cohort is also observed here. 
As the exit rates tend to decrease, over 50% of entrants (53.1%) exit by the 7 t h year. 
Compared to the entrants of adjacent years, entrants of 1984 and 1985 show a relatively 
higher first year exit rate. This is mainly due to the changes to using the VAT 
registrations, which happened in 1984 and 198523. As time proceeds, especially towards 
the 1990's, very intense competition is observed, which shows itself in significantly 
higher exit rates compared to the previous years. As was explained previously, this 
could be due partly to change in the plant registrations that occurred post-1992 (the 
change to IDBR registrations24); although it is difficult to separate the two effects. Post-
1992, 1 s t year exit rates increased, to the extent that 41.4% of 1996 entrants exit in the 
1 s t year after entry. In order to get an overall picture, one can take an average of the exit 
rates (shown in Table 3.11), by year after opening, across all the cohorts (Figure, 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 Average exit rate in cohort of entrants in years following entry (percentage of plants) 
16 -i 1 
14 -
JJ> 10 -
2 - ~* — 
0 I ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r——T 1 1 1 1 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 
Year after opening 
2 3 This is fully explained in Section 3.2. Note, that the VAT register discovered more small plants existed, than were 
previously in the ARD. 
The IDBR discovered far more small plants than were registered, previously. However, the problem associated 
with matching identities of some existing plants, before and after change into IDBR registration, translated itself into 
high exit rates in these years. 
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The 1 s t year's average exit rate (the first point in Figure 3.4) is calculated by taking an 
average of all the 1 s t year exit rates across the entry cohorts (the first line of the columns 
in Table 3.11). The 2 n d year's average exit rate is calculated by taking an average of all 
the 2 n d year exit rates across the entry cohorts (the second line of the columns in Table 
3.11). This continues until the 23 r d year's average exit rate, which is calculated by 
getting an average of all the 23 r d year exit rates across all the entry cohorts (the only 
observed 23 r d year exit rate in Table 3.11 is for the entrants in 1974). 
The average exit rate, shown in Figure 3.4, decreases as the cohorts age. Starting from 
a high of 13.6% in the 1 s t year, it reduces gradually, reaching 1.6% in the 23 r d year 
following entry. On average, 47.3% (almost half) of entrants exit before the 5 t h year. 
One can see, that although a large number of plants open each year, the majority of 
them exit shortly after entry. 
However, the reduction in exit rates, shown in Table 3.11 and Figure 3.4, are in part a 
natural consequence. The reason is that out of a fixed number of plants, there wil l be 
less remaining as more exits take place. Therefore, the denominator of the ratio (number 
of plants in the first year when a cohort came into existence) remains constant, while the 
numerator (number of plants that exit in each year following entry) reduces. Mata et al. 
(1995) studied the life duration of Portuguese manufacturing plants, which were created 
during the 1983-89 period. They found that more than 20% of them died during their 
first year, about 50% in the first 4 years, and less than 30% of the entire group survived 
for 7 years. Dunne, et al. (1989) also found that in US manufacturing industries, 39.7% 
of all firms exited within five years of entry and 70% within ten years of entry. 
In order to discover the risk attached to each period following entry, and using the 
same methodology, entrants are followed over time, but on this occasion hazard rates 
are calculated (Table 3.12). The hazard rate is defined as the probability of closing in a 
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specific time period, having survived up to that time. The difference between the two 
measures is that the denominator of the hazard rate is the total number of surviving 
plants at the beginning of each time period . 
There is no systematic pattern discovered in the hazard rates, although a careful 
examination of the figures reveals that hazard rates tend to increase towards the 1990s, 
especially in the late 1990s. In order to get an overall picture, one can get an average of 
the hazard rates (shown in Table 3.12) across the cohorts, by each year after opening 
(Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5 Average hazard rate of closure by years after opening 
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The mean by which each point, in Figure 3.5, is calculated is similar to that used in 
Figure 3.4. The 1 s t year's average hazard rate is calculated by getting an average of the 
1 s t row of the column in Table 3.12; the 2 n d year's average hazard rate, by getting an 
average of the 2 n d row of the columns; and this continues until the 23 r d year's average 
hazard rate, by getting an average of the 23 r d row of the columns. Starting from 13.6% 
in the 1 s t year following entry (Figure, 3.5), hazard rates do not show a systematic 
pattern until the 14 th year after entry. However, after the 14 th year the hazard rate 
2 5 The denominator of the figures in Table 3.11 is the total number of entrants in the year they entered. 
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increases, reaching a high of 19.2% in the 23 r year following entry. This pattern could 
be due, partly, to the presence of high competition and change to IDBR registration, 
which resulted in higher hazard rates in those years. 
However, this result is rather surprising and controversial, i f compared with previous 
findings found in the literature. Boeri and Bellmann (1995) and Mata et al. (1995) both 
found that the hazard rate of entrants decreased with their age. This refers to the impact 
of learning-by-doing (associated with age), on plant survival2 6. In Geroski (1995), this is 
represented as a 'stylised' fact, that 'both firm size and age are correlated with the 
survival of entrants'. He explains that turnover and exit are the by-products of the 
process in which firms adjust themselves to the turbulent environment, through 
information acquisition. At the same time, not only is information costly and some 
entrants underinvest in information gathering, but also in the presence of a changing 
market environment, the type of actions, which they need to take in order to survive, 
also changes. This, according to Geroski {op. cit), shows clearly that the ability of 
entrants to learn about their changing environment directly affects their growth and, 
consequently, their survival. Therefore, the slower their process of learning, the more 
likely they are to decline in size and eventually exit. At the same time, as learning 
comes with the age of plants, this shows the impact of age on the growth and the 
likelihood of survival. 
The findings of this section are as follows: 1) on average, 43.7% (almost half) of 
entrants survived for less than five years; 2) exit rates on average fall as a cohort ages, 
which is in part due to the high closure of plants in the first few years after entry and 3) 
no clear pattern was found in the hazard rates in the first 14 years after entry, although 
there is some evidence that it increased afterwards. This increase may be due, partly, to 
2 6 This effect will be investigated further in Section 5.3.4.2, when studying the impact of initial size, current size and 
age on the plants' likelihood of closure. 
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the economic boom and high competition in the late 1990s. However, this finding 
indicates that there was no specific risk attached to the first 14 years following entry. 
3.3.7 Distribution of closures by age 
An alternative way to capture the dynamics of plant opening and closure is to 
calculate the age of the plants that close in a given year, based on the year they opened. 
Following this we can also calculate the contribution of plants of various ages to total 
closure in that year. This is done, separately, for the closures of each year, over the 
1974-97 period (Table 3.13). 
Taking the year 1997, out of 2651 closures27 that occurred in this year, 17.5% opened 
in 1996, 25.5% opened in 1995, 15.0% opened in 1994, while 11.4% opened before 
1974. Sudden increases in the closure of one-year-old plants, in 1984-85 and 1993, are 
again due to the changes that happened in the ARD, as explained in Section 3.2. The 
competitive environment of the late 1990s resulted in a very high closure rate of young 
(especially one year old) plants. This is evident by examining the proportion of one-
year-old plants that closed in 1995 and 1996, which were 50.9% and 41.4%, 
respectively. The evidence on the age distribution of closed plants is varied: in some 
years (for example 1983) one year old plants contribute least to the total closure and in 
some other years (for example 1995) they contribute most. 
This figure is calculated using the weighted selected file. 
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Next, one can add up the percentages in each column of Table 3.13, in order to get the 
contribution of plants that opened in and after 1974, to total closures in each year. This 
way one can discover how the proportion changes over time, in comparison to the 
contribution of those plants that opened prior to 1974. These proportions are depicted 
according to year in Figure 3.6. As can be seen, plants that opened prior to 1974 
contributed more to total exit until 1983 (10 years into the study time period), when the 
relationship reverses and the newer entrants contribute more to the total exit. The trend 
is a natural outcome, as year by year there are fewer remaining plants from the fixed 
number that entered before 1974. However, Figure 3.6 shows how long it takes for the 
exiting of the new entrants to overtake those of the more established plants. This shows 
the high level of dynamics in the UK manufacturing industries and the increasing 
importance of entrants, in terms of numbers, as compared with older plants. 
Figure 3.6 Contribution of plants that entered pre-1974 in comparison to 
those that entered post-1974 to total plant closure against year 
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3.3.8 Comparing length of life of entrants with incumbents 
In this section the experience of entrants for a given year in the years following entry 
is compared with the experience of those plants that existed at the beginning of the year 
(incumbents). A reason for carrying out this exercise is to find out, in the years 
following entry, whether incumbents possess any advantage over entrants, in terms of 
having a lower hazard rate or exit rate. Take the year 1974 as an example28, total plants 
in this year are divided into two sub-groups: new entrants and incumbents. Then, these 
sub-groups are followed over time (the process is the same as in Tables 3.11 and 3.12) 
and compared, in terms of their exit rate and hazard rate, in each year following entry. 
The exit rates and hazard rates of the two sub-groups are depicted against the year after 
opening in Figure 3.7. 
Comparing the exit rate of plants that opened in 1974 with the exit rate of plants that 
opened prior to 1974, one can see that the exit rate of both groups decreases over time, 
although it is more gradual for the incumbents. Starting from a value of 0.113, the exit 
rate of entrants stays higher than that of the incumbents, until the 10 th year after entry. 
However, the difference decreases over time, but from 1987 (the 13 th year after entry) 
the relationship reverses and the exit rate of entrants falls below that of the incumbents. 
This relationship is due, partly, to the high closure rate of entrants in the initial years 
after entry. That is the number of survivors falls rapidly over time, hence their exit rate 
drops even more than that of the 1974 incumbents. 
There is no specific reason behind the choice of years. However, the experience of entrants to that of incumbents, in 
the years following entry, could be different, depending on the year. Therefore, to avoid any bias, 1974 is picked as 
an early year from the period under study and 1985, as a middle year. 
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Trends in the hazard rates are not very clear, since for both groups it is increasing over 
time (specially for the incumbents). However, the entrants in 1974 face a higher hazard 
(risk) of closure in comparison to the 1974 incumbents in any year after 1974 (except 
for 1993, 1995 and 1997). This means that having survived up to any point in time, 
1974 entrants face a higher risk of closure compared to the plants that opened before 
1974. This is clear in Figure 3.7, as the line showing 1974 entrants' hazard rate lies well 
above that of the incumbents. 
The same exercise is repeated for the 1985 entrants and incumbents (Figure 3.8). 
Similar trends are observed for the exit rates and the hazard rates. As the exit rates 
decrease over time, it is more gradual for the 1985 incumbents. Starting from 0.231, the 
exit rate of the 1985 entrants stays higher than that of the 1985 incumbents until 1991 
(the 6 t h year after entry). Post-1993, the exit rate of entrants falls below that of the 
incumbents and remains lower afterwards. With regards to the hazard rates, the increase 
is obvious for the 1985 incumbents, while there is no clear trend in the hazard rate for 
the 1985 entrants. Starting from a high of 0.231, the hazard rate of entrants remains 
higher than that of the incumbents in any year post-1985 (except for 1995). 
A common pattern was observed in both examples. In the first few years after entry, 
entrants had a higher exit rate, relative to those plants that existed at the beginning of 
the entry period. However, following the initially high closure of entrants, their exit rate 
decreased sharply and, finally, dropped below that of the incumbents. On the other 
hand, in every year following their entry (except those years mentioned), the entrants 
faced a higher risk of closure relative that of the incumbents. This, obviously, shows the 
clear disadvantage that the entrants face relative to the incumbents, which increases 
their risk of closure in the subsequent years. As is explained in the literature, this 
advantage for incumbents comes from two aspects: 1) the strategic implications of 
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having a first mover advantage and 2) the different asymmetries that are created by 
incumbents, such as cost asymmetries, capacity asymmetries, brand loyalty and all the 
other factors that affect a firm's profits. These two aspects, in total, create what is 
known as the value of incumbency (Freshtman, 1996). As a result, the new plants, in 
any period after entry, face disadvantages relative to the incumbents. However, the 
associated disadvantage reduces as they age. 
3.3.9 Growth of the surviving plants 
In order to characterise the post-entry experience of the surviving plants, this section 
first looks at the average size of new plants (measured in real gross value added), in 
each year following entry. By following entrants for each year, over the 1974-97 period, 
the average real G V A 2 9 (real gross value added) of the surviving plants is considered for 
each year following entry (Table 3.14). As can be seen from Table 3.14, the average 
size of the surviving plants tends to increase the longer they stay in operation (although 
there are decreases in some years). Taking 1974 as an example, the average size of a 
plant that opened in this year (measured in terms of real GVA) is £43,000, which 
steadily increases to an average size of £144,000 in 1997. 
To get an overall picture of the post-entry growth of plants, one can calculate the 
average of the average size of the surviving plants (shown in Table 3.14), across all the 
entry cohorts, in each year following entry. The calculated average sizes are plotted 
against year after opening in Figure 3.9. The 1 s t year's average size (shown in Figure 
3.9) is calculated by getting an average of the first row of the columns across all the 
cohorts in Table 3.14, the 2 n d year's average size is the average of the second row of the 
columns, and this continues until the 23 r d year. Having an average real GVA of £43,000 
2 9 Real gross value added is calculated, as real gross output minus intermediate output. The base year in this case is 
1990. 
100 
0) 
'E a. 
© 
Os 
OS 
T3 
a 
CA s o 
X3 
4) 
T3 a s .a =+« 
Os 
Os 
I 
OS 
a cs 
OJ) 
a 
9 
o 
OS 
»> 
i« 
O 
>-
M 
M 
CS 
4) 
ro 
4) 
3 
M 
H 
i n 
oo 
OS 
oo 
OS 
r o 
oo 
Os 
CN 
OO 
Os 
oo 
Os 
T3 
<L> a u a. o 
U 
4> 
o 
oo 
Os 
Os 
r -
Os 
oo 
r-
Os 
r -
OS 
SO 
OS 
i n 
Os 
Os 
SO r~ o o 00 i n CN m so CN t— —< 
CN so oo oo OS Os OS ~ CN oo r s 
d © d d d d d d 
Os i n >n so — oo fN 00 so os m 
r s oo CO OS q q q Os tN r o »-H sq 
d d d d d 
m m o\ •<* ro •3- so 00 CN o ro so 
>n SO so m m 00 OS 00 00 so q sq 00 
d d d d d d d d d d r—< »—< d 
os r - OS CN ro t Os Os Os 
SO r - i n 00 Os oo oo oo CN fN r-; q 
d d d d d d d d d d d I — 1 d 
f - SO [-~ 
r o TJ- so 
d d d © 
00 
fN 
m 
»—1 
SO 
o 
OO 
00 r o <N 
r -
Os 
q 
r -
>n 
r o 
oo 
d d d d d d d d —< *—t 
r o r -
~ d 
o 
>n ^ -
r o oo o 
q 
>n 
oo i n 
f N 
oo 
d d d d d d d 
- H f N SO O s so Os r o ^t" oo CN| f N fNI —; i n 
H H (S H d 
Os r o r o i f N >n so Os so oo CN SO 
i n i n so 00 f - ; q 00 q <n so Os 
d d d d d 
Tj" 00 00 O f N 
t r o so f N r o 
so r- 3 00 r o CN t-- Os f N f N i n q q Os Os q 
d d d d d d d d 
> n O — < f N f N 0 0 f N O O 
SO os so SO 
m ro 
d d d d d 
O OS 
m >n oo 
o d d 
so 
>n 
00 >n 
f--
r o 
q 
SO f N o 
— i i n 
r - r o SO 
i n 
O 
r o 
OS 
sq 
d d d d CN r o r o r o 
• n o s o s ^ i n r - i n c N s o 
w i m t s O i f i ^ v n o o 
d d d d d d d d ^ 
Os OS o\ 
i n SO sq 
d d d d 
r - i n r o t ~ ~ r o t ~ ~ r ~ ^ } - o o 
r ~ - r - s o s o o s o s > n r - s o d d d d d d ^ d d 
© >n r - r - oo m oo n t * ^ - i n 
d d d d d d d 
ro CN so m 
Tf Tf i n m 
d d d d 
OS 
Os 
OS 
r - OO 
i n 
q 
i n 
ro 
oo 
q 
r -
CN 
<n 
ro 
t -
Os 
O 
q 
r -
OS 
ro 
sq 
OS 
ro 
d d d ro CN CN 
o r o 
>n >n >n i n i n 
d d d d d 
Os 00 CN i n 
q Os t - oo 
—I d d d 
r~ oo T-< os TJ-
Os O — Os O so 
o « « 6 «' -
•<r r- os 
>n CN 
>n SO 00 Os o J—1 CN r o >n so oo Os O fN r o 
r - r - r - oo oo oo 00 OO oo oo oo 00 oo Os OS OS OS 
Os OS OS Os Os OS Os Os Os OS Os OS Os Os Os Os Os Os Os Os 
TJ- >n so r -
u 
a 
u 
a . 
© 
00 ON 
co CN 
O O 
f- m Tj-in r~ T | -
o d d 
ON CN — 
t m N N 
d o d o 
CN o O N CN in 
ON 00 m 
d d d d 
oo T—1 ON CN in © 00 oo 
d d —< d d 
o co CN 00 co in O S T T 
d d d »—1 
CN 
d o o d d n o o 
00 o o r - ON o 
CO CO N O o\ in 
d d d d d d d d d 
N O co t CO o r - co CO co •3- in N O co q t . N O N O d d d d d 
CN o r-- o r- in ON co 
N O in in in 00 r - p »—< ON 
O O d d d d d d d 
•* N O co N O CN oo co CN in N O r-- N O r- p r ~ p N O 
d d d d d d d 
in N O r- oo ON o (N co in N O f- oo ON o in N O c-~ r - r- 00 oo 00 00 00 oo oo oo 00 00 ON ON O N O N ON ON ON O N 
ON O S O N ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON o\ ON ON ON ON O N 
102 
Figure 3.9 Average size of entrants, measured in real gross value added, in years following entry 
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Years after opening 
in the initial year (as shown in Figure 3.9) the size of the surviving plants tends to 
increase following entry. It reaches the average size of £221,000, by the 20 t h year, and 
decreases afterwards. 
In Section 3.3.6 it was found that, on average, about 50% of entrants leave before the 
5 t h year. However, Figure 3.9 shows that despite the high mortality rate, those that 
survive tend to grow significantly in size, as time progresses. This being so, it is useful 
to consider the extent to which the growth of the surviving plants increases the overall 
size (measured in real gross value added) of the entry cohort to which they belong. Two 
factors affect the size of a given cohort over time: the closure of plants tends to reduce 
the number of plants in that cohort and, therefore, its overall size; while the growth of 
the surviving plants tends to increase the cohort's size. Whether the overall impact is a 
reduction or increase in size of that cohort depends on the magnitude of these forces. To 
test this, one needs to follow each cohort of entrants over time and find the aggregate 
size of the cohort, as a percentage of its size in the year it came into existence (Table 
3.15)30. One can see that size of the cohorts tend to decrease in the majority of cases as 
3 0 Note, that in Table 3.15 the overall size of a given cohort, in each year following entry, is divided by the overall 
size of the same cohort, in the year it came into existence. The overall size is calculated by adding up the real gross 
value added of all the plants belonging to that cohort. This differs from Table 3.14 in that, Table 3.14 looked at the 
average size of the surviving plants belonging to a given cohort, in each year following entry. 
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the cohort ages. Taking the 1974 cohort as an example, its overall size (in terms of 
real gross value added) in 1975 was 90% of its size in 1974. In 1976 it was 89% and 
this continued until 1997, when its overall size was only about 6% of its size in 1974. In 
order to get an overall picture, one needs to take an average of the ratios, shown in 
Table 3.15, across all the entry cohorts, in each year following entry (Figure 3.1031). 
Figure 3.10 Average GVA across all cohorts from 1974-97 in each year after 
opening (numbers are expressed as a percentage of the initial year GVA) 
* 0.60 
Gross value added relative 
to initial year 
>> 0.80 -
3 0.70 -
•£ 0.30 
Pi 0.10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Years after opening 
One can see that, on average, the overall size (measured in real GVA) of a given 
cohort, which entered between 1974-97, tends to decrease as it ages. This clearly shows 
that, as time proceeds, the negative impact on the overall size (due to the closure of 
plants) is greater than the positive impact on the overall size (due to the growth of the 
surviving plants). 
In order to find out how the share of the cohorts changes over time the associated 
shares (relative to total manufacturing real GVA and plant numbers) are calculated for 
each cohort. Note, these shares are also divided by the first year's shares, in order to 
determine whether they have increased or decreased in relative terms (Table 3.16 and 
3.17). 
3 1 Figure 3.10 is obtained from Table 3.15 going through exactly the same procedure, as that used in Figure 3.9. The 
1st year's figure (plotted in Figure 3.10) is calculated, by getting an average of the 1st row of the columns in Table 
3.15; the 2 n d year's figure, by getting an average of the 2 n d second rows of the columns; and this continues until the 
23 r d year's figure, by getting an average of the 23 r d row of the columns. 
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Therefore, Table 3.16 shows each cohort's share of the total number of manufacturing 
plants, in each year following entry, divided by its share in the first year the cohort came 
into existence. Table 3.17 repeats this exercise for real GVA shares rather than plant 
numbers. Figure 3.11 3 2 shows the average of the ratios, shown in Table 3.16 and 3.17, 
for each year since their opening, across all entry cohorts. 
Figure 3.11 Share of the surviving plants vis-a-vis all manufacturing plants: GVA 
share and number of plants (as a percentage of the initial year, 1974-97) 
• Share of total number of 
plants 
A— Share of total gross value 
added 
•5 0.30 
3 0.20 
Years after opening 
One can see that, on average, the share of a cohort (from the total manufacturing 
number of plants and real GVA); relative to its share in the first year, decreases as it 
ages. However, the decrease in its share from the total manufacturing plants is more 
than the decrease in its share from the total manufacturing real GVA. This shows that 
small plants (in terms of real GVA) exit first. 
Finally, it is possible to measure the cumulative share (of the total manufacturing real 
GVA) of the cohorts of entrants, in a given year, over the 1974-97 period (shown in 
Figure 3.12). This is done, by adding up the share of the individual cohorts, from total 
manufacturing real GVA, in a given year. Over time, entrants contribute more and more 
3 2 The process, in order to get the data for Figure 3.11, is the same as that for Figure 3.10 and 3.9. The squares were 
obtained from figures in Table 3.16 and the triangles from figures in Table 3.17. 
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to the total manufacturing GVA (this is evident in Figure 3.12 from the bolded black 
line). However, the associated share for each cohort decreases. By 1997, entrants 
account for some 51% of the total manufacturing's GVA, while the remaining 49% of 
GVA belongs to those plants that entered before 1974. Figure 3.12 can be better 
understood, when looked at in conjunction with Figure 3.13 and Table 3.15. Figure 3.13 
shows the real GVA of the manufacturing industries as a whole, over the 1974-97 
period. 
Figure 3.13 Total manufacturing real G V A 
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In order to analyse Figure 3.12, one needs to consider how this Figure and both Figure 
3.13 and Table 3.15 were calculated. Therefore, we define GVAc t as the real gross value 
added of a given cohort in year t; GVAd, as the real gross value added of that cohort in 
the year it enteredrGVAin<j t, as real gross value added of the manufacturing industries in 
year t; and GVAj ndi, as real gross value added of the manufacturing industries in the 
initial year that the cohort entered. The numbers in Table 3.15 were obtained by 
calculating GVAc t/GVAci; those in Figure 3.12 by (GVAc t/GVAjndt) and those in Figure 
3.13 by GVAjndt- From Figure 3.13 it is evident that GVAindt is decreasing over time 
(although one can observe some peaks in 1976, 1984, 1989 and 199433). In Table 3.15 it 
3 3 The reason for the two peaks in 1984 and 1994 (as was explained in Section 3.2) is due to the changes into the 
VAT and IDBR registration, which resulted in a large number of small plants being discovered and, consequently, an 
increase in the size of the manufacturing industries (both in terms of number of plants and real GVA). 
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can be seen that GVAct/GVAd decreases over time; the denominator being constant, this 
means that GVAc t is decreasing over time. The observed decrease in (GVAct/GVAjndt) in 
Figure 3.12 shows that over time the decrease in GVAc t had been greater than the 
decrease in GVA i n d t . For 1976, 1984, 1989 and 1994, the GVA i n d t actually increased. 
Therefore, the reduction in (GVAct/GVAjndt) was even greater (see Figure 3.12). 
These results are similar to those found by Dunne et al. (1989), in that they also found 
that the market share of the cohort of entrants, that entered the US manufacturing 
industries over the 1963-82 period, declined over time. This was due, mainly, to the exit 
of 61.5% of entrants within the first five years since entry and 79.6% within the first ten 
years. On the contrary, Baldwin (1995) found that in Canadian manufacturing 
industries, over the 1970-82 period, the share of new firms from the total manufacturing 
value added, increased over time. However, their share of the total number of firms 
decreased. This showed that the surviving firms grew significantly in size. 
The findings of this section are as follows: 1) on average, the size (measured in real 
gross value added) of a new plant that opened between 1974-97 increased over time; 2) 
the reduction in the overall size of the cohorts of entrants (measured in real GVA), due 
to the closure of their plants, was greater than the increase in their overall size, due to 
increase in the real GVA of their plants; 3) the share of a given cohort of entrants, from 
the total manufacturing number of plants and their real GVA, declined over time; 
however, the decline in the share from the number of plants was greater than that from 
real GVA and 4) the cumulative share of entrants from the total manufacturing's real 
GVA increased, as time progressed. At the same time, the associated share for each 
individual cohort was decreasing. This decrease was even greater than the decline in the 
total manufacturing real GVA. 
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3.3.10 The cumulative (long-run) entry and exit rates 
Cumulative entry rate is defined as the number of plants that opened between t-n and t 
(denoted here by En t), divided by the total number of plants in year t (St). Similarly, the 
cumulative exit rate is defined as the number of plants that closed between t-n and n 
(Ex t), divided by the total number of plants in t-n (S t.n). In both definitions, 'n ' refers to 
the number of lags in years. By choosing n=l , one can obtain the annual entry and exit 
rates (shown in Table 3.2). As n increases, the entry and exit rates can be obtained over 
a longer period. Panel A in Table 3.18 shows the long-run entry and exit rates (both in 
terms of number of plants and employment). The first five rows of Panel A are obtained 
by putting n=4 (except for the 1994-97 interval, where n=3). However, in order to 
measure entry and exit rates for a longer-run (over the 1974-97 interval), the last row of 
Panel A is calculated, when n=23. Panel B, in Table 3.18, shows the average annual 
entry and exit rates over the same intervals. These are obtained by calculating the 
average of the annual rates in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.18 Long-run entry and exit rates, measured by number of plants and employment, using 
the weighted selected file, 1974-97 (figures are percentages) 
Entry rates Exit rates 
Number of plants Employment Number of plants Employment 
Panel A: Long-run rates 
1974-1978 21.6 5.5 24.9 8.8 
1979-1983 16.9 5.7 26.4 13.7 
1984-1988 35.0 12.2 27.7 12.2 
1989-1993 28.2 10.3 34.5 17.1 
1994-1997 46.8 32.0 48.2 33.2 
1974-1997 89.7 62.6 85.4 63.2 
Panel B: Average annual 
rates within each period 
1974-1978 6.5 1.6 6.6 1.7 
1979-1983 3.4 1.2 7.5 2.6 
1984-1988 21.8 4.8 7.2 2.9 
1989-1993 14.5 3.8 3.5 3.5 
1994-1997 23.2 11.6 12.8 12.8 
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I f turnover process is marginal, entry happens only in the fringe of industries and 
entrants exit shortly after entry, then there wil l not be a large difference between the 
accumulated entry rates (the first two columns of Panel A) and the average short-run 
entry rates (the first two columns of Panel B), over a given interval. I f one conceives the 
extreme case that entrants only survive for one year, then there wi l l be no accumulated 
entry over time and the long-run entry rate (over the t-n, t interval) only includes 
entrants in period t. The longer lasting the entry, the greater wil l be the difference 
between the accumulated entry rate and the average annual rate, over a given interval. 
The same applies to exit; i f exit is more confined to the fringes of an industry and not to 
the well established incumbents, then the accumulated exit rate, over a given interval 
(the last two columns in Panel A) wil l be very similar to the average short-run exit rate 
(the last two columns in Panel B). However, i f exit also includes the well-established 
incumbents, then the accumulated exit rates, over a given interval, wi l l be greater than 
the average annual exit rates, over that interval. 
Comparing the entry rates in Panel A with Panel B, it is evident that the accumulated 
entry rates for the first two intervals are much higher than their corresponding average 
annual rates, although the difference is more pronounced in terms of the number of 
plants. On the other hand, from 1984 onwards, the difference between the accumulated 
entry rates and average annual entry rates appear to exhibit significant signs of decrease. 
Taking the 1974-78 period as an example, the accumulated entry rate over this interval 
is equal to 21.6%, when measured in terms of number of plants, and 5.5% in terms of 
employment. This means that out of the entire population of manufacturing plants in 
1978, 21.6% of them entered after 1974 and their share of the total manufacturing 
employment in 1978 was 5.5%. This is compared with the average annual entry rates, 
over the same interval, which were only 6.5% when measured in terms of number of 
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plants and 1.6% when measured in terms of employment. On the other hand, the 
accumulated entry rates over the 1994-97 period are 46.8% in terms of number of plants 
and 32% in terms of employment. These rates are compared with the average annual 
rates over the same interval, which were 23.2% in terms of number of plants and 11.6% 
in terms of employment. These findings shows that the number of entrants that could 
make it to the fourth year were much higher prior to 1984 than compared with the post-
1984 years. Survival and therefore accumulation of entrants became more and more 
difficult as time proceeded, to the extent that over the 1994-97 interval, the accumulated 
entry rate was only 2 times higher than the average annual rate, when measured in terms 
of number of plants, and 2.7 times higher when measured in terms of employment. 
Similarly, the proportion of manufacturing plants in 1974 that did not survive to 1978 
was equal to 24.9% and their share of the total manufacturing employment was equal to 
8.8%. These rates are compared with the average annual exit rates, over the same 
interval; that is 6.6% in terms of the number of plants and 1.7% in terms of 
employment. The difference between the long-run exit rates and the average annual exit 
rates is significant and remains significant over the next intervals. This implies that exit 
is not only confined to the fringe of manufacturing industries, but also includes 
incumbents. The last row of Panel A shows the accumulated entry and exit rate, over the 
1974-97 interval, which is 89.7% and 85.4%, in terms of number of plants and 62.6% 
and 63.2%, in terms of employment, respectively. 
At this point, it is beneficial to find out whether, as time proceeded, the increase in the 
accumulated entry and exit rates were due, mostly, to the entrants and exitors who 
gradually accumulated over time or as a result of the increase in the annual entry and 
exit rates. Thus, in Table 3.19 the annual entry rate, associated with the last year of a 
given interval, is deducted from the accumulated entry rate, over that interval. Similarly, 
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Table 3.19 Difference between the long-run entry rate and the last year annual entry rate for a 
given interval (figures are in percentages) 
Entry rates 
Difference between the long-run Number of plants Employment 
and short-run rates 
1974-1978 versus 1977-78 16.4 4.5 
1979-1983 versus 1982-83 13.9 4.5 
1984-1988 versus 1987-88 20.4 8.4 
1989-1993 versus 1992-93 15.5 7.2 
1994-1997 versus 1996-97 32.2 20.1 
Table 3.20 Difference between the long-run exit rate and the first year annual exit rate for a given 
interval (figures are in percentages) 
Exit rates 
Difference between the long-run Number of plants Employment 
and short-run rates 
1974-1978 versus 1974-75 17.4 6.7 
1979-1983 versus 1979-80 19.3 11.2 
1984-1988 versus 1984-85 21.0 9.2 
1989-1993 versus 1989-90 26.3 13.5 
1994-1997 versus 1994-95 32.0 25.6 
in Table 3.20, the annual exit rate associated with the first year of a given interval, is 
deducted from the accumulated exit rate, over that interval3 4. 
Table 3.19 shows the difference between the long-run and the short-run entry rates. A 
comparison between Table 3.19 and the first two columns of Panel A in Table 3.20, 
reveals that towards the end of the period, the increase in the long-run entry rates was, 
to a large extent, a result of the huge wave of entrants in the last year of the intervals. 
For example, over the 1989-93 period, out of 28.2% of plants in 1993 that did not exist 
in 1989, only 15.5% were accumulated entrants and 12.7% were entrants in 1993. 
However, over the 1974-78 interval, only 5.2% of entrants were entrants of the 1978 
and the remaining 16.4% accumulated, over the interval. 
3 4 The reason for choosing the last year of an interval, in Table 3.19, and the first year in Table 3.20, is to make the 
subtractions meaningful. The denominator for the entry rate is the number of plants in year t, while the denominators 
for the exit rate is the number of plants in year t-n. Therefore, one has to subtract the annual entry rate in year t, from 
the long-run entry rate, over the t-n, t interval (in this case, both denominators will be equal to the number of plants in 
year t). Similarly, the annual exit rate in year t-n has to be subtracted from the accumulated exit rate, over the t-n, t 
interval (in this case, both denominators will be equal to the number of plants in year t-n). 
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The findings for exit rates are slightly less dramatic (The last two columns of Panel A 
in Table 3.18 are compared with Table 3.20). Over the 1974-1978 interval, out of the 
24.9% of plants that existed in 1974, but did not survive to 1978, only 7.5% exited in 
1975, while the remaining 17.4% gradually exited afterwards. However, over the 1994-
97 interval, out of 48.2% of plants that existed in 1994 and did not survive to 1997, 32% 
were the result of accumulated exit and 16.2% was due to exit in 1995. 
These findings are in line with the findings of Baldwin (1995), in that he also found 
that the accumulated entry and exit rates for Canadian manufacturing industries were 
greater than the average annual entry and exit rates, over 6 years intervals. However, in 
his study the annual entry and exit rates were much lower than for the present study and 
this resulted in a more gradual accumulation of entrants and exitors over time. 
The findings of this section can be summarized as follows: 1) survival and 
accumulation of entrants over the five year intervals was much easier prior to 1984 as 
compared with the post-1984 period. In the 1990s, especially towards the end of the 
decade, the difference between the accumulated entry rates and the average short-run 
entry rates was much less compared to the earlier years, which meant that 
manufacturing industries were becoming more competitive and survival was becoming 
more difficult; 2) the accumulated exit rates appeared to be much higher than the 
average short-run exit rates and they remained high for all the intervals. This meant that 
incumbents as well as the entrants were among plants that exited over the chosen 
intervals; 3) In 1997, the accumulated entrants, over the 1974-97 interval, accounted for 
89.7% of the plants and 62.6% of the employment. Similarly, the accumulated exit over 
this interval accounted for 85.4% of plants in 1974 and 63.2% of employment and 4) the 
long-run entry and exit rates were increasing over time, which was partly a result of the 
increase in the annual rates, especially, towards the 1990s period. 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, the magnitude of entry and exit in the manufacturing industries of the 
UK, over the 1974-97 period, were studied, together with various aspects of these 
processes. By studying the annual entry and exit rates at the total manufacturing level, it 
was found that both were increasing, over the period under study. More plants were 
taking their chance to enter the various markets but, at the same time, due to the 
presence of intense competition, more exits were also taking place. On average, the 
entry and exit rates were larger, when measured in terms of number of plants, than when 
measured in terms of employment. However, plants that opened relative to those that 
closed, were greater in terms of number, but smaller in terms of employment. 
The entry and exit rates, measured at the four-digit manufacturing level, were not 
stable over time. This means that entry and exit rates were not affected by the structural 
characteristics of the individual industries, but rather the time-variant factors were more 
important. Given this, it was found that certain four-digit manufacturing industries were 
characterised with having consistently higher/lower than average entry rates, over the 
1974-97 period, and certain industries with having consistently higher/lower than 
average exit rates. Similarly, certain years were characterised with having consistently 
higher/lower than average entry rates, across the four-digit manufacturing industries, 
and certain years with having consistently higher/lower than average exit rates. Over the 
1974-97 period, the highest entry and exit rates were observed in the years of boom (the 
late 1970's), which could indicate that entry and exit may be pro-cyclical. Thus industry 
and time are important factors that need to be considered when modelling entry and 
exit. 
Cohorts of entrants, during the 1974-97 period, were followed and it was found that 
the majority of entrants close shortly after entry. On average about half (43.7%) of the 
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entrants exited by the f if th year. However, during the first 14 years after entry, no 
specific trend was found in the hazard rates of closure. This means that the risk of 
closure did not change during these years. However, hazard rates tended to increase 
afterwards. This increase could be due, partly, to high competition in the late 1990s and, 
also, the change to using IDBR registrations, which resulted in a higher hazard rates in 
these years. 
By studying the contribution of the post-1973 and pre-1974 entrants to total closure, it 
was found that 10 years into the study time period (in 1983), the majority of closures 
taking place was due to the plants that opened prior to 1974. 
Comparing the post-entry experience of the new plants with the incumbents, over the 
1974-97 period, revealed that incumbents possessed a clear advantage over entrants, in 
any year following entry. This was evident by comparing their hazard rates in the years 
following entry. 
On average, size (measured in real gross value added) of the entrants, during the 
1974-97 period, increased. However, the overall size of the entry cohorts (measured in 
real gross value added) decreased, over time. This shows that the reduction in the size of 
the entry cohorts, due to the high closure of plants, was greater than the increase in the 
size of the cohorts, due to the increase in the size of their plants. Over time, the 
accumulated share of the post-1973 entrants, in terms of total manufacturing real GVA, 
was increasing. However, the size of the individual cohorts was decreasing and it was 
even greater than the decline in the total manufacturing's real GVA. 
Finally, prior to 1984, the accumulated (long-run) entry rates, over the chosen 
intervals, were significantly higher than the average annual (short-run) rates. However, 
post-1984 the difference between the accumulated entry rates and the annual rates was 
not as high. This shows that survival was much easier for the entrants prior to 1984 
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while it became increasingly difficult from 1984 onwards. Similarly, the accumulated 
exit rates were much higher than the annual exit rates over the chosen intervals. This 
shows that exit did not only happen at the fringe of manufacturing industries, but with 
the incumbents. In 1997, 89.7% of plants, accounting for 62.6% of employment, were 
those that opened since 1974, while 85.4% of plants in 1974, accounting for 63.2% of 
employment, closed before 1997. However, the increase in the accumulated (long-run) 
entry and exit rates, over time, is due partly to the increase in the annual (short-run) 
rates, especially towards the end of the 1990s. 
The raw data in this chapter contained various interesting and unexpected features. It 
showed that a large number of small plants were opening across various industries over 
the period under study. At the same time, exit was also occurring frequently. Overall, it 
seemed evident that entry and exit were taking place to a large extent, especially 
towards the late 1990's period. The finding that entry and exit may be pro-cyclical 
could suggest that over the periods of economic boom, more individuals were taking a 
chance to participate in various industries. However, the finding that almost half of the 
entrants exited before the fifth year reveals that survival was not as easy as entry. The 
initial small size of plants could perhaps be an important reason for the high failure rate 
of such plants, as the costs of adjustment to increase market penetration can be 
significantly high. What was even more striking was that exit was not evident only 
among the new entrants. Incumbents' life was also threatened by the intensity of the 
competition. A large displacement of existing plants also occurred over the 24 years 
under study; only 10.3% of plants in 1997 also existed in 1974, while the remaining 
89.7% of plants were new entrants. This finding clearly shows the particular relevance 
of churning (i.e. "creative destruction" in Schumpeterian terms) in UK manufacturing 
industries and that it plays a significant role in restructuring these markets. 
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One might take the observed high level of dynamics as a sign of a healthy 
competition. However, one should not ignore the amount of costs that is involved in the 
opening of these plants. I f these costs, such as costs on physical asset, costs of labour 
and the opportunity cost of such capital are added together and multiplied by the total 
number of entrants, then one can see how great are the social costs of entry. Given the 
evidence from the data on how frequent are entries and exits and how difficult is 
survival, one might think that maybe entry levels are too high and maybe barriers to 
entry are not high enough. I f entry were more difficult then perhaps those that were 
capable of overcoming these barriers would be those who were more capable of 
surviving. 
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3 
In estimating a model, determining y conditional on the exogenous variable x, i f 
random sampling is applied (i.e. sampling is based on every one in the population 
having an equal, independent chance of getting into the sample) then there is no need 
for weighting, as in this case x is exogenous in the sample. However, when sampling is 
not random and it is based on the value of x, then it is necessary to weight the data, as in 
this case x is exogenous only in the population and not in the sample. In this case, i f 
unweighted regression is used the estimated parameters wi l l be inconsistent (Heckman, 
1979; Hausman and Wise, 1981; Magee et al. 1998). Therefore, when there is the 
likelihood of endogenous sampling, weights have to be used i f one wishes to have 
consistent parameter estimates. In the selected file, stratified sampling is based on the 
employment of establishments and this makes the employment variable endogenous in 
the sample. In this case, i f unweighted regression is used, not only does it not represent 
the true relationship between y and x in the population, but also the estimated 
parameters wi l l be inconsistent. 
As a result of the above argument, population weights are applied, whenever the 
selected file is used. The weights were calculated at the 4-digit industry level, broken 
down into 5 size-bands and the status of the plant (in terms of whether it opened that 
year, closed the next year, or neither of these two categories). When they were less than 
five observations in each sub-group (industry * size-band x open/close status) then size-
bands were amalgamated. I f there were still insufficient observations, then status was 
dropped, and finally (if necessary) the industry definition was moved from a 4-digit to a 
3-digit classification. Note that the 1980 Standard Industrial Classification was used 
throughout, with plants from 1970-79 reclassified from the 1968 SIC, while post 1994 
data necessitated recoding from the 1992 SIC. 
124 
Chapter 4: The Determinants of Entry 
4.1 Introduction 
Entry of new competitors is considered an important phenomenon, which has various 
beneficial effects on markets. These include bringing down prices, reducing excess 
profits and x-inefficiency, introducing new products, and increasing process innovation. 
Markets that are subject to a large number of entrants are assumed to be flexible, 
efficient, and operating towards consumers' interests (Geroski, 1991b). 
However, entry does not only relate to new firms setting up new plants (or new 
capacity), as classically defined by Bain (1956). According to Geroski (1991b), "entry 
by foreign-based producers through imports, entry by acquisition of an old-established 
firm or even entry by new managers effecting a thorough-going management shake-up 
in an existing firm all may have much of the same effect on the competitive process as 
entry more narrowly defined" (p. 10). Geroski (ibid.) further explained that new ideas 
have the same sort of impact on markets, in terms of creating the effects generally 
associated with entry by new firms. 
Entry itself does not occur to the same extent in all industries and geographical 
locations; it depends on a combination of plant, industry, location and time specific 
factors. Most of the empirical work, regarding the factors that determine entry in U.K. 
manufacturing industries, either focus on entry into different industries, or across 
geographical regions. However, there has been a lack of empirical work that studies 
both industrial and geographical aspects at the same time. In this study, having access to 
the ARD 1 , makes it possible not only to study, separately, the entry decisions of various 
types of entrants, but also to explore the various industrial and geographical factors that 
affect these decisions, simultaneously. In an attempt to do this, Section 4.2 considers 
1 Explained in Section 3.2. 
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various industrial and geographical specific factors that the literature predicts wi l l affect 
entry2. Section 4.3.1 considers the magnitude of entry (plant opening) by different kinds 
of firms (domestic de-novo firms, domestic incumbents and foreign firms), in terms of 
the number of opened plants and their employment; it also compares their initial entry 
size. In Section 4.3.2, the plant entry rate (the dependent variable in subsequent 
analysis) is measured and its magnitude across various industries and geographical 
regions is examined. Section 4.3.3 discusses the various explanatory variables used to 
model entry, together with their definitions. Section 4.3.4 explains the econometric 
model employed in this study, and Section 4.3.5 considers the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 4.4 provides the conclusions for this chapter. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Entry of different kinds of entrants 
Entrants do not form a homogenous group. They have different attributes including: 
being owned by a foreign company, as opposed to a domestic company; or being owned 
by a new firm, as opposed to an already existing firm. These attributes might place 
some entrants in a position of relative superiority, compared to the others. 
Caves (1971) made the distinction between foreign and domestic entrants. He stated 
that, due to the advantages that foreign entrants possess, it is easier for them to 
surmount structural entry barriers as identified by Bain (1956). Hines (1957) was among 
the first to point out that certain differences between entrants put some of them in an 
advantaging position, in terms of being able to overcome entry barriers. He 
distinguished between de-novo entry and entry by already established firms, and stated 
that the latter is a more common type of entry, as they are more capable of overcoming 
2 A comprehensive review of the literature, regarding various geographical and industrial specific factors that affect 
entry decisions, is provided in Chapter 2. Variables explained in Section 4.2 are those that will be included in the 
model. The reason for the exclusion of the other variables is unavailability of data. 
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entry barriers. According to Khemani and Shapiro (1988), failure to take account of the 
heterogeneity between entrants can result in a biased estimate of the height of any entry 
barrier. Geroski (1991a) divided entrants into two major categories i.e. domestic and 
foreign entrants. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) divided new plants into two categories: 
those that were owned by a new firm and those that were owned by an already existing 
firm. Other studies e.g. those by Gorecki (1975, 1976), Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) and 
Mata (1993) also made a distinction between the different kinds of entrants. Entrants 
have been categorised in some studies according to their entry size (Acs and Audretsch, 
1989a; Acs and Audretsch, 1989b). However in this study entrants are not sub-divided 
by their entry size, as that would "stretch" the data too far . 
The above studies all found significant differences between different kinds of entrants, 
in terms of their entry behaviour and their choice of industry. Therefore, making a 
distinction between different kinds of entrants appears to be necessary. Sections 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3 provide a brief review of the factors that are expected to have a significant 
effect on the decision to open a new plant, with the review being based on the previous 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
4.2.2 Industrial specific factors 
4.2.2.1 Inducements to entry 
Perceived profitability: present profits can be an indicator of post-entry profits. 
Therefore, the higher the level of profits in an industry, the higher is the likelihood of 
3 In this study, new plants are divided into three categories: new plants opened by domestic de-novo firms; those 
opened by domestic incumbents; and those opened by foreign firms. The dependent variable (plant opening rate) is 
then calculated, separately, for each kind of entrants, according to the year, two- digit manufacturing sector and the 
geographical region into which they entered. There are 20 two-digit manufacturing sectors, 11 geographical regions 
and 24 years, resulting in 5280 data points (20x 11 x24 is equal to 5280). However, not all kinds of entry are observed 
in all years and in all industries and geographical regions. Out of the 5280 cases, there are 1754 cases of 0 entry by 
domestic incumbents, 2202 cases of 0 entry by domestic de-novo firms and 3571 cases of 0 entry by foreign firms. If 
one was also to divide the entrants based on their entry size, this would increase the number of cases of 0 entry. 
Therefore, entrants are not going to be directly sub-divided, based on their entry size. However, size is accounted for 
in this study by calculating the dependent variable (plant opening rate) using the employment of the new plants rather 
than their actual numbers. 
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entry into that industry. However, in previous empirical work the effect of profits on 
entry has not been always significant4. Orr (1974), Harris (1976), Dunne and Roberts 
(1991) and Schwalbach (1991) found a positive impact of industry profits on entry. 
Dividing the entrants into foreign and domestic, Geroski (1991a) found that foreign 
entrants did not respond to increases in industry profit margins and that domestic 
entrants were quicker in their response to excess profits. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) 
found that both domestic and foreign entrants responded positively to profit 
opportunities. However, they found that within the category of domestic entrants, 
industry profits had a positive impact only on entry by de-novo firms and by established 
firms entering the same industry, while it had no significant impact on diversified entry. 
Khemani and Shapiro (1986) found that only de-novo entrants responded positively to 
an industry's profits; while Mata (1993) found that the only kind of entry that was 
encouraged by higher industry profits was expansion entry5. 
Industries' growth rate of demand: according to Siegfried and Evans (1994) 
entrants not only base their entry decisions on current or past profits, but also look at the 
trend in profits, as an indication of the future profitability of an industry. Therefore, they 
might take the growth rate in demand as an indicator of future profits. The following 
empirical studies have found that the industry growth rate in demand has had a positive 
impact on entry: Orr (1974), Hause and Du Rietz (1984), Khemani and Shapiro (1986), 
Highfield and Smiley (1987), Chappell et al. (1990), Schwalbach (1991) and Mayer and 
Chappell (1992). In fact, Mata (1993) found that growth in demand had an insignificant 
4 The first reason, according to Geroski (1995), is that variations in profits, across industries, are usually persistent 
over time and, therefore, have more of an industry specific nature rather than a time specific. On the other hand, entry 
variations are more transitory and time variant. Therefore, the correlation between entry and industry profits, with 
two different sources of variations, is not going to be significant. The second reason is that the relationship between 
entry and profits is not always straightforward, as more profitable industries are also more concentrated with stronger 
retaliatory reaction from the incumbents in case of entry (Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Clarke and Davis, 1982). 
This leaves a conflicting effect of industry profits on entry. 
5 This is explained in Footnote 3 to Chapter 2. 
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impact on entry of all different kinds of entrants. Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) found a 
positive impact of industry growth on domestic de-novo entry; in contrast, Geroski 
(1991a) found a negative impact. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) found that all different 
kinds of domestic entrants responded positively to industry growth, but not the foreign 
entrants. On the contrary, Gorecki (1975) found that foreign entrants were more 
responsive to industry growth, in comparison to domestic entrants. 
Exit (the replacement effect): the causal relationship running from exit to entry can 
be due to two effects: a replacement effect and a resource release. Studying inter-
industry differences in entry and exit, measured across the US manufacturing industries, 
Evans and Siegfried (1992) tested for the replacement effect. The reason proposed by 
them for the replacement effect was that previous exits leave room in the market for 
new entrants. Another explanation for this causal relationship, according to Brown et al. 
(1990), is that exit feeds back into entry by releasing resources for more efficient new 
entrants. Storey and Jones (1987) considered this possibility with respect to physical 
assets, in the sense that more second hand equipment wi l l be available and at a cheaper 
price when exit is frequent. In the same vein, Love (1996) suggested that previous exits 
release entrepreneurial resources, which can increase self-employment. 
Existence of fringe firms (small firms) in industry: movement of firms, in and out 
of industries, is usually by small firms. Therefore, the larger the population of small 
firms in an industry, the higher entry and exit are to be expected (Dunne et al. 1988). 
Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) both found that the 
presence of small firms in an industry had a positive impact on the number of entries 
and exits taking place within. 
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4.2.2.2 Impediments to entry 
Economies of large scale: Bain (1956) introduced economies of scale as a structural 
entry barrier. He explained, that i f the minimum efficient scale (MES) in a market is 
large relative to its overall size, the necessity to produce at a cost efficient level could 
create a barrier for potential entrants. Various studies have found that MES had a 
negative impact of MES on entry (Harris, 1976; Hause and Du Rietz, 1984; Chappell et 
al 1990; Mayer and Chappell, 1992). However, Highfield and Smiley (1987), Dunne 
and Roberts (1991) and Rosenbaum (1993) found that economies of scale had no 
significant impact on entry. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) and Mata (1993) both found 
that MES had a negative impact on entry by de-novo firms. Baldwin and Gorecki 
(1987) did not find any significant impact of MES on either group of domestic or 
foreign entrants. Mata (1993) found that MES had a positive impact on entry by purely 
diversifying entrants. 
Absolute cost advantage of incumbent firms: Bain (1956) introduced this factor as 
a structural entry barrier. According to him, one of the reasons for having an absolute 
cost advantage by incumbents is peripheral access to the factors of production, 
especially capital. However, capital, per se, cannot create an absolute cost advantage for 
the incumbents, unless the expenditure is sunk. This means that it cannot be recovered 
in the case of an unsuccessful entry. 
Orr (1974), Khemani and Shapiro (1986), Dunne and Roberts (1991) and Chappell et 
al. (1990) found that capital requirement had a negative impact on entry. Using data 
from 36 countries, Gschwandtner and Lambson (2002) found that industries with a 
higher level of sunk costs had significantly lower number of entrants. However, 
Highfield and Smiley (1987) did not find such an impact. Khemani and Shapiro (1986) 
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and Mata (1993) found that only de-novo entrants responded negatively to the level of 
capital requirement. Dividing the entrants into foreign and domestic entrants, Gorecki 
(1975) found a negative impact of capital only on entry by domestic entrants. 
Multi-plant operation: according to Duetsch (1984), existence of multi-plant firms 
in an industry can create a barrier for potential entrants6. Mayer and Chappell (1992) 
found that entry occurred less in industries dominated by a large population of multi-
plant firms. Khemani and Shapiro (1986) found the same results only applied to de-
novo entrants. 
4.2.2.3 Inducements or impediments to entry 
Concentration: Yip (1982) assigned two contrary effects to industry seller 
concentration: a barrier effect and an inducement effect. He explained that in highly 
concentrated industries, the threat of oligopolistic coordination by incumbents, in the 
face of entry, creates a barrier. However, i f an entrant survives this barrier it can 
subsequently enjoy a less competitive environment in such industries. The following 
studies by Orr (1974), Chappell et al. (1990) and Mayer and Chappell (1992) found that 
concentration had a negative impact on entry. On the contrary, Duetsch (1975) and 
Harris (1976) found that concentration had a positive impact on entry. Looking at the 
entry of different groups of entrants, Gorecki (1975) found that concentration affected 
entry by domestic firms negatively, and Khemani and Shapiro (1988) also found it to 
have a negative impact, but only on entry by de-novo entrants. 
6 This is due to two effects: 1) if multi-plant configuration brings cost advantages to a firm, then the capital cost will 
be a more serious barrier for potential entrants, as, in this case, it has to be raised in order to set up a multi-plant firm 
and 2) having the advantage of operating in various product lines or segments of the markets, multi-plant firms can 
indulge easier in various activities (such as price competition) in order to deter entry. 
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4.2.2.4 The impact of industry life cycle 
Gort and Klepper (1982), Hoff (1997) and Agarwal (1998) explored how markets 
evolve through various stages of their life cycle. They explained that the characteristics 
of the markets, in term of availability of information, nature of innovative activities and 
structural characteristic, changes as they go through various phases of their life cycle. In 
an infant industry, a large amount of external information is available, which motivates 
new entrants to participate in markets and exploit them. As a result, the number of 
entrants and output increases, which subsequently reduces prevailing prices. As markets 
evolve, incumbents' knowledge tends to replace external knowledge, which pushes the 
most inefficient firms out of the industry, causing net entry to reduce and concentration 
to increase over time. Klepper (1996) explained that, in mature industries, process 
innovation replaces product innovation and size brings an advantage for those firms 
involved in process innovation. 
The above argument shows that as markets evolve, their structural characteristics also 
change which, according to Agarwal and Gort (1996), can affect the magnitude of entry 
into markets in two possible ways: 1) it changes the value of the explanatory variables 
on the right hand side of an entry equation 2) it alters the value of the parameter 
coefficients that relate entry to the explanatory variables. Therefore, in the current 
study, industries wi l l be divided into "young" and "old" industries7, based on the 
average age of their plants, noting that young industries in this study mainly are 
characterised as 'high technology' and 'capital intensive'. 
7 See Footnote 18 and the Appendix to this chapter. 
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4.2.3 Geographical specific factors 
High demand in the local market: as particularly small firms usually serve local 
markets or restricted geographical areas, their success can be largely dependent on local 
demand (Storey, 1982). Fritsch (1992) and Armington and Acs (2002) both found that 
demand in the local market had a positive impact on new firm formation. However, 
Berglund and Brannas (2001) found that local demand had no significant impact on 
entry. In terms of the impact of demand in local market on foreign entry, Friedman et al. 
(1992) and Billington (1999) both found that the size of the host market had a positive 
impact on foreign direct investment decisions. However, Scaperlanda and Mauer's 
(1969) found no such significant impact. 
Wealth of the individuals in the area: Reynolds et al. (1994) explained that start-up 
capital is the primary requirement to start a new business, which can be either provided 
by the entrepreneurs themselves or borrowed. In either case, the higher the wealth of 
residents in an area, the easier it is to provide such start-up capital. Cross (1981), Storey 
(1982) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) found that wealth, measured by the degree of 
house ownership, had a positive impact on new firm formation. 
Existence of external economies of scale in the area: according to Armstrong and 
Taylor (2000), external economies of scale arise due to the geographic proximity of 
economic activities. Two sources contribute to the existence of external economies of 
scale: localization economies and agglomeration (or urbanization) economies . 
According to Armstrong and Taylor (2000) localization economies results from spatial concentration of related 
economic activities which, in the extreme case, could be due to the concentration of plants all belonging to the same 
industry. On the other hand, agglomeration economies are a result of geographical concentration of a large number of 
economic activities, which do not necessarily belong to the same industry (Henderson, 1986). 
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Specialization in an area occurs when the area is dominated by a particular industry 
and it contributes to the creation of localization economies. Garofoli (1994) and 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) found that area specialization had a positive impact on 
new firm formation. However, Gudgin (1978) contended that the higher the level of 
diversification, the higher is the number of new firms. The reason, proposed by him, 
was that a higher level of diversification indicates a higher variety of skills available 
locally. 
Regarding the effect of agglomeration (or urbanization) economies on entry, 
Armstrong and Taylor (2000) explained that agglomerated areas create attractive 
locations for new business start-ups, due to the provision of a large number of facilities 
to service the industries. Armington and Acs (2002) measured agglomeration economies 
by industrial density and found that it had a positive impact on entry. On the contrary, 
Guimaraes et al. (1998) found in their sample that new firm formation was affected 
negatively by the population density of an area (a proxy for the degree of agglomeration 
economies). The reason suggested was that a high density in an area indicates a high 
level of congestion, which can offset the positive effects of agglomeration economies on 
new firm formation. Dumais et al. (1997) also found that new firms preferred less 
concentrated regions. In terms of the impact of density on foreign entry, Billington 
(1999) found that it had a negative impact on foreign direct investments in the UK. 
Size structure of the area's factories: areas with large number of small firms tend to 
have higher rates of new firm formation. This is due to the fact that small firms are a 
better incubator for potential new firms than large firms (Cross, 1981). The reasons for 
this effect are as follows: 1) working in small firms provides the employers with the 
opportunity to familiarise themselves with a wide range of operational processes 
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(Storey, 1981); 2) in small firms, employers can have a closer contact with the 
managers of the company, which increases their confidence to start a new business 
(Mason, 1991); and 3) due to a lower job security is small companies, employees are 
encouraged to start their own business (Storey, 1982). The following studies found that 
areas with a large number of small plants had a higher formation of new businesses: 
Fritsch (1992), Garofoli (1994) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1999). 
Unemployment: two conflicting hypothesis have been assigned to the effect of 
unemployment on new businesses formation. Unemployment in an area can either push 
individuals into starting their own businesses (Reynolds et al. 1994), or it can be an 
indicator of a lack of buoyancy in that area (Storey, 1982). Armington and Acs (2002) 
found that unemployment in an area positively affected the formation of new 
businesses. However, Fritsch (1992) and Garofolli (1994) found that unemployment had 
a negative effect on new business start-ups in an area. 
Unemployment can have different implications for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
decisions. It can imply the availability of a cheap workforce willing to work harder for a 
lower wage. Friedman et al. (1992) and Billington (1999) found that unemployment had 
a positive impact on FDI. 
The North-South division: the so-called "north-south" divide in the UK is 
epitomised by the greater decline in manufacturing employment in the north. This 
caused inequality between the regions of the north and the south in terms of industrial 
development and social well-being (Townsend, 1983). Various studies have found 
major differences between the regions of the north and the south in a wide range of 
aspects including: regional growth, unemployment, rates of return on capital and firm 
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formation (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Martin, 1997; Harris and Andrew, 2000). In the 
current study, the north includes the standard regions of the North, North West, 
Yorkshire and Humberside, West Midlands, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
while the south includes the regions of the South East, South West, East Anglia and 
East Midlands. 
4.3 Empirical work 
4.3.1 Importance of different kinds of entrants 
As it was explained in Section 3.3.1, entry in this study relates to setting up of a new 
plant (new capacity). However, as illustrated in Section 4.2.1, the owner firm can have 
different attributes; it can either be a foreign firm, as opposed to a domestic firm, or, be 
a de-novo firm, as opposed to an already existing firm. Therefore, in this study, entry 
(plant opening) is sub-divided into the following three categories: 
1) Plant opening by a foreign firm (FOR). 
2) Plant opening by a new domestic firm, i.e. de-novo entry (DE-NOVO). 
3) Plant opening by a domestic incumbent (INCUM). 
The second category includes all plants that are opened by new domestic firms, 
regardless of the firms being a single-plant or a multi-plant, while the third category 
includes plants being opened only by already existing domestic multi-plant firms9. 
Mata (1993) divided entry by incumbents into three different categories: expansion, 
extension and purely diversifying entry10. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) divided plant 
opening by incumbents into two categories: new plants built in the same industry and 
new plants built in a different industry. In this study it is not possible to divide plant 
9 Plant opening by the last category includes all plants that are opened, regardless of the industry into which they 
entered. 
1 0 If entry was in the same five-digit sector it was an extension entry. If it was into a different five-digit, but the same 
three-digit sector it was an expansion entry. Finally, if it was into a different three-digit sector, it was a purely 
diversifying entry 
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opening by incumbents into further sub-categories. The reason is that the dependent 
variable11 (i.e. entry rate) is calculated, separately, for each kind of entry (i.e. FOR, DE-
NOVO and INCUM) at both the industry and regional level. Dividing the entrants into 
further sub-categories wi l l result in having too many zeros (i.e. no entry occurring) for 
the dependent variable12. 
Using the weighted selected file in the ARD 1 3 , the share of each group of entrants 
(based on the number of plants and their employment) has been calculated and is shown 
in Table 4.1. In terms of the three categories used, plant opening by domestic 
incumbents has the largest share of entry (in terms of both total number of opened 
plants and their employment, except for 1993) and foreign entry has the smallest share. 
On average, over the 1974-97 period, plant opening by foreign firms accounted for 
10.6% of plants and 12.6% of the employment; plant opening by new domestic firms 
for 29.9% and 31%, respectively, and plant opening by domestic incumbents for 59.5% 
and 56.3%, respectively. Therefore, the majority of entries (both in terms of the number 
of plants and their employment) were by domestic incumbents building new plants. 
It is also useful to consider the average initial size of entrants in each group. The 
median size of entrants in each category is shown in Table 4.2. The first column, in 
Table 4.2, shows the median size of new plants, opened by foreign firms. The second 
category of entrants comprises both new domestic single-plant and multi-plant firms. 
Therefore, the median size for each sub-group is presented in columns 2.1 and 2.2. 
Finally, column 3 shows the median entry size by domestic incumbents. A comparison 
between the columns in Table 4.2 reveals that new plants opened by new domestic 
single-plant firms (column 2.1) on average had the largest initial size in comparison to 
the other entrants. 
" Dependent variable is explained in Section 4.3.2. 
1 2 See Footnote 1. 
1 3 This is fully explained in Section 3.2. 
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Hence, it can be concluded that in the U.K. manufacturing industries over the 1974-97 
period, the most frequent type of entry (measured both in terms of number of plants and 
their employment) was entry by domestic incumbents seeking new markets, either in the 
same or in a different industry, followed by entry by new domestic firms and, finally, 
entry by foreign firms. On the other hand, plants opened by new domestic firms had the 
largest initial size out of the three categories of entrants, which was mainly the result of 
the large initial size of new plants opened by new domestic single-plant firms. 
4.3.2 Measuring entry (plant opening) rates 
In this section, entry (plant opening) rate variations, across two-digit manufacturing 
sectors and the geographical regions of the U.K, are examined. In order to measure 
entry rates, the data provided in the A R D 1 4 wi l l be used. Using the 1980 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC80) indicator, it is possible to identify the two-digit 
manufacturing sector to which plants belong. At the same time, the regional 
geographical indicator, provided in the ARD, enables one to find the geographical 
region in which plants are located. There are 20 two-digit manufacturing sectors in the 
U.K. and 11 geographical regions (including Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). 
Since the entry rate wi l l be measured for a particular two-digit manufacturing sector in a 
specific region in a given year, the outcome is 220 (20x11) different cross sections, 
followed over 24 years (i.e. 1974-97). Moreover, as entrants (new plants) are divided 
into three different sub-categories (plants opened by foreign firms, plants opened by 
new domestic firms and plants opened by domestic incumbents), entry relates to plant 
opening by a given sub-category of entrants in a given year, into a specific two-digit 
manufacturing sector and in a specific region. 
1 4 ARD has been explained in Section 3.2. 
140 
Table 4.3 shows the average share of each two-digit manufacturing sector, from total 
manufacturing employment, over the 1974-97 period. Similarly, Table 4.4 shows the 
average share of each region from total manufacturing employment, over the 1974-97 
period. Table 4.3 shows that the food, drink and tobacco manufacture industries (with 
12.5% average share from total manufacturing employment15) on average had the 
largest share from total manufacturing employment, over the 1974-97 period, and the 
extraction of minerals (with 0.2%) had the smallest share. On average over the period 
under study, the five largest industries (Food, drink and tobacco, Mechanical 
engineering, Electrical and electronic engineering, Manufacture of paper and paper 
products and Manufacture of other transport equipment) stand for almost half of 
manufacturing employment (49.7%). 
U.K. manufacturing employment, over the 1974-97 period, was also unevenly 
distributed across its geographical regions (see Table 4.4). The South East region, on 
average, had the highest proportion of the manufacturing employment (22.8%), while 
Northern Ireland possessed the smallest share (2.5%). On average, over the 1974-97 
period, almost half of the manufacturing employment (49%) was concentrated in just 
three regions of the UK (South East, West Midlands and North West). 
Looking at the geographical distribution of the individual industries, significant 
differences are again observed (see Table 4.5). For instance, although the food, drink 
and tobacco manufacture industries had the highest share of total manufacturing 
employment, it accounted for only some 2.4% of manufacturing employment in the 
South East region. However, the electrical and electronic engineering industries were 
more important in the South East region, having a share of 3.9% of total manufacturing 
employment. In comparison, industries such as the chemical industry and the production 
1 5 Figures in Table 4.3 are calculated by obtaining the average of the shares of each two-digit manufacturing sector 
from total manufacturing employment, over the 1974-97 period. 
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Table 4.3 Average share of the two-digit manufacturing sectors of the U K from total 
manufacturing employment, over 1974-97 
Two-digit manufacturing sectors The two-digit SIC80 Average share from Rank 
indicator total manufacturing 
employment (%) 
Food, drink and tobacco manufacture 41 12.48 1 
Industries 
Mechanical engineering 32 11.71 2 
Electrical and electronic engineering 34 11.15 3 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; 47 7.64 4 
printing and publishing 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 36 6.79 5 
Chemical industry 25 6.68 6 
Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere 31 6.20 7 
Specified 
Footwear and clothing industries 45 5.99 8 
Textile industry 43 5.74 9 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and parts 35 5.54 10 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 24 4.22 11 
Processing of rubber and plastics 48 4.14 12 
Metal Manufacturing 22 4.05 13 
Timber and wooden furniture industries 46 2.99 14 
Instrument engineering 37 1.46 15 
Other manufacturing industries 49 1.33 16 
Manufacture of office machinery and data 33 0.95 17 
processing equipment 
Production of man-made fibres 26 0.38 18 
Manufacture of leather and leather goods 44 0.37 19 
Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified 23 0.18 20 
Table 4.4 Average share of the standard regions of the U K from total manufacturing employment, 
over 1974-97 
Standard regions Average share from total 
manufacturing employment (%) 
Rank 
South East 22.8 1 
West Midlands 13.2 2 
North West 13.0 3 
Yorkshire and Humberside 10.1 4 
East Midlands 9.7 5 
Scotland 8.3 6 
South West 6.8 7 
Northern 5.7 8 
Wales 4.5 9 
East Anglia 3.3 10 
Northern Ireland 2.5 11 
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of man-made fibres, approximately, had equal shares of manufacturing employment in 
Northern Ireland, while in the UK as a whole the former industry had a relatively high 
proportion of manufacturing employment relative to man-made fibres. On average, the 
South East region had the most uneven distribution in the share of its different sectors 
from total manufacturing employment (i.e. it was more diversified), as is evident from 
its standard deviation (0.011), while Northern Ireland had the most even distribution 
(the standard error of the share of its sectors from total manufacturing employment is 
equal to 0.001). 
The observed marked differences in the distribution of manufacturing employment, 
across different two-digit manufacturing sectors and geographical regions, means that 
these need to be controlled for, when looking at plant entry across different two-digit 
manufacturing sectors and geographical regions. 
In the regional economic literature, two approaches have mainly been used, when 
comparing plant birth rates across geographical regions (Fritsch, 1992; Armington and 
Acs, 2002). The first approach, called the ecological approach, standardises the number 
of entrants in a region, with respect to the number of establishments already in 
existence. However, regions vary in their average number of employees per 
establishment so this approach can result in a higher birth rate in regions with higher 
than average establishment size (as the denominator becomes smaller) and a lower birth 
rate in regions with lower than average establishment size. Therefore, it is necessary to 
control for plants' sizes, in order to overcome this measurement bias that is inherent in 
the ecological approach. 
The second approach, called the labour market approach, standardises the number of 
new entrants with respect to the size of the labour force in the region. This method has a 
specific theoretical appeal in that it is based on the entrepreneurial choice model 
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proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), who assumed that each new business is 
started by a new entrepreneur. This assumption means that entrepreneurs come from the 
same market in which a new business operates. In the extreme case, where each 
entrepreneur has started his/her own business, the plant opening rate (defined as number 
of plants opened in a region, divided by the size of the labour force in that region) takes 
a value of one. 
In the current study, as in the labour market approach, employment size is chosen as 
the denominator for the plant opening rate. However, in the numerator, instead of the 
number of new plants, their employment is chosen. The reason for this is that the effect 
of entry on competition is associated, directly, with the size of entrant, in terms of their 
employment or their output, which subsequently affects market prices. Therefore, the 
entry (plant opening) rate is defined as employment due to new plant opening by a 
given group of firms (foreign firms, new domestic firms and domestic incumbents) in 
the industry i , region j and year t, divided by total employment in that industry, region 
and year. 
Average entry rates, over the 1974-97 period are calculated for each group of entrants 
separately, and are presented in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Each cell in these tables is 
calculated as 
* 
^-i24 e i j t 
— ( M , 2 . . . 2 0 ; y = l , 2 . . . 1 1 ; / = 1 , 2 . . . 2 4 ; * = 1 , 2 , 3 ) 
24 
where, e\j( denotes employment due to entry by a specific group of entrants, k, into the 
two-digit manufacturing sector, i, in the geographical region, j, in year t and £/,, 
represents total employment of the manufacturing sector, i, in region, j, and year 
From Table 4.6, it is evident that over the 1974-97 period the manufacturing of office 
machinery and data processing equipments had on average the highest entry rate by 
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foreign firms (5.2%), the production of man-made fibres had the second highest (1.8%) 
and instrument engineering had the third highest (1.1%). However, the distribution of 
new foreign owned plants varied significantly across geographical regions. For 
example, foreign entry into office machinery and data processing equipment was 
concentrated mainly in the regions of the North, East Anglia and Northern Ireland, 
while entry into the production of man-made fibres industry was concentrated mainly in 
the South East, East Anglia and Wales. Although the Northern region had the second 
highest foreign entry rate (1.3%), this was due mainly to their entry into the 
manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment (17.6%). On average, 
the South East region had the highest entry rate by foreign enterprises (1.2%) and 
Scotland the lowest (0.5%). 
Examining entry by new domestic firms (see Table 4.7), the highest entry rates were 
in the production of man-made fibres sector in East Anglia (10%), the extraction of 
minerals in the South West (9.7%) and the production of man-made fibres in Scotland 
(6.7%). Examining the distribution of new plants opened by new domestic firms across 
geographical regions, the production of man-made fibres had the most uneven 
distribution of entry rates (with a 10% entry rate in East Anglia and 0% in West 
Midlands), while the manufacturing of office machinery had the least uneven 
distribution of entry rates (it varied between 5.9% in East Anglia and 1.1% in Scotland). 
On average, the manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment had 
the highest entry rate by new domestic firms across the geographical regions (3.2%) and 
the manufacture of other transport equipment had the lowest (0.7%). 
Finally, Table 4.8 shows the average entry rate by domestic incumbents, over the 
1974-97 period. On average over this period the highest entry rates, by domestic 
incumbents, were observed in the extraction of minerals in Yorkshire and Humberside 
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(11.1%), the manufacture of office machinery in Wales (11%) and the extraction of 
minerals in Scotland (9.4%). Over the period under study, the extraction of minerals had 
on average the highest entry rate by domestic incumbents across the regions (5.4%) and 
the manufacture of other transport equipment had the lowest (1.2%). 
This section shows that the regional and industrial concentration of U.K. 
manufacturing employment over the 1974-97 period was unevenly distributed, which 
thus shows the necessity to control for these differences when measuring entry in the 
geographical regions and industrial sectors. However, after controlling for the different 
sizes of manufacturing sectors and regions, there still remains a marked difference in 
entry rates across different manufacturing sectors and geographical regions. This section 
shows that though a given industry in a certain regions might face a high entry rate, by a 
particular group of entrants, it might not be an attractive option for that group in another 
region. In the same way, a given region might have a high entry rate into one industry 
but not into another, due to differences in the characteristics of those industries. 
Therefore, the decision to open a new plant is determined by both the characteristics of 
the industries and the regions. 
4.3.3 Independent variables 
Chapter 2 provided a comprehensive review of the variables listed in the literature that 
are deemed to be important determinants of the entry decision. However, due to 
unavailability of data, it is not possible to accommodate all of them in the model used in 
this study. The industrial specific factors are calculated using the data provided in the 
ARD 1 6 . However, the ARD provides information on advertising expenditure only for 
the 1984-92 period, while it provides no information on R&D expenditure. At the same 
1 6 See Section 3.2. 
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time, there is no available information regarding binding commitments and strategic 
limit pricing. In terms of the geographical specific variables, the associated data was 
collected from 'Regional Trends' (Regional Trends, various issues). A l l geographical 
specific factors, as explained in Chapter 2, are included in the model except for the 
occupational structure of the residents in an area, for which data goes back only to 1982. 
As this study covers the 1974-97 period, it was decided not to include those variables 
for which data does not exist for the entire time period. The final list of the variables 
included in the analysis together with their definitions is shown in Table 4.9. 
Starting with the industry specific variables, PROFITit measures the profit margin in 
industry / and year / and is used as a proxy for the future profitability of an industry. 
This variable is expected to affect entry in a positive way. However, this measure does 
not entirely capture the future profitability of an industry, as entrants are unlikely to 
have the naive expectation that their entry wi l l not affect the market equilibrium (Mata, 
1993). In order to capture this effect, one must also take account of the industry growth 
rate of demand, for which the growth rate of output is used as a proxy. GROWTHit is 
expected to encourage entry (Schwalbach, 1991). 
EX RATEu measures the room left in the market, due to exit in the previous period. It 
captures the replacement effect and is expected to have a positive impact on entry 
(Evans and Siegfried, 1992). In order to measure the magnitude of the fringe of an 
industry, the variable SMALL_FIRMit is calculated. The expectation is that a large fringe 
wil l affect entry in a positive way (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998). In the present study, 
following Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992), the scale disadvantage ratio, SCALE_DRih is 
calculated as the ratio of output associated with producing at minimum efficient scale 
1 "7 
(MES) divided by the cost disadvantage ratio . The advantage of this measure is that it 
1 7 See the Appendix to this chapter. 
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Table 4.9 Explanatory variables, used in the regression model, together with their definitions 1 
Var iab les Definitions 
Industry Specific Variables 
PROFIT,, 
GROWTHj, 
EX RATEu 
SMALLFIRM,, 
SCALEDRj, 
CAPLAB,, 
MULTIu 
CONCENTRATION,, 
CYCLE, 
((Nominal gross output-Total cost) ^Nominal 
gross output) for industry i in year /. 
L n (real gross output in year t + real gross 
output in year r-1) for industry i . 
(Total employment loss due to exit in year t+ 
total employment in year t-l) for industry j . 
Proportion o f firms in industry i in year t w i th 
employment less than 100. 
M i n i m u m efficient scale divided by cost 
disadvantage ratio for industry i i n year r b . 
(Capital+Labour) for industry i in year t. 
(Number o f plants that belong to the multi-plant 
f irms -r total number o f plants) in 
industry i i n year 
Herfindahl measure o f concentration for 
industry / i n year t. 
Dummy variable equal to 1, i f the industry i is 
in the first stage o f its l i fe cycle, 0 
otherwise 0. 
Geographical Specific Variables 
DEMAND], 
HOUSE,, 
SPECIALIZATION,, 
DENSITY], 
SMALL PLANT,, 
UNEMPLOYMENT, 
CORE REGION] 
LN(population ,-r population ,. |) for region j. 
Proportion o f owner occupied dwellings in 
region j i n year t. 
Herfindahl measure o f concentration for region 
j in year 
(Population+area in square kilometre) for 
region j i n year t. 
(Employment o f plants wi th less than 100 
employees -=- total employment) in region j in 
year t. 
I L O rate o f unemployment for region j i n year 
/. 
Dummy variable equal to 1, i f the region j is 
one o f the fo l lowing regions: South East, South 
West, EastMidlands and East Anglia, 0 
otherwise. 
Source: Data contained in the A R D is used to calculate a l l the independent variables, except for the 
information on population, proportion o f owner occupied dwellings, area in square kilometre and I L O 
rate o f unemployment, which have been collected f r o m 'Regional Trends' (various issues). 
a I n addition to the above variables, 219 individual dummies (having 20 two-digit manufacturing sectors 
and 11 geographical regions, results in 220 (20x11) individuals) and 23 time dummies are also included 
in the model. 
b ' c ' d See the Appendix to this chapter. 
not only shows the level of output, associated with producing at MES, but also shows 
the extent of the disadvantage imposed on plants, due to producing at a level less than 
the MES. The expectation is that entry is lower in industries characterised with a high 
level of scale disadvantage ratio (Mayer and Chappell, 1992). CAP_LABit measures the 
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extent of capital intensity in an industry and is also expected to encapsulate sunk costs. 
This variable is expected to discourage entry (Khemani and Shapiro, 1986). MULTIit 
measures the degree of multi-plant operation and, ceteris paribus, is expected to affect 
entry in a negative way (Mayer and Chappell, 1992). CONCENTRATION measures the 
degree of seller concentration and can have either a positive or a negative impact on 
entry (Orr, 1974; Duestch, 1975). The last variable in the category of industrial specific 
variables is CYCLEu which is a dummy variable and shows the stage of the life cycle of 
• 1S 
an industry . 
As for the geographical (regional) specific variables, DEMANDjt measures the degree 
of demand in the local area (in this case region). Population growth is used as a proxy 
for demand in the local area and is expected to affect entry in a positive way (Keeble 
and Walker, 1994). HOUSEjt measures the extent of owner occupied dwellings and has 
been found to effect entry in a positive direction (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999). The 
Herfindahl measure of concentration in a region, SPECIALIZATION/9, measures the 
degree of industrial specialization. This variable has been found to have a positive 
impact on entry (Garofoli, 1994). Population density, DENSITYj,, is a proxy for the 
degree of agglomeration (or urbanization) in a region and is expected to have either a 
positive or a negative impact on entry (Guimaraes et al., 1998; Armington and Acs, 
2002). SMALL PLANTjt is a proxy for the local industrial structure and has been found 
Manufacturing sectors are divided into two categories, based on the median age of their plants: those in the first 
stage of their life cycle and those in the second stage. This is done by, initially, ranking the manufacturing sectors, 
based on the median age of their plants, from the lowest to the highest. Subsequently, the first 50% of the 
manufacturing sectors, having the smaller median age are grouped into one category, representing those industries in 
the first stage of their life cycle. Similarly, the second 50% of the manufacturing sectors, having the larger median 
age, are grouped into another category, representing those industries in the second stage of their life cycle. However, 
the grouping of the manufacturing sectors is based on the median age of their plants in the year 1995. The reason for 
this choice of year is that the entire history of the manufacturing sectors, since they were first introduced, is not 
available. The data goes back only to the year 1974, which, therefore, makes it impossible to obtain the exact age of 
the plants. Year 1995 is chosen, because it is towards the end of the period under study and, therefore, there is enough 
time for the identity of plants to change, due to natural turnover in the industries. This, therefore, gives a more 
realistic measure of the age of plants. The two-digit manufacturing sectors together with the stage of their life cycle 
are presented, in Table A4.16, in the Appendix to this chapter. 
1 9 Other measures have also been used in the literature, in order to measure the degree of specialization in an area 
(Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999). Following Devereux et al. (2001), in this study, the Herfindahl measure of industrial 
concentration is used, as it gives more sensible results. This measure is explained in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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to have a positive impact on new firm formation (Fritsch, 1992). The variable 
UNEMPLOYMENTji measures the degree of unemployment in a region. Unemployment 
can either have a positive or a negative affect on entry, based on whether it pushes the 
individuals into starting their own business or shows a lack of buoyancy in the local 
economy (Reynolds el al 1994; Garofoli, 1994). Finally, CORE_REGIONj is a dummy 
variable controlling for the geographical division between the north and the south of the 
U.K. This variable is included in order to capture the fundamental differences between 
the regions of the north and the south, which can result in differences in their entry rates 
(Gripaios et al. 2000). The minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of these 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 Minimum, Maximum, Mean and Standard Deviations of the explanatory variables 
M i n i m u m M a x i m u m Mean Standard Deviation 
Industry Specific Variables 
PROFITit 
GROWTHit 
EX RATEu 
SMALLFIRMj, 
SCALEDR,, 
CAP_LAB„ 
MULTIU 
CONCENTRATION„ 
CYCLEj 
-4.832 
-2.392 
0.000 
0.316 
0.003 
0.002 
0.040 
0.005 
0.000 
0.258 
1.488 
0.481 
0.982 
3.805 
0.112 
0.862 
0.804 
1.000 
-0.614 
-0.032 
0.047 
0.860 
0.114 
0.020 
0.340 
0.072 
0.500 
0.997 
0.274 
0.055 
0.106 
0.321 
0.019 
0.169 
0.095 
0.500 
Geographical Specific Variables 
DEMAND], 
HOUSE], 
SPECIALIZATIONj, 
DENSITY], 
SMALLPLANTj, 
UNEMPLOYMENT], 
COREREGION] 
-0.395 
0.320 
0.094 
0.066 
0.000 
1.600 
0.000 
0.057 
0.740 
0.357 
0.900 
1.000 
19.400 
1.000 
0.001 
0.602 
0.140 
0.290 
0.235 
9.163 
0.360 
0.025 
0.090 
0.052 
0.222 
0.206 
3.877 
0.480 
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4.3.4 Entry model 
The model used in this study is the GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) model, 
introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995). This choice was governed by the fact that the 
standard panel data models, such as fixed effect and random effect model, were not 
applicable. The reason is that the fixed effect model omits any time-invariant variable 
included in the model. In this study, both industry life cycle and core regional dummies 
are time-invariant. At the same time, the random effect model assumes that the 
differences across the individuals (in this case a manufacturing sector in a region) are 
random and therefore does not take account of the individual specific factors affecting 
entry rates. This is also a shortcoming, as entry rates are significantly higher/lower in 
certain manufacturing sectors and regions, due to some specific factors attached to 
either the manufacturing sector or the region. Therefore, the GMM approach, available 
in PcGive, is used in this study, since it is capable of taking account of the time-
invariant variables. At the same time, individual dummies are included in the model, in 
order to take account of the fixed effects (individual specific factors) affecting the entry 
rates. 
The model to be estimated is: 
y*, = Constant + a CYCLEi + p CORE_REGIONj + yi */,./+ Y2 ( */»-/ x CYCLEi)+ 73 
(xu-\ x COREREGIONj ) + 81 zJt., + 8 2 ( z M * CYCLEi) + 83 ( zJt., x CORE_REGIONj) 
19 11 10 23 
+ X X <?y (Industry. Region}) + ]T 920j (Industry20 Regiony) + £ Xt Time, + %, (1) 
1=1 j=\ j=i /=i 
uij, = au + yl + vUl ( i = l ,2 . . .20;7=l ,2 . . .11; t = 1,2...24; k= 1,2,3 ) 
E(v ? / ) = 0, K(vijt)2= a2, E ( v i j t , v r f , ) = 0 
y*., is defined as entry rate for the sub-group of entrants k in the industry /', region j 
and time /. CYCLEi and CORE REGIONj are the stage of the life cycle and the 
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geographical division dummies, respectively. and zy,_/ are the lagged values of the 
industry specific and the regional specific variables, respectively, as explained in Table 
4.9. Note that both the industry and the regional specific variables (the x's and the z's) 
are lagged. It is therefore assumed that entry is a lagged decision, which means that 
individuals make the decision to enter in a specific year based on the value of the 
explanatory variables in the previous year. A consequence of this model specification is 
that all the explanatory variables wil l be predetermined, which automatically eliminates 
the need for using instrumental variables with regard to the right hand side of equation 
(1). The error term is divided into three different components: a,y is the individual 
specific component; y t is the time specific component; and vyt is an error term with the 
usual desirable Gaussian properties. 
The effects of the industry life cycle and the geographical division are modelled not 
only separately, using the dummy variables in equation (1) {CYCLEi and 
CORE REGIONj), but also by multiplying each dummy by the explanatory variables 
(xu-i x CYCLEi, xu.i x CORE_REGIONj, zj,., x CYCLEi andz,,./ x CORE_REGIONj) 
to test for any composite effects of xu-\ and zjt.\ on entry rates, given the effect of the 
explanatory variables might vary across the two different stages of life cycle and the 
two major geographical divisions. 
19 I I 10 
The term {Industry { Regionj) + ^02QJ{Industry2O Region/) is included in the 
/=i j=\ y=i 
model in order to take account of the individual specific factors (fixed effects) affecting 
the entry rates20. These dummies allow for the intercept to vary for each individual. 
23 
Finally, ^ X, Time, are the time dummies that take account of the time specific factors 
/=i 
As there are 220 individuals (20 industries in 11 geographical regions), only 219 dummy variables have to be 
included in the model. Therefore, Industry20 Region,; is dropped out of the equation. 
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affecting the entry rates. The expected signs of the coefficients associated with the 
explanatory variables in equation (1) are presented in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 Variables and the expected sign of their coefficients 
Var iab le s Expec ted Signs 
Industry Specific Variables 
PROFIT*., + 
GROWTH,,., + 
EX_RATEit_, + 
SMALL_FIRMU_, + 
SCALE_DR„_, 
CAP_LAB„_, 
MULTIu., 
C O N C E N T R A T I O N ? 
CYCLE, ? 
Geographical Specific Variables 
DEMANDj,., + 
HOUSE],., + 
SPECIALIZATION],., + 
DENSITY],., ? 
SMALLPLANT],., + 
UNEMPLOYMENT],., ? 
COREREGION] ? 
4.3.5 Results 
Before running the model, the bivariate correlations between the explanatory variables 
needs to be examined, in order to determine the possibilities for multi-colinearity. 
Therefore, the bivariate correlations between each pair of the industry specific and the 
regional specific variables are presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, respectively. The 
correlations between the geographical specific variables are low. However, there are 
some significantly high correlations observed between the industry specific variables, 
especially the variable MULTIit.i which shows a high correlation with the variables 
SMALL FIRMit-i and CAPLABu.,. The high correlation between the variable MULTIit.i 
and SMALL_FIRMj,.] is expected, due to the way in which these two variables are 
calculated21. 
2 1 Large firms are more likely to be a multi-plant firm than are small firms. 
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The dependent variable is calculated separately for each category of entrants (plants 
opened by domestic de-novo firms, plants opened by domestic incumbents and plants 
opened by foreign firms). Equation (1) was initially applied separately to each different 
category of entrants. However, not all the explanatory variables were included in all the 
equations. The variables HOUSEj,.i and SMALL PLANTjt.i were included only when the 
dependent variable was entry by domestic de-novo firms. The reason for their exclusion 
from the other two equations was that there was no theoretical justification behind 
including them. HOUSEj,.] is used as a proxy for personal wealth, which can be used as 
a collateral for starting a new business. This naturally does not apply to entry by 
domestic incumbents and foreign firms. Similarly, SMALL_PLANTjt.i is only included 
when examining the entry by domestic de-novo firms, as small plants are a better 
incubator for new businesses. Therefore, it is presumed not have any impact on entry by 
domestic incumbents and foreign firms. 
The variable MULTIit.j was dropped from all three equations, due to creating a severe 
multicollinearity. This was a result of its high correlation with the variables 
SMALL FIRMu-i and CAP_LABit.i. Next, using a general to specific modelling strategy, 
only the significant interaction terms were kept in the equations. The final models are 
presented in Table 4.14. A comparison between the results reveals that the different sub-
groups of entrants respond differently to the same explanatory variables. By way of 
illustrating the results, the elasticities for the mechanical engineering industry in the 
South East region of the U.K. in 1994, are calculated and presented in Table 4.15 . I n 
this example, the coefficients are calculated based on the two dummies (the industry life 
cycle and the geographical division dummy) having a value of one. The reason is that, 
2 2 The choice of industry, region and year in this example is completely arbitrary and it is just for the ease of 
interpretation. Elasticities are then calculated as, coefficient x (x /y), where x is the value of the explanatory variable 
in 1993 (as the explanatory variables are one year lagged) and y is entry rate for a given group of entrants, in the 
mechanical engineering industry, in the South East region in 1994. 
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Table 4.14 Results of running the G M M model, for the three different groups of entrants (1974-97) 
Coefficients 
Variables 
PROFIT,,., 
PROFIT,,., * CYCLE, 
PROFIT,,.,* CORE_REGIONj 
GROWTH,,., 
GROWTH,,.,* CYCLE, 
GROWTH,,.,* CORE_REGIONj 
EXJATE,,., 
EX RATE,,.,* CYCLE, 
EXJATE,,.,* CORE REGION, 
SMALL FIRM,,., 
SMALL FIRM,,., * CYCLE, 
SMALL FIRM,, , * CORE_REGIONt 
SCALEDR,,., 
SCALE_DR„ i* CYCLE, 
SCALE_DR„ i* CORE REGIONj 
CAP_LAB„., 
CAP IAS,,.,* CYCLE, 
CAP_LAB„ i* COREJEGION, 
CONCENTRATION,,., 
CONCENTRA TION,,., * CYCLE, 
CONCENTRATION,,.,* CORE_REG!ONj 
DEMAND,,., 
DEMAND,,./* CYCLE, 
DEMANDj,.,* CORE_REGIONj 
HOUSEJ,, 
HOUSEJ,,* CYCLE, 
HOUSEJ,.,* CORE_REGIONJ 
SPECIALIZATION,,., 
SPECIALIZATIONj,.,* CYCLE, 
SPECIAUZA TIONj,., * COREJREGIONj 
DENSITY,,., 
DENSITY„.,*.CYCLE, 
DENSITYj,.,* CORE_REGIONj 
SMALL_PLANTj,., 
SMALLJLANT,,.,* CYCLE, 
SMALL_PIA NT,,., * CORE_REGIONj 
UNEMPLOYMENT,,., 
UNEMPLOYMENT,,., * CYCLE, 
UNEMPLOYMENT,,.,* CORE_REGIONj 
CYCLE, 
COREJEGION, 
Domestic de-novo firms 
0.002 (2.51)** 
0.003 (2.75)* 
n.s 
0.003 (1.45) 
n.s 
n.s 
0.003 (0.19) 
n.s 
n.s 
0.008 (2.59)* 
0.004 (2.94)* 
n.s 
-0.006 (-3.70)* 
0.008(1.70)*** 
n.s 
-0.006 (-3.18)* 
-0.007 (-14.1)* 
-0.001 (-2.11)** 
-0.003 (-0.50) 
0.01 (2.03)** 
n.s 
-0.008 (-0.98) 
n.s 
0.016(3.09)* 
0.004(1.34) 
n.s 
0.024 (3.18)* 
0.023 (7.51)* 
0.004 (2.30)** 
-0.027 (-3.21)* 
-0.005 (-6.39)* 
0.003(9.65)* 
-0.014 (-2.70)* 
0.013 (4.45)* 
n.s 
0.010(2.55)** 
-0.001 (-3.20)* 
n.s 
n.s 
0.0002 (0.200) 
-0.015 (-4.03)* 
Domestic incumbents 
0.006 (2.75)* 
n.s 
n.s 
-0.012 (-3.01)* 
n.s 
0.011 (2.01)** 
0.057 (2.18)** 
-0.096 (-1.88)*** 
n.s 
0.0217(2.93)* 
-0.0216 (-3.15)* 
n.s 
0.005 (0.766) 
n.s 
n.s 
0.014(3.93)* 
0.003 (2.10)** 
0.007 (6.84)* 
-0.006 (-0.415) 
n.s 
-0.022 (-3.35)* 
0.016(2.24)** 
n.s 
n.s 
-0.022 (-5.45)* 
n.s 
n.s 
-0.005 (-3.63)* 
0.008 (8,12)* 
n.s 
-0.0015 (-1.69)*** 
0.0012(2.99)* 
n.s 
0.010(1.56) 
0.0006(0.160) 
Foreign firms 
0.0009(1.03) 
n.s 
n.s 
-0.002 (-0.814) 
n.s 
0.007(1.70)*** 
0.081 (1.65)*** 
n.s 
n.s 
-0.02 (-2.62)* 
n.s 
n.s 
0.020 (2.84)* 
n.s 
n.s 
0.003 (2.34)** 
n.s 
0.003 (2.85)* 
-0.001 (-0.110) 
0.011 (2.85)* 
n.s 
0.004(1.28) 
n.s 
n.s 
0.002 (0.773) 
n.s 
-0.004 (-2.45)** 
0.008 (7.16)* 
-0.025 (-8.29)* 
n.s 
-0.0007 (-1.80)*** 
n.s 
n.s 
0.018(9.84)* 
-0.0002 (-0.217) 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.*, ** and *** denote that coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level o f significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.15 Elasticities calculated for the mechanical engineering industry, in the South East region 
of the U . K . in 1994 
Elasticities 
Variables Domestic de-novo firms Domestic incumbents Foreign firms 
PROFIT,,., 2.40% 2.37% 0.38% 
GROWTHj,.! 0.34% -0.10% 0.42% 
EX RATEu.i 0.68% -6.05% 14.04% 
SMALL FIRM,,., 40 .91% 0.13% -58.28% 
SCALE DRit_, 0.05% 0.09% 0.37% 
CAP LABit_, -0 .71% 0.98% 0.32% 
CONCENTRATION,,., 0.17% -0.60% 0.24% 
DEMANDj,., 0.09% 0.16% 0.05% 
HOUSEj,, 62.58% 
SPECIALIZATION^, 0 .31% -6.57% -0.59% 
DENSITYj,., -20.23% 2.55% -19.47% 
SMALL PLANTj,., 20.03% 
UNEMPLOYMENT^., -33.91% -7.68% -18.09% 
Elasticities are calculated as, coefficient x ( x / y ) , where x is the value o f the explanatory variable i n year 
1993 (as the explanatory variables are one year lagged) andy is entry rate for a given group o f entrants, i n 
the mechanical engineering industry, i n the South East region, in 1994. 
based on the median age of its plants, the mechanical engineering industry is 
categorised as being in the first stage of its life cycle (see Table A4.16). At the same 
time, the South East region is located in the South, which gives a value of 1 to the 
geographical division dummy. 
Starting from the variable PROFITj,./ in Table 4.14, it is clear that it has a different 
impact on entry by different groups of entrants. Both domestic de-novo firms and 
domestic incumbents respond positively to increased profits, while this effect is 
insignificant on foreign entry. For the domestic de-novo firms, the positive effect is 
even stronger, i f they are entering into an industry in the first stage of its life cycle. 
Based on the model introduced by Gort and Klepper (1982), in young industries prices 
of the products are initially high, due to the small number of firms producing them. 
Subsequently, as entry increases, the number of firms and industry output increases, 
which results in a reduction in prices. They explained that, as industries enter the mature 
stages of their life cycle, the rate of growth in output drops below that of an average 
firm. At this stage, exit is inevitable and shakeout happens. 
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Based on this model, it is clear that increased profits, in the second stage of the 
industry's life cycle, coexist with a high level of concentration, which is usually 
difficult to be overcome by de-novo firms. However, in the first stage, when 
competition is important, increased profits could be a sign of more market 
opportunities. This can be the reason for the stronger effect of profits on de-novo entry 
in the first stage of an industry's life cycle. These results are similar to the findings by 
Khemani and Shapiro (1988), in that they also found that industry profit had a positive 
impact on entry by de-novo firms. Mata (1993) found that the only kind of entry that 
responded positively to industry profits was expansion entry. The reason proposed by 
him was that, for firms already established in an industry, past profits are better proxies 
for the future profits, since they are generated by them. 
On the other hand, in Table 4.14 it is shown that past profits did not have any impact 
on entry by foreign firms. This finding is similar to the finding by Geroski (1991a). He 
found that only domestic entrants responded positively to profit opportunities. He 
suggested the following three reasons for this effect: 1) adjustment costs for foreign 
firms are usually higher than for domestic firms, which results is a quicker response to 
profit opportunities from domestic producers; 2) incumbents' reaction is milder to 
domestic entry than to foreign entry; and 3) the elasticity of demand for the product of 
the domestic firms is higher than that for foreign firms. 
Taking the mechanical engineering industry in the South East region in 1994 (see 
Table 4.15), one can see that a 1% increase in the lagged profits increased entry (the 
plant opening) rate by domestic de-novo firms and domestic incumbents by 2.4% and 
2.37%, respectively. 
GROWTH'it., does not have any significant impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms. 
Mata (1993) found a similar result. It appears that for de-novo entrants, past profits 
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were better proxies for future profits than past industry growth. On the other hand, 
lagged industry growth has a negative impact on plant opening by domestic incumbents 
in the northern regions of the U.K. However, this effect in the regions of the south is 
very small and almost equal to zero. In Section 4.3.3 it was explained that due to the 
unavailability of the equilibrium values of demand, the output values were used in order 
to calculate industry growth. However, this can have a different implication for the 
effect of past industry growth on entry. In this case, a higher growth rate of output could 
indicate that there is less room available in a market for new entrants, which can 
subsequently retard plant opening by domestic incumbents rather than inducing it. 
Lieberman (1990) found that incumbents set a higher capacity expansion threshold for 
new plants than did entrants. This implies that incumbents only build new plants when 
there is a need for additional capacity; otherwise, they just expand production within 
their existing plants. However, a greater potential market in the south (as a result of its 
larger population) to some extent can lessen this negative effect. 
Geroski (1991a) also found that lagged industry growth had a negative impact on 
domestic entry. However, Orr (1974), Hause and Du Rietz (1984), Khemani and 
Shapiro (1986), Highfield and Smiley (1987), Chappell et al. (1990), Schwalbach 
(1991) and Mayer and Chappell (1992) found a positive impact of industry growth on 
entry. Our findings also contradict the previous findings by Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) 
and Khemani and Shapiro (1988). Baldwin and Gorecki found that industry growth had 
a positive impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms and Khemani and Shapiro found 
that it had a positive impact on different kinds of domestic entry. 
In this study, the only group of entrants that respond positively to industry growth are 
foreign firms, although this effect is present only when foreign firms are entering into 
the core regions of the south. This is in accordance with the finding by Gorecki (1975), 
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in that he also found that only foreign entrants responded positively to industry growth. 
However, Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) and Khemani and Shapiro (1988) found no 
significant effect of industry growth on entry by foreign firms. In terms of the 
elasticities, reported in Table 4.15 for our representative case, a 1% increase in lagged 
industry growth decreased the plant entry rate by incumbents, in the mechanical 
engineering industry in the South East in 1994, by 0.1% and increased plant entry rate 
by foreign firms by 0.4%. 
EX RATEu-i has no significant impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms. The 
possible reason for this effect could be that due to their small scale and operating in 
market niches, de-novo entrants do not impact upon total industry output significantly 
and, therefore, do not respond to the room created at the industry level. On the other 
hand, this variable seems to encourage plant opening by domestic incumbents, although 
the direction of the effect depends on the stage in an industry's life cycle. In industries 
in the first stage of their life cycle, the room created due to previous exits has a negative 
impact on entry by domestic incumbents, while in the second stage it has a positive 
impact. This effect can be explained by the theory proposed by Klepper (1996). He 
explained that in the second stage of an industry's life cycle, as the nature of innovation 
is changing from product to process innovation, size creates an advantage for 
incumbents. Hence, at this stage incumbents respond positively to the vacuum created 
due to previous exits as larger size brings them advantages. However, in the first stage, 
the room created in the market has a negative impact on capacity expansion by multi-
plant firms, as it can be just a sign of a highly turbulent environment. 
The only category of entrants that respond unconditionally positively to the room 
created at the industry level, due to previous exits, are foreign firms. Table 4.15 shows 
that in the mechanical engineering industry in the South East in 1994, a 1% increase in 
164 
EX_RATEjt-i decreased the rate of plant opening by domestic incumbents by 6.05%, 
while it increased the rate of plant opening by foreign firms by 14.04%. 
The variable SMALL FIRM),.] is found to have a positive impact on entry by domestic 
de-novo firms and domestic incumbents. Dunne et al. (1988) found that the majority of 
entries and exits that takes place in an industry are among the small firms. Rosenbaum 
and Lamort (1992) also found that existence of small firms in an industry had a positive 
impact on entry. However, the associated impact is stronger for domestic de-novo firms 
in the first stage of an industry's life cycle, and for domestic incumbents in the second 
stage. 
Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) stated that the role of small firms varies through 
various stages of the industry life cycle. They explained that the existence of small firm 
in the first stage is because these firms are competing for the dominant design and thus 
their likelihood of success is low. However in the second stage, when the dominant 
design has emerged, the existence of small firms is more in order to occupy strategic 
niches. This theory shows that based on the stage of the industry life cycle, the existence 
of small firms in an industry can signal different market conditions. In the first stage it 
signals a high level of competition and a turbulent environment, which subsequently can 
attract de-novo entrants, while for the incumbents the opposite is true. 
Finally, foreign entry occurs less in industries dominated by small firms. Caves (1971) 
proposed that foreign firms possess some advantages relative to domestic firms which 
enables them to overcome the entry barriers identified by Bain (1956). These 
advantages are: 1) i f economies of scale are present at a particular stage of production, a 
multi-national firm can carry out that stage at a single location and transfer the rest of 
the stages to its subsidiaries; 2) i f the product differentiation barrier is present and 
created through patenting, then a multi-national enterprise can use its knowledge to 
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serve markets across its national boundaries. On the other hand, i f product 
differentiation is created through advertising, not only does advertising spill across the 
national boundaries, but also previous advertising creates an accumulated knowledge, 
which can be used for marketing of the products abroad and adapting them according to 
the consumers' tastes and 3) foreign firms have the advantage of buying factors of 
production either in the host or the home country, while domestic entrants have to chose 
only from one set of factor prices in their home country. Having these advantages, 
foreign firms tend to enter industries with high entry barriers, which are usually less 
populated by small firms. 
In terms of our example in Table 4.15, a 1% increase in SMALL_FIRMit.i in the 
mechanical engineering industry in the South East region in 1994, increased the rate of 
plant opening by domestic de-novo firms and domestic incumbents by 40% and 0.13%, 
respectively, while it decreased plant opening rate by foreign firms by 58% 2 3. 
SCALE DRu-i has a positive impact on plant opening by domestic de-novo firms, i f 
plants are opening in industries in the first stage of their life cycle. However, i f they are 
entering into industries in the second stage of their life cycle, SCALE_DRu.i has a 
negative impact. Klepper (1996) showed that in the second stage of the industry life 
cycle, process innovation replaces product innovation. In this stage having larger plants 
creates an advantage for the owner firms engaged in process innovation. This puts the 
entrants at a cost disadvantage, relative to the incumbents, i f they are to enter at a small 
scale. Based on this theory, it is evident that due to their small initial sizes de-novo 
entrants are deterred from entry into industries in the second stage of their life cycle, 
characterised by a high degree of the scale disadvantage ratio. However, we find no 
2 3 As it was explained in Footnote 20, elasticities are calculated as, coefficient x ( x / y ) , where x is the value of the 
explanatory variable in year 1993 and y is the entry rate for a given group of entrants, in the mechanical engineering 
industry, in the South East region in 1994. The reason for the high elasticities in the case of entry by domestic de-
novo firms and entry by foreign firms is the high coefficients and the high proportion of small firms in the 
mechanical engineering industry in 1993. However, as the associated coefficient for domestic incumbents is very 
small (0.0001), it decreases the elasticity for this group. 
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support for the associated impact in the first stage of industry life cycle. Harris (1976), 
Hause and Du Rietz (1984), Chappell et al. (1990) and Mayer and Chappell (1992) all 
found that existence of economies of scale in industries had a negative impact on entry. 
Khemani and Shapiro (1988) and Mata (1993) both found that de-novo entrants were 
deterred from entering into industries where a high degree of economies of scale was 
present. 
SCALE_DRih} has no significant impact on expansion decisions by domestic 
incumbents (in terms of plant opening). However, it has a positive impact on plant 
opening by foreign firms. The associated reasons for this impact were explained earlier 
when looking at the effect of SMALL _FIRMU-i on entry by foreign firms. According to 
Caves (1971), due to the advantages that foreign firms possess they prefer industries 
with high entry barriers. As the presence of a scale disadvantage ratio in industries is a 
structural entry barrier, it attracts entry by foreign firms. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) 
also found that foreign entrants were not affected by the presence of scale economies in 
industries. In terms of the example in Table 4.15, a 1% increase in SCALE_DRit.j in the 
mechanical engineering industry in the South East region in 1994, increased the plant 
opening rate by de-novo firms by 0.05% and plant opening rate by foreign firms by 
0.37%. 
CAP LABit-j has a negative impact on entry by de-novo firms and the impact is 
stronger when they are entering into industries in the first stage of their life cycle or 
when they are entering into the core regions of the south. In contrast, CAP_LABit.i has a 
positive impact on entry by domestic incumbents. This positive impact is also stronger 
i f they are entering into industries in the first stage of their life cycle or in the core 
regions of the south. The reason for a different impact of CAP_LABu.i on entry by 
domestic de-novo firms and domestic incumbents is likely to be the imperfection of 
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capital markets. Demsetz (1982) explained that incumbents' history conveys 
information about their ability to accept any unforeseen risk, which affects the interest 
payments required by lenders. As a result, older and larger firms can borrow capital at a 
cheaper price than newer firms. Therefore, according to Demsetz, in a world where 
information is costly the major source of interest rate differential is the history attached 
to a successful firm. Mata (1993) found a negative impact of capital intensity on the 
entry by de-novo firms. Khemani and Shapiro (1988) also found the same result. 
However, they found that capital intensity did not have any significant impact on entry 
by already established firms. 
In the present study, it was also found that the associated effects are stronger in the 
first stage of the industry's life cycle and in the core regions of the south. According to 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), in the first stage of the industry's life cycle there is 
usually a high degree of uncertainty regarding the success of the new ventures. 
Therefore, this can increase the risk of investment by de-novo entrants, especially i f a 
significant amount of capital is sunk. Similarly, it gives the incumbents a relative 
advantage in terms being able to borrow the start-up capital. On the other hand, Harris 
and Andrew (2000) found that the rate of return on capital is higher in the south, which 
increases the opportunity cost of capital. Therefore, this makes it even more difficult for 
the de-novo entrants to borrow start-up capital, i f they are entering into the core regions 
of the south. 
CAP LABj,.] has a positive impact on entry by foreign firms, which is stronger i f they 
are building plants in the core regions of the south. This is again likely to be linked to a 
foreign firm's ability to overcome various entry barriers. In terms of the elasticities 
shown in Table 4.15, a 1% increase in CAP LABj,./ in the mechanical engineering 
industry in the South East region in 1994, decreased the rate of plant opening by de-
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novo firms by 0.71%, while it increased the rate of plant opening by incumbents and 
foreign firms by 0.98% and 0.32%, respectively. 
The last variable, in the category of industry specific variables, is 
CONCENTRATIONit.\- Our findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, more concentrated 
industries in the first stage of their life cycle face higher rates of entry by de-novo firms. 
The models introduced by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal (1998) suggested that 
in the early stages of industry life cycle there is a large amount of information available, 
which encourages new firms to enter the market. Subsequently, as the market grows, the 
number of firms and output increases. They explained that as the dominant technology 
emerges a shake out in the number of firms occurs, and the least efficient firms exit. In 
the next stage, where the market is more mature, product design standardises and price 
and quantity also stabilises. In the present study it was found that high concentration in 
the first stage of industry life cycle can attract entry by de-novo firms. As was explained 
above, the nature of concentration at this stage is very different from that in the second 
stage, when there are widespread collusive activities by incumbents. In the first stage, 
high concentration can be due to the market not being exposed to many firms. This, 
subsequently, can attract entry by de-novo firms. This finding contradicts the previous 
findings by Khemani and Shapiro (1988), in that they found a negative impact of 
concentration on entry by de-novo firms. 
The effect of concentration on the entry by incumbents is insignificant i f they are 
building new plants in the regions of the north. However, concentration has a negative 
impact on their entry, i f they are setting-up plants in the core regions of the south. On 
the other hand, foreign firms are more attracted to highly concentrated industries in the 
first stage of their life cycle. Highly concentrated industries are usually also 
characterised with having high entry barriers which, as was discussed previously, 
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attracts entry by foreign firms. However, the reason for the existence of this positive 
effect only in the first stage could be that a high concentration in this stage signals more 
profitable opportunities in the future and less retaliatory actions from incumbents in 
face of foreign entry. Gorecki (1975) found that concentration had no significant impact 
on entry by foreign firms. In terms of the example in Table 4.15, a 1% increase in 
CONCENTRATIONin the mechanical engineering industry in the South East region 
in 1994, increased plant entry rate by de-novo firms and foreign firms by 0.17% and 
0.24%, respectively, while it decreased the plant entry rate by domestic incumbents by 
0.6%. 
The first regional specific variable, in Table 4.14, is DEMANDjt.i. It is found that 
increases in demand in a region has a positive impact on entry by domestic de-novo 
firms. However, this effect was present only in the core regions of the south, while in 
the regions of the north this effect was insignificant. On the other hand, demand 
increase in a region always has a positive impact on plant opening by domestic 
incumbents in that region. The positive impact of regional demand on entry has been 
found in the following studies: Fritsch (1992) and Armington and Acs (2002). Foreign 
firms were the only category of entrants, where their plant opening decision was not 
dependent on the local demand. In previous empirical studies, the size of the host 
market has usually been found to have a positive impact on inward foreign direct 
investment (Friedman et al, 1992; Billington, 1999). However, Scaperlanda and 
Mauer's (1969) found no such significant impact. Table 4.15 shows that a 1% increase 
in regional demand, increased plant entry rate by domestic de-novo firms and domestic 
incumbents, in the mechanical engineering industry in the South East region in 1994, by 
0.09% and 0.16%, respectively. 
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As was explained earlier in this section, HOUSEpi is included only in the first 
equation. Being a proxy for the degree of house ownership in a region, this variable is 
found to have a positive impact on plant opening by domestic de-novo firms. The 
reason for this positive impact is that individuals can use it as a collateral in order to 
start a new business. Fotopolous and Spence (1999) also found a positive impact of 
house ownership on new firm formation. However, this effect is confined only to the 
core regions of the south. The reason could be the existence of a regional selective 
assistance (RSA) scheme in the north. The RSA encourages new business start-up in the 
north and provides them with the start-up capital. This scheme generally does not apply 
to the new business start-ups in the south. Therefore, individuals in the south have to 
finance the start-up capital mainly through their personal wealth. Table 4.15 shows that 
a 1% increase in HOUSEj,.], increased the rate of plant opening by domestic de-novo 
firms, in the mechanical engineering industry in the South East region in 1994, by 
62.6%. 
The effect of SPECIALIZATIONjtl on entry by domestic de-novo firms is conditional 
on the stage of industry life cycle and the geographical location of the new plant. Area 
specialisation has a positive impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms, except i f they 
are entering into an industry in the second stage of its life cycle and into the core 
regions of the south. 
Krugman (1991b) proposed that specialization contributes to the existence of external 
economies of scale in an area and specialized areas are attractive locations for new 
business start-ups, as specialisation: 1) increases productivity; 2) lowers the cost of 
intermediate inputs and 3) facilitates technological spill-over, as a result of knowledge 
spill-over from other high technology companies, and also facilitates information 
circulation. However, Gudgin (1978) contended that the higher the level of 
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diversification, the higher is the number of new firms. The reason proposed by him was 
that a higher level of diversification indicates a higher variety of skills available locally. 
Garofoli (1994) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) found that area specialization had 
a positive impact on entry. Our findings show that de-novo firms, having no prior 
experience in industries, always benefit from area specialization, except when they are 
entering into an old industry (being in the second stage of its life cycle) and into one of 
the core regions of the south. In this case they prefer a more diversified region. 
Area specialization has a negative impact on plant opening by domestic incumbents. 
Therefore, it appears that this category of entrants, having prior experiences in 
industries, do not benefit as much from the external economies of scale created as a 
result of area specialization. In contrast, they are more attracted to diversified areas. The 
impact of area specialization on foreign entry is negative, although this impact is 
significant only in the core regions of the south. Therefore, these groups of entrants are, 
also, more attracted to the diversified regions, but only in the core regions of the south. 
Table 4.15 shows that a 1% increase in SPECIALIZATION^., increased plant opening by 
domestic de-novo firms in the mechanical engineering industry in the South East region 
in 1994, by 0.31%, while it decreased plant opening by domestic incumbents and 
foreign firms by 6.5% and 0.59%, respectively. 
DENSITY)f i always has a negative impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms, and 
the effect is even stronger i f they are entering into the core regions of the south or an 
industry in the second stage of its life cycle. Population density is used here as a proxy 
for the agglomeration (or urbanization) economies. The associated negative impact can 
be due to the high start-up costs (e.g. land prices) of a new business in the highly dense 
areas. This is likely to be the reason, as this effect is even stronger in the core regions of 
the south. However, this negative impact lessens to some extent i f the target industry is 
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a relatively young industry (which means that it is in the first stage of its life cycle). The 
reason can be associated with the merits of the dense areas, in terms of providing a 
better market for new businesses, which can be important for the young industries, as 
they face higher uncertainty relative to the old industries. Guimaraes et al. (1998) also 
found a negative impact of density on new firm formation. Looking at the trend in 
geographic concentration of firms in certain regions of the United States, Dumais et al. 
(1997) found that new entrant chose to enter the less concentrated regions. The reason 
proposed by them was that in such areas the benefits from concentration were offset by 
the disadvantages associated with high urban densities and congestion problems. On the 
contrary, Armington and Acs (2002) found that industrial density (a proxy for 
agglomeration economies) had a positive impact on entry. 
Density has a positive impact on entry by domestic incumbents, i f they are opening 
new plants in relatively young industries, and has a negative impact i f they are opening 
plants in relatively old industries. As it was explained above, highly dense areas provide 
a better market for businesses, which can be more important i f an industry is relatively 
young. The possible reason for our finding is that incumbents, due to having more 
resources, can overcome the higher start-up costs of new plants in the dense areas and 
take advantage of the agglomeration (or urbanization) economies i f they are entering 
into a young industry. However, i f they want to enter an old industry, density has the 
opposite effect. 
However, density has a positive impact on entry by foreign firms, i f they are entering 
an old industry, and a negative impact i f they are entering a young industry. Billington 
(1999) found that population density had a positive impact on foreign direct investments 
in the UK. However, we found that this impact is present only when the target industry 
is relatively old. Table 4.15 shows that a 1% increase in DENSITYj,.i, decreased the 
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plant opening rate by domestic de-novo firms and foreign firms, in the mechanical 
engineering industry in the South East region in 1994, by 20.2% and 19.5% 
respectively; while it increased plant opening rate by domestic incumbents by 2.6%. 
SMALL_PLANTjt-i is included only in the first equation, due to the reason discussed at 
the beginning of this section. It was found that a larger population of small plants in an 
area affects plant opening by domestic de-novo firms positively, and the effect is even 
stronger in the core regions of the south. This is in accordance with the findings by 
Fritsch (1992), Garofoli (1994) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1999). They found also 
that the existence of small plants in an area had a positive impact on entry by new firms. 
The reasons proposed by Mason (1991), Storey (1981) and Storey (1982) for this 
positive effect are as follows: 1) small plants provide their employees with a better work 
experience; 2) in small plants, employees can have a closer contact with the managers 
of the company, which increases their confidence, and 3) job security is lower is small 
plants, which can push individuals into starting their own businesses. 
However, this effect was found to be stronger in the regions of the south. The reasons 
for this effect can be seen in the different market conditions, labour-force 
characteristics, industry composition and fixed regional specific factors, that makes 
regions in the south of Britain more entrepreneurial than the regions of the north 
(Georgellis and Wall, 2000). Table 4.15 shows that a 1% increase in SMALL_PLANTjt.i 
increased plant entry rate by domestic de-novo firms, in the mechanical engineering 
industry in the South East region in 1994, by 20%. 
The last geographical specific variable in Table 4.14 is UNEMPLOYMENT^.}. We 
find no support for the proposition that due to unavailability of alternative jobs in areas 
with a high level of unemployment, individuals are pushed into starting their own 
business (the unemployment push effect). On the contrary this study found that new 
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business start-ups are higher in regions with a lower level of unemployment. Fritsch 
(1992) and Garofolli (1994) also found that unemployment in an area had a negative 
impact on new firm formations. However, Armington and Acs (2002) found that 
unemployment in an area had a positive impact on the formation of new businesses. 
Similarly, incumbents tend to open their new plants in regions with a lower level of 
unemployment, although the associated impact is very small (almost equal to zero) i f 
they are opening their new plants in young industries. Finally, foreign firms prefer to 
enter regions with a lower level of unemployment. The reason for this negative impact 
can be that a high level of unemployment is an area indicates erosion of the workforce, 
which ceteris paribus makes the area unattractive for foreign entry. This finding 
contradicts the previous findings by Friedman et al. (1992) and Billington (1999), in 
that they found the opposite. In Table 4.15, a 1% increase in unemployment in the 
region, decreased plant opening by domestic de-novo firms, domestic incumbents and 
foreign firms, in the mechanical engineering industries in the South East region in 1994, 
by 33.9%, 7.7% and 18.1%, respectively. 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, entry (plant opening) decision of firms in U.K. manufacturing 
industries over the 1974-97 period was studied. Entrants (new plants) were divided into 
three different categories: 1) new plants opened by domestic de-novo firms; 2) new 
plants opened by domestic incumbents; and 3) new plants opened by foreign firms. 
Their entry decisions were studied separately. The entry determinants were divided into 
two categories: 1) industry specific factors and 2) geographical specific factors. The 
effect of the explanatory variables on entry was allowed to vary across the two different 
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stages in their industry life cycle and the two geographical segments, the north and the 
south of UK, and the following results were found. 
Domestic de-novo entrants took past industry profit as a better proxy for future 
profitability of the industries than past industry growth. At the same time, the positive 
effect of past industry profit on their entry was stronger i f the target industry was in the 
first stage of its life cycle. Similarly, they were encouraged to enter industries with a 
large population of small firms. This effect was also stronger i f the target industry was 
in the first stage of its life cycle. This group of entrants, due to their small size and 
operating in market niches, were not responsive to the room created in industries due to 
previous exits. Highly concentrated industries in the first stage of their life cycle 
encouraged their entry as they signalled future profit opportunities. 
On the contrary, they were deterred from entry into capital intensive industries. This 
effect was found to be stronger i f the target industry was in the first stage of its life 
cycle or i f the target region was located in the south of the UK. This group of entrants 
were deterred from entry into industries characterised with a high scale disadvantage 
ratio in the second stage of their life cycle, but encouraged to enter into such industries 
in the first stage of their life cycle. 
Regional demand had a positive impact on their entry, as domestic de-novo firms 
usually serve local markets. The degree of house ownership in a region also had a 
positive impact on their entry. Therefore, this group of entrants used their house 
ownership status as a collateral to raise the start-up capital in the south of the UK, 
whereas in the north they are able to benefit from governments assistance schemes such 
as regional selective assistance (RSA). However, the effect of regional demand and 
house ownership was present only in the core regions of the south. The size of the 
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incubator plants in the region had a positive impact on their entry and this effect was 
found to be stronger i f entry was into one of the core regions of the south. 
Population density had a negative impact on entry. This negative effect was stronger i f 
the target region was one of the core regions of the south and weaker i f the target 
industry was in the first stage of its life cycle. The reason for this impact could be that 
the start-up costs (such as land prices) are lower in less dense areas. Regional 
unemployment also had a negative impact on entry by domestic de-novo firms. 
Therefore, no support was found for the unemployment push effect. Areas with a high 
level of unemployment signalled a lack of buoyancy and therefore had a lower level of 
entry by this group of entrants. 
Area specialization had a positive impact on entry, except when entry was into one of 
the regions of the south and an industry in the second stage of its life cycle. This means 
that i f entry is occurring into a relatively old industry in one of the core regions of the 
south, a more diversified region is preferred. 
Domestic incumbents were encouraged to enter industries with a higher profit, a 
higher capital intensity and a larger existence of small firms. The positive impact of 
capital intensity on entry was stronger i f entry was into industries in the first stage of 
their life cycle or one of the core regions of the south. However, existence of small 
firms had a very weak positive impact i f entry was into industries in the first stage of 
their life cycle. On the contrary, industry growth had a negative impact on entry by 
domestic incumbents i f they were opening their new plants in one of the regions of the 
north. However, this impact was very weak i f they were entering in one of the core 
regions of the south. Domestic incumbents were also deterred from entry into highly 
concentrated industries, although the effect was present only i f entry was into one of the 
regions of the south. Room created due to previous exits had a positive impact on entry 
177 
by domestic incumbents i f they were entering into industries in the second stage of their 
life cycle, but a negative impact i f they were entering into industries in the first stage of 
their life cycle. This group of entrants are neither deterred nor encouraged to enter 
industries characterised with a high scale disadvantage ratio. 
At a regional level, high demand signalled higher profit opportunities and therefore 
encouraged their entry. On the contrary, specialization had a negative impact on entry 
by domestic incumbents. Therefore, this group of entrants preferred a more diversified 
region to a more specialised one. Unemployment also had a negative impact on their 
entry, although the effect was very weak i f they were entering into industries in the first 
stage of their life cycle. 
Population density of a region had a positive impact on entry by domestic incumbents 
i f they were entering into industries in the first stage of their life cycle, but a negative 
impact i f they were entering into industries in the second stage of their life cycle. This 
shows the importance of a large potential market in the success of firms operating in 
relatively young industries. However, in relatively old industries where their market had 
stabilised, the higher start-up costs in such areas offset the benefits from providing a 
larger market and this decreased their entry. 
Industry growth had a positive impact on entry by foreign firms, while industry profit 
had no significant impact on their entry. Therefore, foreign entrants were more 
sophisticated decision makers, in that instead of taking past industry profit took past 
industry growth as a proxy for future profits. However, the effect of industry growth on 
entry by foreign firms was present only i f entry was into one of the core regions of the 
south. Room created in the market, due to previous exits, also had a positive impact on 
their entry. Scale disadvantage ratio and capital density both had a positive impact on 
entry by this group of entrants, while the positive effect of capital density was stronger 
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i f they were entering into one of the core regions of the south. Concentration also had a 
positive impact on entry by foreign firms, although the effect was present only when 
entry occurred into industries in the first stage of their life cycle. Due to the advantages 
that foreign entrants possessed they were capable of overcoming entry barriers and 
therefore preferred industries characterised with a high scale disadvantage ratio and 
high capital intensity. For the same reason they were discouraged to enter industries 
with a large population of small firms. 
Specialization in a region had a negative impact on entry by foreign firms, although 
the effect was present only i f entry was into one of the core regions of the south. 
Unemployment also had a negative impact on entry by foreign firms. 
Population density had a negative impact on entry by foreign firms i f they were 
entering into industries in the first stage of their life cycle, but a positive impact i f they 
were entering into industries in the second stage of their life cycle. Finally, regional 
demand had no significant impact on entry by foreign firms. 
As it is evident from the above findings, the magnitude and the direction of the impact 
of a variable upon entry rates depend on the industry's stage in its life cycle and on the 
geographical location of the new plant. For example i f one examines the elasticities 
reported for the representative case in Table 4.15, it is evident that variables that have 
the highest effect on entry by domestic de-novo firms are profits and ratio of small firms 
at the industry level and the degree of house ownership, density, ratio of small plants 
and unemployment at the regional level. On the other hand, entry by domestic 
incumbents was most responsive towards profits and the exit rate, at the industry level, 
and area specialization, density and unemployment, at the regional level. Finally, entry 
by foreign firms was mostly responsive towards exit rate and small firm ratio at the 
industry level and density and unemployment at the regional level. 
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Overall, the major findings from this chapter are as follows: 1) the characteristics of 
entrants are equally important in determining their choice of industry and region as the 
characteristics of the industries and regions. However, in this study it was not possible 
to further differentiate between entrants based on other characteristics24; 2) the stage in 
the industry's life cycle has a significant impact on entry as the type of entrants and 
their incentives can vary significantly across the two different stages of industry's life 
cycle; 3) the effect of certain industrial and geographical specific factors on entry were 
found to vary across the two different stages of the industry's life cycle; 4) in the 
context of the UK manufacturing industries, the fundamental differences between the 
southern and the northern regions of the UK significantly affected the type and 
incentive of entrants and 5) the differences between the southern and the northern 
regions of the UK not only affected entry directly but also changed the impact of certain 
geographical and industrial specific factors on entry. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the entry decision is complex, which is affected by 
various factors. Not only the heterogeneity between entrants has to be taken into 
account, but also the determinants of entry have to be carefully examined. Those models 
that only take account of the standard geographical and industrial specific factors have a 
deficiency in that they oversimplify the entry determinants. The stage in industry life 
cycle and the fundamental differences between the southern and the northern regions of 
the UK need also to be taken into account, i f one wishes to study the entry decision in 
more detail. These factors not only affect entry directly, but also have an effect on entry 
through changing the impact of the geographical and the industrial specific factors on 
entry. Therefore, future research should perhaps take account of such influences and 
evaluate the entry decision in a more detailed context than before. 
2 4 The reason was explained in Footnote 3. 
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4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4 
Measuring scale disadvantage ratio 
Scale disadvantage ratio „ = (Minimum efficient scale Cost disadvantage ratio) ,,. 
Minimum efficient scale „ = (Mean output of the largest plants producing 50% of industries 
output -s- total industry output) „. 
Cost disadvantage ratio „ = (Average gross value added for the smallest plants producing 
50% of industries output Average gross value added for the largest plants producing 50% of 
industries output) „. 
Measuring area specialization 
Where ey is the output produced by industry i in region j and ej is the total output produced in 
region;. 
\ 20 
Degree of specialization^ = V 
K J J 
2 
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Chapter 5: The Determinants of Exit 
5.1 Introduction 
According to Geroski (1995), "the growth and survival prospects o f new firms w i l l 
depend on their ability to learn about their environment, and to l ink changes in their 
strategy choices to the changing configuration o f that environment... the more turbulent 
is the market environment, the more likely i t is that firms w i l l fa i l to cope. I f the process 
o f new entry continually throws up new aspirants for market places, then slow learning 
coupled wi th a turbulent environment means that high entry rates w i l l be observed 
joint ly w i th high failure rates" (p. 21). However, the ability o f firms to adjust 
themselves to the turbulent environment depends on a combinations o f different plant, 
industry, geographical, owner enterprise and time specific factors. 
In this chapter, using a hazard model, the closure decision o f plants that opened in the 
U.K. manufacturing sectors during the 1974-95 period w i l l be analysed. Availability o f 
the A R D 1 , makes i t possible to study these exit decisions at the most disaggregated level 
(plant level) and explore the effect o f various plant, industry and owner-enterprise 
specific factors on this decision. In this regard, Section 5.2 reviews the literature 
regarding various factors that have been found to have an impact on the exit decision. 
Section 5.3.1 provides a review on the survival analysis and the non-parametric 
methods o f estimating the hazard and the survivor functions. Section 5.3.2 provides a 
brief overview o f the econometric model (time varying Cox model) that is going to be 
used. Section 5.3.3 explains the variables that are going to be used in the model, 
together wi th their definitions. Section 5.3.4.1 provides a preliminary analysis o f the 
data by employing the Kaplan-Meier survival function for different categories o f plants, 
based on different plant, owner-enterprise and industry specific factors that are 
' Explained in Section 3.2. 
183 
explained in Section 5.3.3. Section 5.3.4.2 provides the results o f estimating the time 
varying Cox model and interprets the results. Finally, Section 5.4 draws conclusions 
from the findings in this chapter. 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Plant specific factors 
Country of ownership: ownership status is expected to affect a plant's risk o f 
closure. According to Caves (1996) foreign investments can be riskier than domestic 
investments due to two reasons2. McCloughan and Stone (1998) found that there was no 
significant impact o f foreign ownership on plant closure in the northern regions o f 
England. However, Colombo and Delmastro (2000) found that in the Italian metalwork 
industry foreign owned plants were more likely to be closed. 
Change in ownership: change in ownership can happen either to a foreign enterprise 
or to a U K enterprise. Foreign firms have the choice o f entering the host country either 
by building new plants (greenfield entry) or by acquiring the already existing plants 
(brownfield entry). These two different modes o f entry by foreign enterprises can have 
different impacts on plants' risk o f closure3. In the case o f foreign acquisitions, there is 
always the problem o f assimilating the new plants into the existing organization, which 
can significantly affect the performance and chance o f closure o f the acquired plants. In 
the case o f acquisitions by U K enterprises there are also such problems, which can 
increase the risk o f closure for the acquired plants. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) found 
that change o f ownership, as an endogenous variable, had a positive impact on the risk 
o f closure o f the smaller and the less productive plants. 
2 These reasons are explained in Page 43. 
3 These impacts and the associated reasons are explained in Pages 45-46. 
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Multi-unit versus single-unit plants: Reynolds (1988), Baden-Fuller (1989) and 
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) showed that multi-plant firms are the first to reduce 
capacity and they do so by closing down their smallest or highest cost branch plants 4. In 
terms o f the empirical work in this area, Baden-Fuller (1989), Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1995), Mata et al. (1995) and Colombo and Delmastro (2000) found that single-unit 
plants had a higher likelihood o f survival compared to that o f multi-unit plants. Disney 
et al. (1999) found that this relationship was dependent on the age o f plants and Dunne 
et al. (1989) found that i t was dependent on the size o f plants. 
Start-up size, current size and age: in the models developed by Jovanovic (1982) 
and Ericson and Pakes (1995) i t is shown how growth and age positively affects the 
likelihood o f survival 5. The positive impact o f initial size, growth and age was found in 
various empirical studies e.g. those o f Dunne et al. (1989), Audretsch (1994), Mata and 
Portugal (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Boeri and Bellman (1995) and Doms 
etal. (1995). 
Exit barriers: the major source o f exit barriers, according to Caves and Porter (1976), 
are durable and specific assets (DSAs). Tangible fixed assets, as one o f the sources for 
DSAs, create a major source for sunk costs6. Dix i t (1989) showed that the sunk 
component o f costs creates a barrier for both entry and exit o f f i rms 7 . In terms o f the 
empirical work in relation to the impact o f sunk costs on exit, Audretsch (1994) and 
Doms et al. (1995) both found a negative impact o f sunk costs on plant closure. 
Colombo and Demlastro (2000, 2001) found that investment decisions were more 
4 The associated reason is explained in Pages 47-48. 
5 The associated reasons are explained in Pages 49-50. 
6 DSAs are explained in Page 51. 
7 In this case, firms think longer before they commit resources and once they enter, they wait longer before they exit. 
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irreversible in older plants, while younger more capital intensive plants exhibited higher 
fixed (as opposed to sunk) costs and therefore had more f lexibi l i ty to leave. 
Profitability, productivity or efficiency of firms: the major reason for exit 
according to Hudson (1990) is when a f i rm's liquidity falls below zero. Studies by 
Doms et al. (1995), Oulton (2000) and A w et al. (2001) used productivity as a proxy for 
profitability and found that plants that were closed had lower productivities than plants 
that remained open. Lieberman (1990) found that smaller plants exit first, due to their 
small size, which directly affects their efficiency 8 . 
5.2.2 Owner-enterprise specific factors 
Size of the multi-plant firms: one o f the important factors that can affect the risk o f 
closure o f multi-unit plants is the size o f the controlling enterprise. Lieberman (1990) 
found that, ceteris paribus, a firm's capacity share o f industry had a positive impact on 
the likelihood o f closure o f plants under its control. According to Lieberman, the reason 
is that, ceteris paribus, large firms cut capacity by a greater percentage than small firms. 
5.2.3 Industry specific factors 
Entry (the displacement effects): The causal relationship running f rom entry to exit 
can be due to two effects: a displacement effect and the effect o f age and size on plant 
survival 9 . The fol lowing empirical studies all found a positive impact o f (lagged) entry 
However, it must be borne in mind that measures such as productivity or efficiency are not a good proxy for 
profitability. These measures are affected only by the supply side factors, which are firm specific, while profitability 
is affected by both the supply and the demand side factors. The reason is that Profits are calculated as n=PY-Tc, 
where n is the level of profits, P is the market prices, Y is the level of output and Tc is the total costs. However, P is 
affected by both the demand and the supply side factors and Y is affected by the supply side factors. Therefore, profits 
are affected by both the supply and the demand side factors. 
9 See Page 54. 
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on exit: Dunne et al. (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994), Baldwin (1995), Boeri and 
Bellman (1995) and Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999). 
Growth: the possible impact o f demand growth on exit is through its effect on plants' 
profi tabil i ty 1 0 . In terms o f the direct impact o f growth on exit, Boeri and Bellman 
(1995) found no such significant impact. Mata et al. (1995) found that industries 
characterised with high growth and high entry had a higher rate o f plant exit. On the 
contrary, Mata and Portugal (1994) found that in fast growing industries firms survived 
longer. Disney et al. (1999) found that the impact o f growth on exit was positive but it 
declined wi th the age o f plants. 
5.3 Empirical work 
5.3.1 Background to survival analysis 
Survival analysis is concerned wi th the analysis o f response data, which is the time 
until a particular event (called the endpoint) occurs. In this study, the event o f interest is 
the time until a given plant closes down. A survival time t can be regarded as a non-
negative variable and its probability distribution function can be specified by: 
F(t)=Pr(t<T) (1) 
which is defined as the probability that the random variable / is less than some value T. 
The associated density function isf (t) = dF (t) / dt. However, in the context o f survival 
analysis, the survivor function, S(t), is o f a particular relevance. S(t) is defined as the 
probability that a plant's survival time is greater than or equal to T and can be written 
as: 
S ( t ) = 1-F(t) =?r(t>T) (2) 
'"There are competing theories regarding the relationship between cyclical effects and industry profitability. These 
theories together with the empirical works are explained in Page 55. 
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and is related to the probability density funct ion, / ( t ) , by: 
S{t) = ?r(t>T)=[f(t)d(t) (3) 
The probability distribution function, the density function and the survival function 
are alternative ways o f specifying the distribution o f However, another function, 
which is o f particular importance in the survival time analysis, is the hazard function, 
h(t), which is defined as: 
h ( t ) = f ( t ) / S ( t ) = ( d F / d t ) / S ( t ) = ( - d S / d t ) / S ( t ) = - d l n S ( t ) / d t (4) 
h (t) is the probability that a particular plant closes in the interval ( T, T+l), given that 
it has survived up to time T. Therefore, i t can be written as: 
h(t) = lim?r(T<t<T + h\t>T)/h (5) 
Finally, the cumulative hazard function (integrated hazard function) is 
H(t)=[h(t)d(t) (6) 
which is related to the survival function as follows: 
S ( t ) = cxp[-H(t)J (7) 
In the case of actual data the non-parametric maximum-likelihood estimate o f the 
hazard function is calculated as: 
h{t) = (8) 
n i 
where dj is the number o f plants that close during the jth interval and «, is the total 
number o f plants at the beginning o f this interval. The survivor function is calculated as 
(Kaplan and Meier, 1958): 
S(t) 
n,-d ^ 
(9) 
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and finally the Nelson-Aalen estimator o f the cumulative hazard function (integrated 
hazard function) is defined as: 
# ( 0 = £ — ( i o ) 
A > j * n j 
5.3.2 Regression model for survival analysis (The Cox Model) 
The Cox model was first introduced by Cox (1972) and is the most widely used model 
in survival analysis. Based on this model, hazard rate for individual i ( in the current 
study, plant i) at time t is calculated as: 
h(t) = h0(t)exV(/3'x) (11) 
where x is a vector, containing the value o f the covariates for plant i, /? is the parameter 
vector to be estimated and ho(t) is the baseline hazard" at time t. The hazard ratio 
between any two individuals can be calculated as: 
A ^ = exp(A*,-*,)) (12) 
hj(t) 
It can be seen that the hazard ratio is independent o f time, t, and, therefore, remains 
constant. This is the major property o f the Cox model. This model is fitted by 
maximising the partial likelihood function, introduced by Cox (1972). This function is 
the product o f various terms, one for each failure time. Each term is the conditional 
probability o f an individual wi th covariate vector xit fail ing at time t, given that there is a 
failure at that time. This can be expressed as a product over the n failures 
l , f £ e X p 0 9 ' x , ) 
1 1 The baseline hazard is the value of hazard rate when all the covariates for the individual i are equal to zero. 
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where /?, is the set o f all individuals still at risk at failure time t. However, the Cox 
model only accommodates those variables where their value is fixed for an individual. 
Altman and de Stavola (1994) gave some detail on how the Cox model can be extended 
to include time dependent covariates1 2 o f the form x (t) in the model 
h(t) = h0(t)exp(P'x(t)) (14) 
Altman and de Stavola referred to this model as the updated-covariates model, which 
is also known as the extended Cox model. Both fixed and time dependent covariates can 
be included in the extended Cox model. However, it w i l l no longer be a proportional 
hazard model, as the time dependence o f the covariates has destroyed the constancy o f 
the hazard ratio. In the current study, equation (14) is applied, as there w i l l be both 
constant and time variant covariates in the model. A t the same time, no distribution is 
specified for the baseline hazard. This makes the model more flexible and allows the 
covariates to be estimated without assuming any particular parametric form for the 
hazard distribution 1 3 . 
5.3.3 Explanatory variables 
In Section 5.2, the literature was reviewed, which related to the various factors that 
can have an impact on the likelihood o f closure o f plants. Table 5.1 presents the 
explanatory variables wi th their definitions that w i l l be employed in this study. 
In order to take into account o f the country o f ownership, plants are divided into five 
different categories. UK-owned plants are chosen as the base category and foreign-
owned plants are divided into the fol lowing four categories: 1) those belonging to the 
1 2 A time dependent covariate is one that changes value either deterministically, such as age, or randomly, such as 
current employment of a plant. 
1 3 The most popular distributions assumed for the baseline hazard are the Weibull and the Exponential distributions. 
The probability density function for the Weibull distribution is aXx""1 exp (-Xx"), where X is the scale parameter and a 
is the shape parameter and both are greater than zero. The Exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull 
distribution, where a is equal to one. 
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Table 5.1 Variable Definitions (and means and standard deviations)3 
Variable Definitions Weighted 
Mean 
Plant Specific Factors 
US„ 
EUU 
SEAj, 
0_FO» 
Greenfld, 
AFO,! 
74-79 
it 
A F O 80-89 
A F O 90-95 
74-79 AOWN: 
AOWN: 
AOWN: 
SINGLEj, 
In START EMPj 
In EMP« 
AGEit 
In REL_P_SZEub 
In CAP_LABU 
In T EFFj, 
IA„ 
O P E N ? , 0 - 8 4 
O P E N 
O P E N 
85-89 
it 
90-95 
it 
Owner-enterprise Specific 
Factors 
In REL_E JZEhb 
Industry Specific factors 
In DISPLACE' 
In GROWTH? 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i is US-owned at time 
r=1974, ...1995 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i is EU-owned at time 
r=1974, ...1995 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i is S E Asian-owned at 
time f=1974, ...1995 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i is other foreign-
owned at time /=1974,... 1995 
Dummy coded 1 throughout if plant i was set-up 
by foreign-owned company 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i is acquired by F O -
sector in t=1974-1979 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i is acquired by F O -
sector in /=1980-1989 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i is acquired by F O -
sector in t= 1990-1995 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i changes 
ownership within UK-owned sector or to U K -
sector in t=1974-1979 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i changes 
ownership within UK-owned sector or to U K -
sector in M980-1989 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i changes 
ownership within UK-owned sector or to U K -
sector in t= 1990-1995 (remains 1 thereafter) 
Dummy coded 1 when plant i is a single plant in 
year t 
Employment in plant i in start year 
Current employment in plant i in year t 
Age of plant (t minus year opened +1) in years 
Employment of plant i relative to enterprise k to 
which plant belongs in t 
Capital-to-labour ratio for plant i in time t 
Technical efficiency in plant / and time t 
Dummy variable coded 1 if plant i is located in 
G B Intermediate or Development Area in t 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i opened in f=1980-
1984 
Dummy coded 1 if plant i opened in r=1985-
1989 
Dummy coded 1 if plant / opened in r=1990-
1995 
Employment of enterprise k relative to industry 
employment in t 
Employment of new entrants -s- employment of 
existing plants in time period t 
Growth in industry real gross output, t-\ to t. 
0.054 
0.039 
0.005 
0.017 
0.019 
0.013 
0.018 
0.007 
0.061 
0.134 
0.053 
0.222 
3.086 
3.256 
6.336 
-3.065 
-5.962 
-0.402 
0.406 
0.165 
0.193 
0.144 
-1.703 
-2.145 
0.023 
Source: A R D (Unless otherwise stated). 
"In addition to the above variables, 200 industry dummy variables at the 4-digit level and 10 standard 
region dummy variables will also be included in the econometric model in Section 5.3.4.2. 
b Single-plant enterprises are coded as zero. 
c Calculated separately for each 4-digit industrial sector. 
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United States (US,,), 2) those belonging to the European Union countries (££/,;), 3) those 
belonging to the South East Asian countries (SEAit) and 4) those belonging to the other 
foreign countries (O FOu). Foreign-owned plants are expected to have a higher 
likelihood o f closure in comparison to the UK-owned plants (Caves, 1996; Colombo 
and Delmstro 2000). The variable Greenfldi captures the mode o f entry by the foreign 
enterprise, which means whether it enters by setting up a new plant (greenfield entry) or 
acquiring an already existing plant f rom a U K enterprise (brownfield entry). Brownfield 
entry has been found in the studies by Hennart and Park (1993) and Buckley and Casson 
(1998) to have a positive impact on plant survival. The reason, proposed by the authors, 
was that brownfield entry is a less risky mode o f entry. On the contrary, MacCloughan 
and Stone (1998) in their studies found the opposite to be true. 
Change in ownership is divided into two major categories: 1) change from U K to 
foreign ownership and 2) change to or within a U K sector. These two major categories 
are each further divided into three sub-categories based on whether ownership change 
happened during the selected periods 1974-79, 1980-89 or 1990-95. Hence, the first 
group includes AFO-,4'79, AFO,® 0 - 8 9 and AFOf~9S, and the second group includes 
AOWN74'79, &OWN™-*9and AOWN™'95. The base category for each variable is the 
plants that did not change ownership in a given time period. In general, change in 
ownership is expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood o f plant closure 
caused by the problems associated with assimilating o f acquired plants into the new 
organization (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). 
SINGLEu captures the effect o f being a single-plant unit. The base category in this 
case is taken to be the plants owned by multi-plant firms. Plants belonging to mult i -
plant firms are assumed to be more likely to be closed than single-unit plants (Baden-
Fuller 1989; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata et al. 1995). The initial size o f a 
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plant, its current size and its age are denoted by the variables In STARTEMP^ In EMPit 
and AGEu, respectively. The expected impact o f these variables on plant survival is 
positive (Dunne et al. 1989; Audretsch, 1994). In REL_P_SZEit measures the size o f a 
multi-plant unit relative to the size o f the owner enterprise. The expectation is that the 
larger the size o f a multi-unit plant, the greater is the likelihood o f its survival 
(Reynolds, 1988; Baden-fuller 1989). 
The magnitude o f sunk costs, which is mainly embodied in capital expenditure, is 
denoted by the variable In CAP_LABj t . The more capital-intensive plants are expected 
to have a lower likelihood o f closure (Audretsch, 1994; Doms et al. 1995; Colombo and 
Demlastro, 2001). The variable In T_EFF i t is included in order to capture how the 
efficiency level o f plants effects their chance o f closure. I t is calculated using the 
approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1993, 1995) and a frontier translog 
production function. The expectation is that plants wi th a lower level o f efficiency close 
first (Doms et al. 1995; A w et al. 2001). In order to capture the effect o f government 
grants on plant survival, the variable IAit is included. As government grants are mainly 
targeted towards plants located in GB intermediate and development areas, the 
expectation is that plants located in these areas w i l l have a higher likelihood o f survival 
compared to other plants. The variables OPENf~M, OPEN™~*9 and OPEN™'95 are 
included in the model, in order to capture the effect o f the time when plants opened on 
their likelihood o f survival. The base category in this case is the plants that opened 
during the 1974-79 period. 
The variable In RELESZE/a measures the size o f an owner enterprise relative to the 
total size o f the industry. The expectation is that plants belonging to larger enterprises 
have higher likelihood o f closure compared to plants belonging to smaller enterprises 
(Lieberman, 1990). 
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The variables In DISPLACE, and In GROWTH, are calculated at the industry level. In 
DISPLACE, measures the extent to which new plants in each year, at the total 
manufacturing level, are displacing the already existing plants and, also, the extent to 
which new entrants are short-lived 1 4. This variable is assumed to have a positive impact 
on plant closure (Shapiro and Khemani 1987; Dunne et al. 1988; Boeri and Bellman 
1995). The effect o f cyclical downturns and upturns is captured through the variable In 
GROWTH,. The associated impact on the likelihood o f closure has not been clearly 
identified in the previous empirical work. Mata and Portugal (1994) found that plant 
closure was lower in the fast growing industries. However, Mata et al. (1995) identified 
the opposite effect. The only two variables in Table 5.1 that are time invariant are 
Greenfldi and In START EMPi, while the rest o f the variables are time variant. 
5.3.4 Results 
5.3.4.1 Non-parametric estimates of the hazard and the survivor functions 
Based on the weighted selected f i le in the ARE) 1 5 , 68601 plants entered the U.K. 
manufacturing sectors during the 1974-95 period. The associated survival time o f these 
plants is ordered f rom the lowest to the highest as tj< t2 < . . .< tj, where ti is equal to 1 
year and tj is equal to 22 years. The total failures observed during this period were 
36237 and the remaining 32364 plants were right censored1 6. Treating all entrants as a 
homogeneous group o f plants 1 7, and using the weighted selected f i le , the non-parametric 
hazard and survivor rates are calculated (see Table 5.2). Note that weights have been 
1 4 This is a natural consequence of our model specification. In this study, hazard rate is calculated based on the 
number of plants that are in the last year of their existence. The displacement effect is calculated based on the number 
of entrants in the same period. However, some new entrants age only one year and therefore the larger their number 
the higher will be the hazard rate in that year. 
1 5 Explained in Section 3.2. 
1 6 See the Appendix to this chapter. 
1 7 Heterogeneity will be introduced by differentiating between entrants based on a variety of plant, owner-enterprise 
and industry specific factors. 
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used in order to make these plants representative o f the entire population o f plants that 
opened during the 1974-95 period in the U.K. manufacturing sectors. In Table 5.2, 
column (1) shows the number o f plants that were under observation at the beginning o f 
each interval and column (2) shows the number o f plants that closed during that 
interval. Column (3) is calculated by deducting column (2) f rom column (1). Hazard 
rates in column (4) are calculated using equation (8). The survivor rates in column (5) 
are calculated using equation (9). Finally, the cumulative hazard rates in column (6) are 
calculated using equation (10). The estimated h ( t j ) , S ( t j ) and H ( t j ) are plotted 
against time, tj, in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. S(f •) and H(tj) are known as the Kaplan-
Meier estimate o f the survival function and the Nelson-Aalen estimate o f the cumulative 
hazard function, respectively. 
Interpreting an empirical hazard function is rather diff icult , as it usually does not have 
a smooth pattern. Figure 5.1 shows that hazard rates are decreasing over time (except 
for 1995, when it increased f rom 8% to 20%). The plots o f the hazard rates are 
smoothed by calculating the cumulative (integrated) hazard function (Figure 5.2). The 
concave integrated hazard implies a decreasing hazard or a negative duration 
dependence (Kiefer, 1988) 1 9. Figure 5.3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimate o f the 
survivor function. Starting f rom a high o f 100% in the first year, survivor rates decrease 
to 8% at the end o f the 22 n d year. Based on the estimated survival rates, almost half 
(49%) o f the plants that entered the U .K . manufacturing sector during the 1974-95 
period were closed before their 6 t h year 2 0. 
Note that the hazard rates calculated in this section differ from those in Chapter 3. In this Section, entrants are not 
differentiated by the year they opened, while in Chapter 3 the hazard rates were averaged across entrants in different 
years. 
1 9 The integrated hazard for the exponential distribution is a straight line. A convex integrated hazard shows that 
hazard rate is increasing (a positive duration dependence), while a concave integrated hazard shows that hazard rate is 
decreasing (a negative duration dependence). 
2 0 In Section 3.3.4, it was found that almost half (47.3%) of the plants that opened during the 1974-96 period exited 
before the 5 t h year. The reason for this difference is the high first year exit rate of plants that opened in 1996 (41.4%). 
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Figure 5.1 Hazard rates of closure 
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Figure 5.2 Nelson-Aalen estimates of the cumulative hazard function 
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Figure 5.3 Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function 
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The above estimates were based on the assumption that entrants were a homogenous 
group o f plants. However, as was discussed in Section 5.2, various plant, owner-
enterprise and industry specific factors can significantly affect a plant's risk o f closure 
(these variables were discussed in Section 5.3.3). Therefore, it is interesting to compare 
the survival rate o f plants, in each year fol lowing entry, based on their characteristics. 
Starting with the ownership factor, survivor rates are calculated for plants that opened 
during the 1974-95 period, denoted by their country o f ownership (Table 5.3). Foreign-
owned plants are divided into US-owned plants, USit, EU-owned plants, EUit, SEA-
owned plants, SEAit, and other foreign owned plants, 0_FOit. The survivor rate o f these 
plants is compared with the survivor rate o f UK-owned plants. These survivor rates are 
plotted against time, tj, in Figure 5.4. 
Table 5.3 Survivor rates, by country of ownership 
Time 
h 
UKit, S(tj) 
(1) 
USit, S(tj) 
(2) 
EUU, S{tj) 
(3) 
SEAU, S(tj) 
(4) 
0_FOiu S(tj) 
(5) 
1 0.8406 0.8239 0.8302 0.8893 0.8358 
2 0.7183 0.7404 0.7030 0.7581 0.7399 
3 0.6309 0.6483 0.6049 0.5742 0.6198 
4 0.5540 0.5611 0.5238 0.4920 0.5307 
5 0.4932 0.4986 0.4337 0.4342 0.4651 
6 0.4432 0.4284 0.3706 0.3994 0.4012 
7 0.3974 0.3646 0.3383 0.3611 0.3456 
8 0.3590 0.3347 0.3029 0.2767 0.3142 
9 0.3247 0.3049 0.2668 0.2563 0.2880 
10 0.2967 0.2792 0.2442 0.2389 0.2282 
11 0.2723 0.2295 0.2208 0.2389 0.2023 
12 0.2475 0.2021 0.2027 0.2389 0.1926 
13 0.2288 0.1761 0.1890 0.2353 0.1769 
14 0.2126 0.1604 0.1641 0.2265 0.1388 
15 0.1951 0.1524 0.1409 0.1655 0.1050 
16 0.1801 0.1397 0.1255 0.1576 0.0867 
17 0.1645 0.1190 0.1090 0.1345 0.0805 
18 0.1499 0.1138 0.1031 0.1345 0.0787 
19 0.1362 0.1085 0.0777 0.1214 0.0746 
20 0.1221 0.1058 0.0630 0.1123 0.0593 
21 0.1123 0.0996 0.0555 0.1123 0.0593 
22 0.0879 0.0957 0.0489 0.1123 0.0593 
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Figure 5.4 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimates, by country of ownership 
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There is no clear difference between the survivor rates in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4. In 
order to f ind out whether there is any significant difference, a Cox test was performed. 
This test is based on the difference between the expected and the actual number o f 
failures in each category. It has a x2 distribution wi th the degree o f freedom equal to four 
(number o f categories - 1). The x2 value is significant at the 0.01 level (Table 5.4). 
Therefore, the nul l hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the survival rates 
can be rejected. However, this test is an overall test and does not indicate which two 
groups have significantly different survivor rates 21 
Table 5.4 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by country of ownership 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
us,, 
EUU 
SEAit 
O FO„ 
32273 
1941 
1473 
140 
664 
32607 
1859 
1299 
141 
585 
0.99 
1.04 
1.13 
0.99 
1.14 
Total 36491 36491 
Wald X 2 (4) = 15.50; Pr> %l = 0.0038 
1 
Next, we differentiate between foreign owned plants that have been set up by a 
foreign company (greenfield entrants) and all other plants. The survivor rate for these 
2 1 The STATA package used for estimation does not allow for a detailed test when data is population weighted. 
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two categories o f entrants is calculated in Table A5.23 in the Appendix to this chapter . 
Except for the second year, greenfield entrants have a lower survivor rate compared 
with that o f other plants. The significance o f this effect is tested in Table 5.5. Based on 
the value o f the x2 test, the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between 
these two groups in terms o f their survivor rates can be rejected at 5% level o f 
significance. The degree o f freedom in this case is equal to 1, as there are only two 
categories. 
Figure 5.5 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, 
by greenfield entry 
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Table 5.5 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by greenfield entry 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
Greenfldi =0 32622 32846 0.99 
Greenfldi =1 3508 3284 1.07 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald (1) = 5.78; Pr> y? = 0.0162 
The effect o f change to foreign ownership, on the survivor rate o f the acquired plants, 
differs according to whether ownership change happened during the 1974-79, 1980-89 
or 1990-95 period. Change into foreign ownership during the 1974-79 period, did not 
have any significant impact on the post acquisition survivor rate o f plants. This is 
2 2 From this point on, only the diagrams are reported in the main body of the text, with associated tables presented in 
the Appendix. 
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apparent from the p value associated with the value o f x2 distribution in Table 5.6 (the 
degree o f freedom in this case is equal to one). On the other hand, change into foreign 
ownership during the 1980-89 period significantly affected the survivor rate for the 
acquired plants post acquisition. This category o f plants had a higher survivor rate up to 
the f i f t h year post-acquisition, but after the fifth year they began to have a lower 
survivor rate. Therefore, this relationship is dependent on the age o f plants post-
acquisition. However, the Cox test shows that overall the survivor rate o f plants, that 
changed ownership during the 1980-89 period, declined post-acquisition relative to 
those that did not change ownership (Table 5.7). In this case, the x* test is significant at 
1% level. 
Figure 5.6 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by change to foreign 
ownership during the 1974-79 period 
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Table 5.6 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to foreign ownership 
during the 1974-79 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AFO 74-79 =0 36198 36206 0.9998 
AFO 74-79 =1 294 286 1.0282 
Total 36491 36491 1 
WaldX 2 ( l ) = 0.13;Pr>x'! =0.7158 
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Figure 5.7 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by change to foreign 
ownership during the 1980-89 period 
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Table 5.7 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to foreign ownership 
during the 1980-89 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AFO 80-89 =0 35957 36067 0.9972 
AFO 80-89 =1 534 424 1.2652 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald •£ (1) = 12.88; Pr> = 0.0003 
Plants that changed ownership during the 1990-95 period, had a higher survivor rate 
during the first two years post acquisition. However, their survivor rate dropped 
afterwards and remained lower than those that did not change ownership during this 
period. In this case, the % test is significant at 0.0001 level. Therefore, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the two survivor curves 
(Table 5.8). 
Figure 5.8 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by change to foreign ownership 
during the 1990-95 period 
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Table 5.8 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to foreign ownership 
during the 1990-95 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AFO 90-95 =0 36229 36321 0.9980 
AFO 90-95 =1 263 171 1.5437 
Total 
2 _ 
36491 
2 _ 
36491 1 
Wald X 2 (1) = 28.69; Pr> %Z = 0.0000 
Change to or within a U K sector had a more significant impact on the survivor rate o f 
the acquired plants in different time periods, compared to change into foreign ownership 
during the same period. Change o f ownership during the 1974-79 period significantly 
decreased the survivor rate o f the acquired plants post-acquisition. The p value 
associated wi th the x2 test in this case is highly significant (see Table 5.9). Therefore, 
one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the two 
survivor curves. Plants that changed ownership during the 1980-89 period had a higher 
survivor rate compared to those that did not change ownership until the 8 th year post-
acquisition. However, this relationship was reversed after the 8 th year. In this case, the 
relationship is based on the age o f plants post-acquisition. The Cox test in Table 5.10 
shows that the survivor rate o f these plants is significantly lower than all other plants 
(the x2 test is significant even at 1% level). 
Figure 5.9 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by change to or within U K 
owned sector during the 1974-79 period 
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Table 5.9 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to or within U K 
owned sector during the 1974-79 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AOWN 74-79=0 1319 1353 0.9743 
AOWN 74-79 =1 35172 35139 1.001 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald X 2 (1) = 48; Pr> %Z =0.0000 
Figure 5.10 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by change to or within U K 
owned sector during the 1980-89 period 
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Table 5.10 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to or within U K 
owned sector during the 1980-89 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AOWN 80-89=0 32706 33336 0.9799 
AOWN 80-89 =1 3785 3156 1.2386 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald %Z (1) = 63.33; Pr> •/? =0.000 
Change to or wi thin a U K sector during the 1990-95 period significantly decreased the 
survivor rate o f the acquired plants post-acquisition, compared to those that did not 
change ownership during this period. The % test in this case is significant even at 1% 
level (Table 5.11). The survivor rates for the change o f ownership are reported in Tables 
A5.24, A5.25, A5.26, A5.27, A5.28 and A5.29 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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Figure 5.11 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by change to or within 
U K owned sector during the 1990-95 period 
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Table 5.11 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by change to or within U K 
owned sector during the 1990-95 period 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
AOWN 90-95=0 33986 34953 0.9776 
AOWN 90-95 =1 2505 1538 1.6716 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Waldx 2 ( l ) = 341.51;Pr>x2 =0.000 
Comparing the survivor rate o f single plants wi th those belonging to multi-plant 
organizations, it was found that not only single plants had significantly higher survivor 
rates, but, also, the difference increased, as the plants got older. During the first year, 
17% of plant belonging to multi plant organizations closed down. However, the 
percentage o f single plants that closed down was only 13%. By the 22 n d year, the 
percentage o f single plants that survived was 37%, while the percentage o f multi-unit 
plants that survived was only 6% (see Table A5.30 in Appendix to this chapter). The 
Cox test in Table 5.12 shows that single plants had significantly a higher survivor rate 
compared to plants belonging to multi-plant organizations. 
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Figure 5.12 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by state of 
being a single unit plant 
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Table 5.12 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by state of being a single unit 
plant. 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
SINGLE =0 33788 31617 1.092 
SINGLE =1 2703 4874 0.5651 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald X2 (1) = 253.48; Pr> jf 2 =0.000 
In order to compare the survivor rate o f plants wi th different initial employment size, 
the plants were divided into 6 different groups, based on the size o f their initial 
employment. The survivor rate o f these plants in years fol lowing their entry is shown in 
Table A5.31 in Appendix to this chapter and plotted against analysis time (age) in 
Figure 5.13. It is clear that plants wi th a larger initial size have a higher survivor rate. 
Plants wi th initial employment between 1 and 2 employees had 22% failure rate in the 
first year, while plants wi th initial employment greater than 500 had only 15% failure 
rate. This difference increases as plants age to the extent that 22 years after entry, 
survivor rate o f plants wi th initial employment between 1 and 2 is only 4%, while 
survivor rate o f plants wi th initial employment greater than 500 employees is 25%. The 
X2 test is highly significant (Table 5.13) showing that there are significant differences 
between the survivor rates o f plants wi th different initial sizes . 
2 3 As it was mentioned previously, a detailed test of which two groups which have significantly different survivor 
rates is not possible in STAT A, when data is population weighted. 
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Figure 5.13 Kaplan-Meier Survivor estimate, by initial employment size 
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Table 5.13 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by initial employment size 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
1=<START EMPit=<2 5081 3822 1.3717 
3=< START EMPit=< 10 14688 12768 1.1811 
\\=< START EMP«=<50 14321 16261 0.8933 
51=<START EMPit=<\00 1515 2230 0.6832 
101=<START EMPi,=<500 745 1163 0.6436 
START £A/P„>=501 142 247 0.5794 
Total 36491 36491 1 
The impact o f current employment on the survivor rate o f plants is very similar to that 
o f initial employment. In this case, plants are again categorised into 6 different groups, 
based on the value o f their current employment. The survivor rate for these different 
groups o f plants is reported in Table A5.32, in the Appendix to this chapter, and plotted 
against age in Figure 5.14. Compared to the initial size, current size o f plants has a more 
significant impact on the survivor rate o f plants. Plants wi th current employment 
between 1 and 2 employees had 23% failure rate in the first year, while plants wi th 
current employment greater than 500 had only 14% failure rate. This difference 
increased as plants aged to the extent that 22 years after entry, survivor rate o f plants 
wi th employment between 1 and 2 was only 4%, while survivor rate o f plants wi th 
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Table 5.14 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by current employment of the 
plants 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
\<=EMPU=<1 
3<=EMPit=<10 
\K=EMPi,=<50 
51<=£MP„=<100 
101<=£MP„=<500 
EMPit >=501 
5863 
14679 
13300 
1675 
918 
55 
4160 
12701 
15409 
2446 
1635 
141 
1.4519 
1.1918 
0.8820 
0.6932 
0.5641 
0.3990 
Total 36491 
Wald %Z (1) = 1076.64; Pr> %Z = 0.0000 
36491 1 
employment greater than 500 employees was 45%. The value o f the x2 test shows that 
the differences between the survival rates o f plants wi th different employment sizes are 
highly significant (see Table 5.14). 
In order to f ind out whether size o f the multi-unit plants affects their survivor rate, we 
divide these plants into two categories: 1) plants that their size, relative to the size o f the 
owner enterprise, is greater than 0.5 and 2) plants that their size, relative to the size o f 
the owner enterprise, is less than 0.5. From Table A5.33 in the Appendix and Figure 
5.15 below it is clear that smaller multi-unit plants have a higher survival rate until the 
age o f 4. However, the relationship reverses afterwards and these plants begin to have a 
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lower survivor rates compared to their larger counterparts. Overall, the value o f the x2 
test shows that the survivor rate o f the smaller multi-unit plants is only marginally lower 
than the survival rate o f their larger counterparts (see Table 5.15). 
Figure 5.15 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by relative size of the 
multi-unit plant 
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Table 5.15 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by relative size of the multi-
unit plant 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
REL_P_SZE<=0.5 
REL P SZE>0.5 
32076 
1713 
31961 
1828 
1.0037 
0.937 
Total 33788 33788 1 
Wald X2 (1) = 3.02; Pr> %Z =0.0824 
In order to f ind out about the impact o f capital intensity on the survivor rate o f plants, 
the plants are divided into two categories based on the value o f their capital to labour 
ratio: 1) plants wi th capital to labour ratio greater than 0.003 and 2) plants wi th capital 
to labour ratio less than 0.003 2 4. The survivor rates are calculated in Table A5.34, in the 
appendix to this chapter, and plotted against age in Figure 5.16. It is evident that the less 
capital-intensive plants have a higher survivor rates compared to the more capital-
intensive plants. The value o f the x test is highly significant and, therefore, one can 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the two survival 
curves (see Table 5.16). 
2 4 0.003 is the median capital to labour ratio. 
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Figure 5.16 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, 
by the degree of capital intensity 
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Table 5.16 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by the degree of capital 
intensity 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
CAP LAB<=0.003 19867 21840 0.8911 
CAP LAB>0.003 16625 14652 1.1876 
Total 36491 36491 1 
W a l d ^ O ) =191.75; Pr> ) ^  =0.0000 
The effect o f technical efficiency on the survivor rate o f plants is examined by 
dividing the plants into two categories and comparing their survivor rates. Except for 
the first two years after opening, more technically efficient plants have a higher survival 
rate in comparison to the less technically efficient plants (see Table A5.35 in the 
appendix to this chapter and Figure 5.17). The value o f the x2 test is significant at 5% 
level and, therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between the two survivor curves (see Table 5.17). 
Figure 5.17 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimates, by 
the magnitude of technical efficiency 
1.00 -, 
InT EFF<=0.7 
a - O - h i T EFF>0.7 
0.50 
oo 
0.00 -I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 i 
0 10 20 
Analysis time 
210 
Table 5.17 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by technical efficiency 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
In T EFF<=0.1 14105 13735 1.0278 
In T EFF>0.7 22386 22756 0.9836 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald X2 (1) =5.1; Pr> X2 =0.0239 
In order to examine the impact o f the size o f a multi-plant organization on the 
survivor rate o f plants belonging to it , we divide these plants into two categories, based 
on the size o f their owner enterprise (size o f the enterprise is calculated relative to total 
size o f the industry). The survivor rates are calculated in Table A5.36 and plotted 
against age in Figure 5.18. The value o f the x2 test in Table 5.18 shows that these 
differences are significant and, overall, plants belonging to larger enterprises have 
significantly lower survivor rates compared to plants belonging to smaller enterprises. 
Figure 5.18 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by relative size of the multi-plant 
enterprise 
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Table 5.18 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by relative size of the multi-
plant enterprise 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
REL E SZE< =0.5 28749 29288 0.9826 
REL E SZE>0.5 5039 4501 1.1212 
Total 33788 33788 1 
Wald X 2 (1) = 31.43; Pr> x2 =0.0000 
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In order to examine the impact o f the displacement effect in industries on the survivor 
rates o f plants, industries are divided into two different groups, based on the magnitude 
o f their entry rate, and the survivor rate o f their plants are compared. As is evident f rom 
Table A5.37 in the Appendix and Figure 5.19, plants operating in industries wi th a high 
entry rate have lower survivor rates compared to plants operating in industries wi th a 
low entry rate. In this case, the value o f the x2 test is highly significant and, therefore, 
we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant different between the two 
survival curves (see Table 5.19). 
Figure 5.19 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by the magnitude of the 
displacement effect 
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Table 5.19 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by the magnitude of the 
displacement effect 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
DISPLACE<=0.01 4106 5192 0.7873 
DISPLACE>0.01 32385 31300 1.0405 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald X (1) =89.92; Pr> X =0.0000 
Finally, industries are divided into two groups based on the value o f their growth rate 
o f output and the survivor rate o f their plants in comparison with each other. Table 
A5.38 and Figure 5.20 shows that plants that are operating in industries wi th a lower 
than average growth have lower survival rate compared to plants operating in industries 
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with a higher than average growth. This difference is significant as i t is clear f rom the 
value o f the x2 test in Table 5.20. 
Figure 5.20 Kaplan-Meier survivor estimate, by industry growth 
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Table 5.20 Cox regression based test for equality of survivor curves, by industry growth 
Events observed Events expected Relative hazard 
GROWTH<=-0.01 18942 18445 
GROWTH>0.01 17549 18046 
1.0275 
0.9727 
Total 36491 36491 1 
Wald X 2 (1) =8.37; Pr> X 2 =0.0038 
What can be concluded f rom the information in this section is that the survivor rate o f 
plants depends on a variety o f plant, owner-enterprise and industry specific factors. A t 
the same time, the effect o f these factors on the survivor rate o f plants can vary 
depending oh the age o f plants. However, in this section no other factors were 
controlled for when examining the effect o f a specific factor on the survivor rates. 
Therefore, in the next section, using the time variant Cox model, all the factors that 
might affect the survivor rate o f plants are controlled for in order to obtain the pure 
impact o f a given variable. The associated impacts w i l l be examined also in conjunction 
wi th the age o f plants, as these impacts can significantly vary wi th age. 
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5.3.4.2 Time dependent covariates Cox model 
In this section, the time dependent covariates Cox model is applied to the plants in the 
selected file in the A R D 2 5 that entered the U.K. manufacturing sectors during the 1974-
95 period. These plants have been weighted in order to be a true representative o f the 
entire population o f plants that entered the U.K. manufacturing sectors during the 1974-
95 period. Based on the time dependent covariates Cox model, the hazard rate for a 
given plant at time t is calculated according to the fol lowing equation: 
h(t) = h0(t)exp(/]'x(t)) (14) 
ho(t) is defined as the baseline hazard2 6 at time /, ft is the parameter vector to be 
estimated and x(t) is a vector, containing the value o f the covariates for plant i. In this 
study, no functional form is specified for the baseline hazard component, ho(t), as that 
might lead to a misspecification error. Therefore, the chosen model is a semi-parametric 
hazard model. The baseline hazard is allowed to differ across 5 different sub-groups o f 
plants, based on the value o f the Herfindahl measure o f concentration at the 4-digit 
industry level to which plants are allocated . The estimated model gives a higher log-
likelihood function and a better result as compared to when model was estimated using 
only a single base-line hazard. 
The time variant Cox model i n STATA (version 7) is used to estimate the model, 
• 9R • 
which makes it possible to take a f u l l account o f censoring . The covariates, xty's, are 
explained in Table 5.1. The continuous variables entered the model in log-form. Wi th 
the exception o f the 200 industry dummies, the 11 regional dummies, the dummies 
accounting for the period in which plants opened and the dummy related to the GB 
2 5 Explained in Section 3.2. 
2 6 The baseline hazard is the value of hazard rate when all the covariates for the individual / are equal to zero. 
27The STATA package used for estimation allows stratification for up to 5 sub-groups. The other sub-grouping of 
plants (e.g. by broad industry sub-groups; high-tech and low-tech sub-groups; capital versus labour intensive sub-
groups) were tested but it was found that using the Herfindalh concentration index provided superior results. Given 
that this index is often used as a proxy for barriers to entry, this outcome seems appropriate 
28See the Appendix to this Chapter. 
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intermediate or development area, all the other variables entered the model a second 
time multiplied by age o f the plants, in order to f ind out how their impact varies wi th 
age. A general to specific modelling strategy was then employed and only the 
significant interaction terms were kept in the model (the insignificant regional and 4-
digit SIC dummies were also excluded). The final model was tested against the original 
form and the value o f the xlt t e s t w a s insignificant. Therefore, the null hypothesis, that 
the excluded variables had zero parameter coefficients, could not be rejected. Table 5.21 
reports the results f rom estimating equation (14) and Table 5.22 shows the estimated 
parameters o f the hazard function (e^-1) only for those variables that had a significant 
interaction term wi th age (the figures reported in Table 5.22 are median values). 
Within the category o f foreign owned plants, those belonging to the South East Asian, 
SEAih and other foreign countries, O FOn, have a significantly lower likelihood o f 
closure compared to UK-owned plants. However, the evidence is weak for the US-
owned, USu, and EU-owned plants, EUu. In the case o f plants belonging to other foreign 
countries, 0_FOit, the associated effect diminishes wi th the age o f plants, so that after 
being in operation for over 5 years, plants in this category have significantly higher 
likelihood o f closure compared to UK-owned plants. On average, a South East Asian-
owned plant has some 30% lower chance o f closure compared to a UK-owned plant 2 9 . 
On the other hand, plants belonging to other foreign countries, having been in operation 
for only one year, are almost 14% less likely to be closed (see the variable O FOu in 
Table 5.22). However, this impact decreases wi th the age o f these plants, to the extent 
that plants over ten years o f age have a 64% higher chance o f closure relative to U K -
owned plants. 
2 9 Column (2) in Table 5.21 is the estimated e P. Based on equation (14), hazard ratio for plant i relative to plant j is 
calculated as h j (t) / h j (t) = e^*' *' *. Therefore, e P -1 shows the percentage that the hazard rate for plant i is 
higher/lower than that for plant j. In this case, plants belonging to South East Asian countries had almost 30% (69%-
1) lower chance of closure compared to UK-owned plants. 
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Table 5.21 Parameter estimates of the weighted hazard model for U K manufacturing industry, 
1974-95 
Variable p(\} (2) z-values (3) 
Plant Specific Factors 
usu -0.063 0.939 -1.36 
EUU -0.078 0.925 -1.35 
SEAi, -0.361 0.697 -2.46** 
0_FO„ -0.198 0.821 -1.90*** 
0_FOi,xAGEil 0.050 1.051 4.37* 
Greenfld, -0.042 0.96 -0.47 
AFO 7 , 4 " 7 9 0.396 1.486 2.37** 
AFO, 7 4 - 7 9 XAGE„ -0.039 0.962 -2.57* 
AFOf, 0- 8 9 0.301 1.351 3.89* 
AFO? t°- 9 5 0.264 1.303 2.60* 
AOWNl4-79 0.271 1.311 3.42* 
AOWN™19 xAGEj, -0.018 0.982 -2.68* 
0.250 1.284 7.75* 
AOWN™-95 0.334 1.397 9.98* 
SINGLEj, -0.685 0.504 -5.30* 
SINGLE), xAGEu -0.051 0.950 -3.63* 
In START EMPj 0.026 1.026 1.29 
In START_EMP, xAGEu -0.003 0.997 -1.61 
In EMPU -0.241 0.786 -12.54* 
In REL_P_SZEU 0.057 1.058 3.27* 
In REL_P_SZEil xAGEu -0.005 0.995 -2.98* 
In CAP_LABU 0.032 1.032 5.20* 
In CAP_LABi, xAGEit -0.008 0.992 -5.38* 
In T EFFj, -0.183 0.832 -6.38* 
In T EFFuxAGE,, 0.007 1.007 1.82*** 
IAit -0.008 0.992 -0.38 
EastAnglicij, -0.172 0.842 -3.29* 
Yorks_Humbersideu -0.077 0.926 -2.06** 
Northern,, -0.103 0.903 -2.04** 
Scotland,, -0.247 0.781 -6.49* 
N_Irelandu -0.204 0.816 -3.02* 
o p E N 8 0 - 8 4 0.247 1.281 6.95* 
OPEN?,5"89 0.488 1.629 15.06* 
OPEN?,0"95 0.877 2.403 24.74* 
wner-enterprise Specific Factors 
In REL E SZEj, 
0.078 1.081 4.55* 
In REL_E_SZEU xAGE,, -0.006 0.994 -3.23* 
dustry Specific Factors 
In DISPLACE, 0.236 1.266 9.46* 
In DISPLACE, xAGEu -0.011 0.989 -3.31* 
In GROWTH, 0.239 1.270 2.77* 
In GROWTH, xAGEu -0.035 0.966 -3.17* 
54 significant 4-digit SIC dummies 
Log Likelihood = -207920.04; zero-slopes LR x2(95)=4603.85; no of plants = 70,953; no of closures observed = 25,312; no of 
observations = 259,748 
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Table 5.22 Median parameter estimates e p - l by age sub-group in years (based on Table 5.21) 
AGE<= 1 1 <AGE<=5 5<AGE<= 10 AGE> 10 
Plant Specific Factors 
0_FO, -0.137 -0.047 0.163 0.647 
AFOJ;-19 0.430 0.324 0.135 -0.133 
AOWN]*-19 0.287 0.240 0.152 0.012 
SINGLEj, -0.521 -0.568 -0.647 -0.753 
In START EMP, 0.023 0.016 0.002 -0.021 
In REL_P_SZEit 0.053 0.044 0.024 -0.009 
In CAP LAB,, 0.024 0.008 -0.024 -0.078 
In T_EFFit -0.162 -0.150 -0.126 -0.083 
Owner-enterprise Specific Factors 
In REL E SZEia 0.075 0.063 0.039 0.000 
Industry Specific Factors 
In DISPLACE, 0.253 0.227 0.176 0.092 
In GROWTH, 0.226 0.143 -0.006 -0.223 
These results are at odds wi th the findings o f Colombo and Delmastro (2000), in that 
they found that foreign owned plants had a significantly higher chance o f closure 
compared to the domestic plants. 
The variable Greenjld,, denoting those plants that have been set up by a foreign 
company, has no significant impact on the likelihood o f closure o f such plants, relative 
to other plants. However, the evidence is quite different when one compares the risk o f 
closure for plants that were acquired by foreign companies (the variables AFOj, 4"" 7 9, 
A F O j f - 8 9 and AFO? t 0 - 9 5 in Table 5.21). Acquisitions by foreign enterprises, significantly 
increases a plant's likelihood o f closure. However, there is a significant age factor 
attached to the risk o f closure o f plants that were acquired during the 1974-79 period. 
The associated risk reduces as they age. A one year old plant that was acquired by a 
foreign company during the 1974-79 period, on average had a 43% higher chance o f 
closure as compared to a plant that did not change ownership during that period. 
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However, a ten years old plant that changed ownership during the same period had a 
13% lower chance o f closure compared to a plant that did not change ownership during 
that period. Plants that were acquired during the 1980-89 and the 1990-95 period, on 
average, were some 35% and 30%, respectively, more likely to be closed in the years 
fol lowing acquisition 3 0. Overall, the positive impact o f foreign acquisitions on the risk 
o f closure o f acquired plants can be due to the cultural differences between the home 
and the host country, which was referred to by Caves (1996) as the fixed costs o f 
learning how things are done in the host country. These findings support the findings o f 
L i (1995), McCloughan and Stone (1998) and Harris and Robinson (2002), in that they 
found that foreign acquisition significantly lowered likelihood o f survival. McCloughan 
and Stone (1998) also found that the older plants that were taken over by foreign 
enterprises had a higher likelihood o f survival in comparison to the younger plants, 
although, in the current study this effect was observed only for those plants that were 
acquired during the 1974-79 period. 
Evidence is very much the same when one looks at the variables &.OWN]*'19. 
AO WW*0"8 9 and AOWN™'95, denoting changes o f ownership within or to UK-owned 
sectors during the associated periods. However, in this case the effects are generally 
lower compared to those for the change into foreign ownership (except for the 1990-95 
period). Plants that changed ownership within or into a UK-owned sector during the 
1974-79 period had a higher chance o f closure post-acquisition compared to those that 
did not change ownership during that period, although this effect reduces wi th the age 
o f plants. Risk o f closure for a one year old plant that changed ownership during this 
period is 28% higher than for a plant that did not change ownership, while the 
3 0 Examination of the raw data in Table A5.24 shows that 13% of plants that were acquired by foreign enterprises, 
during the 1974-95 period, closed within 1 year post-acquisition, 22% within 0-2 years and almost 35% within 0-3 
years. This shows that 65% of the plants that were taken over by a foreign enterprise remained open for a significant 
period before they were closed. 
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associated impact on the risk o f closure for a ten year old plant is only 1.2%. Plants that 
changed ownership wi thin or to a UK-owned sector during the 1980-89 and 1990-95 
period, ceteris paribus, had 28% and 39%, respectively, had higher chances o f closure 
compared to those that did not change ownership. These finding show that change in 
ownership in general has a detrimental effect on plant survival (this effect is found after 
controlling for a range o f factors including size an technical efficiency). This suggests 
that there is problems associated wi th assimilating such plants. The current findings 
contradict those found by McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) in that they found that change 
in ownership had a negative impact on the risk o f closure o f US-owned plants during 
the 1977-87 period. This negative impact was found when change in ownership was 
treated as an exogenous variable. However, once it was treated as an endogenous 
variable and the size and productivity o f plant were also taken into account as a 
composite variable wi th change in ownership dummy, it had a positive impact on the 
risk o f closure. This meant that change o f ownership had a negative impact on the risk 
o f closure o f the larger and the more productive plants. 
The variable SINGLEit has a significant negative coefficient, which strengthens wi th 
the age o f plants. This means that a one year old single plant, on average, is 52% less 
likely to be closed compared to a plant that is owned by a multi-plant organization, 
while a ten year old single plant is 75% less likely to be closed (see Table 5.22). Our 
findings therefore support those studies that argue that for single plant enterprises 
closure is the last resort, which imposes re-entry costs on the enterprises i f they want to 
restart their operation, while multi-plant enterprises prefer plant closure to reduction in 
capacity across all their plants. These results are in line wi th the findings by Baden-
Fuller (1989), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata et al. (1995) and Colombo and 
Delmastro (2000) in that they found that the chances o f survival for single plants were 
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higher than for plants belonging to multi-plant organizations. However, the current 
finding contradicts those found by Disney et al. (1999) i n that they found that single 
plants were initially more likely to survive, but after a year were less likely to do so . 
Initial size, denoted by the variable In STARTEMPt, has a positive impact on the 
hazard rate o f closure, although the relationship is negative for older plants (see Table 
5.22). This indicates that older plants with a larger initial size are more likely to survive 
as they age. This finding is counter to expectations, as in the previous literature initial 
size is found to have a positive impact on plant survival (Mata and Portugal, 1994). In 
order to consider the positive relationship between the initial size and likelihood o f 
survival, following Mata et al. (1995), it is possible to reformulate the results and f ind 
the impact o f initial size, growth f rom initial size and age on the likelihood o f survival 
o f plants. The fol lowing relationship between these variables is obtained: 
-0.215 In START EMPi - 0.241 In {EMPU + STARTEMP,) - 0.003 {In 
START EMPi) x AGEit (15) 
This relationship shows that the higher the initial size o f a plant, the lower is its risk o f 
closure. A t the same time, there is an additional negative impact on the hazard o f plants 
closure, the more they grow from their initial size and the older they become (this is 
evident by examining the coefficients associated wi th the In (EMPit + START EMPft 
and (In START_EMPt) x AGEit variables, respectively). Current size is more important 
than the initial size, which indicates that larger plants are less likely to exit. This 
findings are in line wi th the models proposed by Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and 
Pakes (1995) in that they showed that learning by doing (denoted by the age o f plants) 
and growth had a positive impact on the likelihood o f survival o f plants. This implies 
that the more plants learn about their changing market conditions and the closer they 
3 1 They also used the ARD in their study but their units of analysis were establishments (reporting units) rather than 
plants. In their case, closure did not happen unless all plants belonging to that establishment closed. 
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operate to the minimum efficient scale the more likely they are to survive. The current 
findings are, also, in line wi th the previous findings by Dunne et al. (1989), Audretsch 
(1994) , Mata and Portugal (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Boeri and Bellman 
(1995) and Doms et al. (1995) in that they found that initial size, growth f rom initial 
size and age had a positive impact on the likelihood o f survival. 
The variable In REL_P_SZEit has a significant positive impact on the hazard o f 
closure o f plants, which weakens with their age. This means that larger plants belonging 
to multi-plant enterprises are more likely to be closed compared to the smaller plants. 
However, the older they become the weaker is the associated impact. In this case, a 
200% increase in the size o f a multi-unit plant 3 2 that has been in operation only for one 
year, increases its risk o f closure by 10.6%, while the associated impact on the risk o f 
closure o f a multi-unit plant that has been in operation for over ten years is -1.8%. The 
current finding contradicts the finding by Dunne et al. (1989) i n that they found a 
negative relationship between the size o f plants belonging to a multi-plant enterprise 
and its likelihood o f failure. It also contradicts the theory proposed by Reynold (1988) 
that in declining industries large firms reduce capacity by first closing down the 
smallest and the highest cost branch plants. 
Exit barriers, measured by In CAP_LABit, which are mainly created through sunk 
costs, have a positive impact on plants' risk o f closure. However, this impact weakens 
with the age o f plants, to the extent that for plants that are operating for over 5 years the 
associated impact is negative. From Table 5.22 one can see that a 200% increase in In 
CAP LABu increases the risk o f closure for plants that have been in operation for one 
year by 4.8% and for plants that have been in operation between 1 and 5 years by 1.6%. 
On the contrary, the associated impact on the risk o f closure o f plants that have been in 
3 2 The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the relative plant size (across all manufacturing sectors) during 
the 1974-95 period is about 200%. 
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operation between 5 and 10 years and over 10 years are -4.8% and -15.6%, 
respectively. The current finding is in line wi th the findings by Colombo and Demlastro 
(2000, 2001) in that they also found that investment decisions were more irreversible in 
older plants who were more attached to their industries, while younger more capital 
intensive plants exhibited higher fixed (as opposed to sunk) costs and therefore had 
more f lexibi l i ty to leave. 
The variable In T_EFFit, which denotes the technical efficiency o f plants, has a 
negative impact on their likelihood o f closure, although this effect weakens wi th the age 
o f plants. This means that the younger technically efficient plants have a lower risk o f 
closure in comparison to the older plants that are equally technically efficient. This 
suggests that plant exits, on average, result in a cleansing effect, freeing resources for 
more innovative companies and alternative investment opportunities. However, older 
plants resist this process o f creative destruction better than their younger counterparts. 
In this case, a 200% increase in In T_EFFit decreases the likelihood o f closure o f one 
year old plants by 32.4%, while the associated impact on the likelihood o f closure o f 
plants that have been in operation for over 10 years is only 16.6%. This finding is in line 
with the findings by Doms et al. (1995), Oulton (2000) and A w et al. (2001), although 
they used productivity measure instead o f technical efficiency measure. They found that 
the more productive plants had a lower risk o f closure in comparison to the less 
productive plants. 
The significant regional dummies are reported in Table 5.21. They all have a 
significant negative coefficient, which means that those plants located in the regions o f 
East Anglia, Yorkshire and Humberside, North, Scotland and Northern Ireland, ceteris 
paribus, have a lower likelihood o f closure compared to plants located in other regions. 
Taking the Northernit variable as an example, the associated coefficient shows that 
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plants located in the Northern region have a 9.7% lower chance o f closure compared to 
plants located in other regions. The impact o f the regional dummies can be better 
explained when it is looked at in association wi th the variable IAit, which is a dummy 
denoting the GB intermediate or development areas. Most o f the regions mentioned 
above qualify for government grants. This can be the reason for the insignificant impact 
of IAu on the likelihood o f closure o f plants, when these dummies are also present in the 
model. However, the spatial evidence is mixed; certain regions such as Wales and North 
west that are strongly associated wi th the regional assistance do not have a significant 
impact on the likelihood o f closure o f plants, while in Northern Ireland, which is not a 
development area it remains significant. 
The cohort dummies show that the risk o f closure for the later cohorts o f entrants 
increased. For example, plants that opened during the 1990-95 period were some 140% 
more likely to be closed in comparison to plants that opened during the 1974-79 period. 
The size o f a multi-plant enterprise, measured by the variable In RELESZE^, has a 
positive impact on the risk o f closure o f plants belonging to i t . However, as plants get 
older the associated impact reduces. This finding suggests that larger enterprises cut 
capacity to a greater percentage than smaller enterprises. In this case, a 200% increase 
in the size o f a multi-plant enterprise increases the chance o f closure for a one year old 
plant that belongs to it by 15%, while the associated impact on the risk o f closure o f a 
plant that has been in operation for over 10 years and is under its control is almost equal 
to zero. This finding is in line w i th the finding by Lieberman (1990) that, ceteris 
paribus, a f i rm's capacity share o f industry has a positive impact on the likelihood o f 
closure o f plants under its control. 
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The displacement effect, measured by the variable In DISPLACE,, has a positive 
impact on the risk o f closure o f plants, although the effect weakens wi th the age o f the 
plant. In this case, a 200% increase in the displacement effect increases the likelihood o f 
closure o f one year old plants by 50.6%, while the associated impact on the likelihood 
o f closure o f plants that have been in operation for over 10 years is 18.4%. These results 
are in line wi th the findings by Mata and Portugal (1994) and Boeri and Bellman (1995) 
in that they found that plants operating in industries, characterised wi th a high entry, 
had a higher chance o f closure. However, it was found that this effect was stronger for 
the younger plants. This finding is due, partly, to the way that hazard rate is defined in 
this study. It is calculated by using the number o f plants in the last year o f their 
operation. In this case, high entry rates, in a given period, can result in a large number 
o f new plants that might operate only for one year, which, subsequently, increases the 
hazard rate for that period. The reason for this effect is the negative impact o f age and 
size on plant survival (Dunne et al. 1989; Audretsch, 1994; Mata and Portugal, 1994; 
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Doms et al. 1995). Hence, 
the positive impact o f entry rates on risk o f closure o f plants is due both to the 
displacement effect and the negative impact o f age and size on plant survival. 
Finally, the effect o f cyclical upturns and downturns is captured through the variable 
In GROWTH',. It was found that industry growth has a positive impact on the risk o f 
closure o f the younger plants, while the associated impact on the risk o f closure o f the 
older plants was negative. From Table 5.22 it is evident that a 200% increase in In 
GROWTH, increases the risk o f closure for the younger plants, by 45.2%-28.6%, but it 
decreases the risk o f closure for plants older than 10 years, by 1.2%-44.6%. These 
findings are in line wi th the previous findings by Mata et al. (1995) in that they found 
that industries characterised with high entries and high growth faced higher exit rates. 
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However, in this study, this was found only for the younger plants. Given the positive 
impact o f the displacement effect on the risk o f closure, it is likely that industry growth 
results in a large number o f new plants being established that are not viable and, 
therefore, close shortly after entry. Using the A R D , Disney et al. (1999) also found that 
industry growth had a positive impact on plant closures, which declined with age 3 3. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, using the A R D 3 4 , the closure decision o f plants that opened in the U.K. 
manufacturing sectors during the 1974-95 period was studied. Using a hazard model, a 
wide range o f variables were used, o f which some o f them were also linked to the age o f 
the plants. The findings were mainly in line wi th those o f previous studies. However, 
some interesting results were found when the age factor was also taken into account. 
It was found that plants owned by the European Union countries were less likely to be 
closed compared to UK-owned plants. On the other hand, plants owned by other foreign 
countries ('other foreign countries' means countries other than United States and South 
East Asian countries) were less likely to be closed in the first f ive years after opening, 
but more likely to be closed afterwards. 
Plants that were set up by a foreign enterprise had neither more nor less likelihood o f 
closure as compared to U K owned plants. Acquisitions, either by a foreign or a U K 
enterprise, had deteriorating impacts on the likelihood o f survival o f the acquired plants. 
This can be associated wi th problems in assimilating acquired plants into the existing 
organization, which, subsequently, increases the likelihood o f closure for such plants. 
3 3 The 4-digit industry intercept dummies are not reported in Table 5.21. However, they were generally significant, 
showing marked differences in the risk of closure of plants across different 4-digit manufacturing sectors. For 
instance, plants belonging to the wheeled tractors industry (a branch of agricultural machinery), ceteris paribus, were 
181 % more likely to exit, while plants in the ready-mixed concrete sector were 48% less likely to close during the 
1974-1995 period. 
3 4 Explained in Section 3.2. 
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However, the impact o f acquisitions during the 1974-79 period, either by a foreign or a 
U K enterprise, on the likelihood o f survival o f the acquired plants decreased as these 
plants got older. 
Single-unit plants were less likely to be closed than multi-unit plants and this effect 
was found to be stronger for the older plants. This finding supported the argument that 
for single-plant enterprises plant closure is the last resort, which results in complete 
dissolution o f the enterprise, while for multi-plant enterprises this is not the case. 
However, the chances o f closure was higher for an older multi-unit plant, compared to a 
single-unit plant o f the same age. 
Larger multi-unit plants were more likely to be closed in comparison to the smaller 
multi-unit plants. However, this effect was stronger for the younger plants. This finding 
was contrary to the previous findings that multi-plant enterprises closed their smallest 
and highest cost branch plants first. 
It was, also, found that larger multi-plant enterprises were more likely to close their 
branch plants compared to the smaller multi-plant enterprises. This effect was, also, 
found to be stronger on the younger plants. This showed that larger multi-plant 
enterprises cut capacity by a greater percentage than the smaller multi-plant enterprises 
and they did so by closing their younger plants first. 
Initial size, growth from initial size and age o f a plant were found to increase its 
chances o f survival. However, current size had a stronger impact on the likelihood o f 
survival o f plants than the initial size. This showed that the ability o f plants to learn 
about their changing market conditions directly affected their chances o f survival. At 
the same time, larger plants, due to operating closer to the minimum efficient scale, 
were more likely to survive. The greater the growth o f plants f rom their initial size, the 
less important became the initial size. 
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Younger plants wi th a greater level o f capital intensity were found to have higher 
chances o f closure compared to the older plants. This implies that in younger plants 
costs are more fixed (as opposed to sunk), which can be recovered in case o f closure. 
This increases their f lexibi l i ty and their chances o f closure. However, for older plants 
costs are more sunk, which makes them more attached to a specific industry. 
A higher level o f technical efficiency was found to increase a plant's chance o f 
survival. However, this effect diminished, as plants got older. This suggests that plant 
exit should, on average, result in a "cleansing effect", improving the overall 
competitiveness, freeing resources for alternative investment opportunities, and making 
room for more innovative companies. However, older plants manage better to resist this 
process o f "creative destruction". 
Plants located in the regions o f East Anglia, Yorkshire and Humberside, North, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland were less likely to be closed compared to plants located 
in other regions. This effect was expected, as the majority o f these regions qualify for 
government grants, which aims to increase the survival chances o f plants in such 
regions. In this case, the presence of the regional dummies makes the dummy for GB 
intermediate or development areas insignificant. This finding could potentially have 
implications for government policy. As less efficient plants are more likely to be closed 
and the provision o f capital grants by government increases a plant's chance o f survival, 
the role o f such grants seems less than perfectly straightforward. The understanding is 
that these grants should not be employed to aid the survival o f plants wi th a lower level 
o f efficiency; this supports the conclusion reached by Harris (2001). 
Plants operating in industries characterised wi th a high entry have higher chance o f 
closure as compared to plants operating in industries characterised with a low entry. 
However, this effect is found to be stronger on the younger plants. This shows that new 
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entrants can displace the incumbents to a large extent, although the older plants, either 
due to their larger size or higher level o f experience, can resist the displacement effect 
better than the younger plants. 
Finally, plants operating in industries characterised with high growth are more likely 
to be closed i f they are young and less likely to be closed i f they are old. Combining the 
effect o f displacement and growth, it can be concluded that high growth industries result 
in a large number o f new plants that are not viable and, subsequently, exit. 
At this point, a summary o f the major findings seems appropriate. Among the plant 
specific factors, cohort dummies and change in ownership (either to a foreign or to a 
U K enterprise) had the highest positive impact upon the plants' chances o f closure. On 
the contrary, plants belonging to South-East-Asian countries, plants wi th a higher level 
o f employment, those located in East-Anglia, Northern region, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, single plants and plants wi th a higher level o f efficiency were among those with 
the lowest chances o f closure. Industry specific variables such as displacement and 
growth were also very important in terms o f their effect on the hazard rate o f closure o f 
plants. 
It also became evident that age had both a direct and an indirect impact upon a plant's 
likelihood o f closure. It directly decreased it and indirectly changed the magnitude or 
even the direction o f the impact o f certain variables upon it. 
What can be concluded from the above findings is that exit decision is a mult i -
dimensional one and the various characteristics o f plant, enterprise, industry, region and 
time can affect it . The history attached to a specific plant has an important impact upon 
its likelihood o f failure. The only way to take account o f this history is to employ a 
model that accommodates the plant-specific factors as well as the industry, owner-
enterprise and time specific factors and takes account o f any changes that happen in 
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their value as plants age. This highlights the salient feature o f the chosen model (time 
varying Cox model) in that it is capable o f accommodating all these factors. It also 
shows that those econometric models that take a measure o f exit, e.g. gross exit or exit 
rate at an industry level, and try to explain its variations using some industry-level 
variables (such as barriers to exit, growth and profitability) have major shortcomings. 
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5.5 Appendix to Chapter 5 
Right censoring 
All plants that survived beyond 1995 are censored. However, as an unbalanced panel 
data is used here there are, also, a number of occasions when plants that existed during 
the 1974-95 period are not observed to exit during the time they are believed to be at 
risk in the model. This is because they were not sampled by ONS to be included in the 
ABI during that interval in which they failed (but because the population data is 
available, we know that they indeed failed before 1996). This has no impact on the 
model being estimated (which takes account of such censoring), but it is important not 
to impute the rate of closure from the diagnostic statistics obtained from the estimated 
model. 
Table A5.23 Survivor rates, by greenfield entry. 
Time, t. greenfieldj =0 greenfield j=l 
1 0.8405 0.8308 
2 0.7189 0.7325 
3 0.6315 0.6297 
4 0.5555 0.5321 
5 0.4935 0.4679 
6 0.4428 0.4052 
7 0.3973 0.3490 
8 0.3588 0.3176 
9 0.3244 0.2894 
10 0.2964 0.2565 
11 0.2708 0.2285 
12 0.2461 0.2074 
13 0.2271 0.1909 
14 0.2101 0.1689 
15 0.1923 0.1446 
16 0.1774 0.1270 
17 0.1606 0.1190 
18 0.1465 0.1176 
19 0.1325 0.1013 
20 0.1184 0.0909 
21 0.1093 0.0782 
22 0.0879 0.0531 
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Table A5.24 Survivor rates, by Change to foreign ownership during 1974-79 period. 
Time, t. AFO 74-79 =0 AFO 74-79=1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7193 0.8743 
3 0.6304 0.7869 
4 0.5529 0.6566 
5 0.4905 0.6119 
6 0.4390 0.5168 
7 0.3923 0.4802 
8 0.3542 0.4565 
9 0.3204 0.4073 
10 0.2921 0.3673 
11 0.2667 0.3028 
12 0.2422 0.2776 
13 0.2232 0.2638 
14 0.2059 0.2261 
15 0.1881 0.1899 
16 0.1729 0.1749 
17 0.1566 0.1691 
18 0.1439 0.1427 
19 0.1295 0.1378 
20 0.1156 0.1278 
21 0.1060 0.1250 
22 0.0848 0.0988 
Table A5.25 Survivor rates, by Change to foreign ownership during 1980-89 period. 
Time, t; AFO 80-89 =0 AFO 80-89 =1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7197 0.7730 
3 0.6306 0.7049 
4 0.5526 0.6380 
5 0.4916 0.4904 
6 0.4401 0.4098 
7 0.3935 0.3710 
8 0.3556 0.3319 
9 0.3213 0.3076 
10 0.2928 0.2825 
11 0.2683 0.2242 
12 0.2433 0.2123 
13 0.2249 0.1855 
14 0.2077 0.1614 
15 0.1891 0.1499 
16 0.1746 0.1266 
17 0.1582 0.1192 
18 0.1450 0.1067 
19 0.1317 0.0826 
20 0.1188 0.0590 
21 0.1090 0.0590 
22 0.0864 0.0590 
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Table A5.26 Survivor rates, by Change to foreign ownership during 1990-95 period. 
Time, /, AFO 90-95 =0 AFO 90-95 =1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7196 0.7840 
3 0.6312 0.5472 
4 0.5534 0.4715 
5 0.4914 0.3917 
6 0.4394 0.3631 
7 0.3930 0.3127 
8 0.3554 0.2528 
9 0.3218 0.2054 
10 0.2934 0.1817 
11 0.2672 0.1723 
12 0.2432 0.1355 
13 0.2243 0.1184 
14 0.2068 0.1018 
15 0.1886 0.0885 
16 0.1733 0.0840 
17 0.1588 0.0482 
18 0.1453 0.0464 
19 0.1311 0.0422 
20 0.1171 0.0386 
21 0.1081 0.0328 
22 0.0859 0.0328 
Table A5.27 Survivor rates, by Change to or within U K owned sector during 1974-79 period. 
Time, tj AOWN 74-79 =0 AOWN 74-79 =1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7190 0.8829 
3 0.6294 0.7996 
4 0.5526 0.6803 
5 0.4901 0.6120 
6 0.4387 0.5406 
7 0.3922 0.4840 
8 0.3539 0.4451 
9 0.3197 0.4075 
10 0.2905 0.3849 
11 0.2646 0.3521 
12 0.2422 0.2966 
13 0.2228 0.2795 
14 0.2056 0.2529 
15 0.1872 0.2319 
16 0.1719 0.2153 
17 0.1553 0.2018 
18 0.1417 0.1889 
19 0.1266 0.1798 
20 0.1149 0.1505 
21 0.1052 0.1418 
22 0.0941 0.0698 
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Table A5.28 Survivor rates, by Change to or within U K owned sector during 1980-89 period. 
Time, t. AOWN 80-89 =0 AOWN 80-89 =1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7188 0.8767 
3 0.6312 0.7491 
4 0.5566 0.6159 
5 0.4972 0.5199 
6 0.4460 0.4555 
7 0.3996 0.4029 
8 0.3618 0.3605 
9 0.3275 0.3247 
10 0.2997 0.2926 
11 0.2790 0.2526 
12 0.2567 0.2235 
13 0.2384 0.2034 
14 0.2217 0.1844 
15 0.2052 0.1637 
16 0.1898 0.1489 
17 0.1729 0.1344 
18 0.1590 0.1223 
19 0.1444 0.1091 
20 0.1303 0.0961 
21 0.1217 0.0863 
22 0.1113 0.0553 
Table A5.29 Survivor rates, by Change to or within U K owned sector during 1990-95 period. 
Time, t. AOWN 90-95 =0 AOWN 90-95 =1 
1 0.8396 1.0000 
2 0.7213 0.8057 
3 0.6362 0.6093 
4 0.5600 0.4957 
5 0.5001 0.3989 
6 0.4498 0.3290 
7 0.4046 0.2726 
8 0.3682 0.2238 
9 0.3355 0.1838 
10 0.3073 0.1576 
11 0.2828 0.1262 
12 0.2583 0.1072 
13 0.2392 0.0929 
14 0.2224 0.0755 
15 0.2034 0.0658 
16 0.1878 0.0585 
17 0.1719 0.0501 
18 0.1574 0.0461 
19 0.1433 0.0398 
20 0.1283 0.0355 
21 0.1193 0.0315 
22 0.0943 0.0264 
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Table A5.30 Survivor rates, by state of being a single-unit plant. 
Time, t, Other SINGLE i t 
1 0.8336 0.8787 
2 0.7119 0.7736 
3 0.6189 0.7212 
4 0.5356 0.6897 
5 0.4693 0.6653 
6 0.4136 0.6465 
7 0.3639 0.6332 
8 0.3247 0.6105 
9 0.2889 0.5950 
10 0.2609 0.5630 
11 0.2350 0.5362 
12 0.2111 0.5155 
13 0.1925 0.5026 
14 0.1748 0.4942 
15 0.1569 0.4833 
16 0.1422 0.4724 
17 0.1267 0.4649 
18 0.1140 0.4549 
19 0.1016 0.4301 
20 0.0883 0.4145 
21 0.0810 0.3858 
22 0.0608 0.3780 
Table A5.31 Survivor rates, by initial employment size 
Time START EMPit START EMPit START EMPj, START EMPit START EMPit START EMPjt 
'/ (1-2) (3-10) (11-50) (51-100) (101-500) (501+) 
1 0.7813 0.8316 0.8642 0.8785 0.8781 0.8595 
2 0.6434 0.6898 0.7646 0.7911 0.7952 0.7900 
3 0.5519 0.5813 0.6845 0.7316 0.7374 0.7451 
4 0.4674 0.4936 0.6082 0.6796 0.6909 0.7127 
5 0.3982 0.4286 0.5438 0.6322 0.6638 0.6565 
6 0.3417 0.3739 0.4924 0.5873 0.6160 0.6097 
7 0.2971 0.3239 0.4444 0.5547 0.5716 0.5703 
8 0.2620 0.2868 0.4030 0.5147 0.5488 0.5176 
9 0.2188 0.2581 0.3668 0.4765 0.5074 0.4944 
10 0.1959 0.2283 0.3369 0.4506 0.4741 0.4780 
11 0.1724 0.2080 0.3048 0.4250 0.4507 0.4576 
12 0.1533 0.1879 0.2757 0.3987 0.4230 0.4400 
13 0.1389 0.1718 0.2548 0.3694 0.3984 0.4083 
14 0.1254 0.1529 0.2370 0.3541 0.3704 0.3341 
15 0.1100 0.1348 0.2189 0.3287 0.3391 0.3131 
16 0.0910 0.1192 0.2062 0.2995 0.3216 0.3043 
17 0.0837 0.1073 0.1865 0.2777 0.2946 0.2859 
18 0.0716 0.0985 0.1697 0.2641 0.2805 0.2859 
19 0.0616 0.0843 0.1550 0.2465 0.2673 0.2745 
20 0.0571 0.0721 0.1375 0.2319 0.2517 0.2745 
21 0.0523 0.0672 0.1265 0.2111 0.2254 0.2565 
22 0.0452 0.0471 0.1030 0.1963 0.2045 0.2565 
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Table A5.32 Survivor rates, by current employment of the plants 
Time, tj EMPi, 
(1-2) 
EMP i t 
(3-10) 
EMPj, 
(11-50) 
EMP i t 
(51-100) 
EMPj, 
(101-500) 
EMP h 
(501+) 
1 0.7742 0.8157 0.8609 0.8745 0.8785 0.8683 
2 0.6033 0.6759 0.7684 0.7887 0.7881 0.8169 
3 0.5209 0.5919 0.7010 0.7337 0.7380 0.7613 
4 0.4400 0.5121 0.6381 0.6874 0.7025 0.7435 
5 0.3791 0.4481 0.5823 0.6453 0.6759 0.7201 
6 0.3318 0.3938 0.5339 0.6114 0.6419 0.7035 
7 0.2888 0.3486 0.4937 0.5713 0.6130 0.6932 
8 0.2558 0.3117 0.4522 0.5414 0.5895 0.6756 
9 0.2304 0.2723 0.4201 0.5050 0.5654 0.6634 
10 0.2108 0.2423 0.3880 0.4815 0.5431 0.6462 
11 0.1911 0.2176 0.3594 0.4545 0.5211 0.6376 
12 0.1778 0.1948 0.3298 0.4287 0.5029 0.6070 
13 0.1645 0.1790 0.3106 0.4035 0.4776 0.5851 
14 0.1473 0.1621 0.2931 0.3805 0.4549 0.5668 
15 0.1312 0.1413 0.2739 0.3572 0.4341 0.5542 
16 0.1209 0.1284 0.2545 0.3350 0.4159 0.5472 
17 0.1071 0.1180 0.2346 0.3147 0.3972 0.5472 
18 0.1011 0.1080 0.2151 0.2931 0.3838 0.5287 
19 0.0811 0.0965 0.1976 0.2711 0.3684 0.5189 
20 0.0707 0.0827 0.1744 0.2508 0.3490 0.5052 
21 0.0600 0.0743 0.1632 0.2253 0.3268 0.4872 
22 0.0434 0.0452 0.1387 0.2188 0.3096 0.4585 
Table A5.33 Survivor rates, by the relative size of the multi-unit plants. 
Time, t/ R E L P SZE=<0.5 R E L P SZE>0.5 
1 0.8403 0.7192 
2 0.7159 0.6477 
3 0.6205 0.6020 
4 0.5344 0.5751 
5 0.4674 0.5182 
6 0.4105 0.4810 
7 0.3596 0.4503 
8 0.3197 0.4264 
9 0.2837 0.3933 
10 0.2560 0.3583 
11 0.2299 0.3369 
12 0.2053 0.3209 
13 0.1871 0.2965 
14 0.1697 0.2734 
15 0.1516 0.2589 
16 0.1369 0.2436 
17 0.1215 0.2261 
18 0.1092 0.2081 
19 0.0963 0.2067 
20 0.0828 0.1942 
21 0.0757 0.1836 
22 0.0546 0.1836 
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Table A5.34 Survivor rates, by the degree of capital intensity 
Time, tj CAP LAB=<0.003 CAP LAB>0.003 
1 0.8504 0.7861 
2 0.7482 0.6213 
3 0.6625 0.5341 
4 0.5823 0.4666 
5 0.5199 0.4123 
6 0.4721 0.3652 
7 0.4228 0.3264 
8 0.3880 0.2930 
9 0.3567 0.2636 
10 0.3302 0.2393 
11 0.3087 0.2166 
12 0.2857 0.1961 
13 0.2673 0.1803 
14 0.2500 0.1656 
15 0.2330 0.1504 
16 0.2182 0.1380 
17 0.2028 0.1250 
18 0.1909 0.1143 
19 0.1791 0.1029 
20 0.1635 0.0919 
21 0.1579 0.0844 
22 0.1579 0.0670 
Table A5.35 Survivor rates, by the magnitude of technical efficiency 
Time, t. L n T EFF<=0.7 L n T EFF<=0.7 
1 0.8412 0.8389 
2 0.7279 0.7153 
3 0.6276 0.6329 
4 0.5445 0.5584 
5 0.4747 0.5016 
6 0.4229 0.4499 
7 0.3730 0.4067 
8 0.3322 0.3716 
9 0.3025 0.3341 
10 0.2767 0.3036 
11 0.2547 0.2738 
12 0.2306 0.2497 
13 0.2123 0.2306 
14 0.1973 0.2102 
15 0.1777 0.1946 
16 0.1628 0.1799 
17 0.1458 0.1671 
18 0.1337 0.1527 
19 0.1197 0.1398 
20 0.1043 0.1296 
21 0.0943 0.1223 
22 0.0838 0.0855 
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Table AS.36 Survivor rates, by the relative size of the multi-plant enterprise. 
Time, t. R E L E SZE=<0.5 R E L E SZE>0.5 
1 0.8338 0.8318 
2 0.7304 0.5949 
3 0.6349 0.5177 
4 0.5481 0.4556 
5 0.4778 0.4126 
6 0.4194 0.3724 
7 0.3684 0.3306 
8 0.3280 0.2994 
9 0.2907 0.2722 
10 0.2628 0.2441 
11 0.2372 0.2177 
12 0.2122 0.1995 
13 0.1936 0.1820 
14 0.1754 0.1668 
15 0.1572 0.1512 
16 0.1416 0.1408 
17 0.1264 0.1246 
18 0.1131 0.1151 
19 0.1020 0.0986 
20 0.0869 0.0915 
21 0.0802 0.0815 
22 0.0595 0.0655 
Table A5.37 Survivor rates, by the magnitude of the displacement effect 
Time, t,- DISPLACE=<0.01 DISPLACE>0.01 
1 0.8939 0.8364 
2 0.8046 0.7098 
3 0.7286 0.6168 
4 0.6586 0.5354 
5 0.6008 0.4713 
6 0.5438 0.4200 
7 0.4811 0.3765 
8 0.4450 0.3383 
9 0.4134 0.3042 
10 0.3769 0.2774 
11 0.3400 0.2529 
12 0.3124 0.2295 
13 0.2875 0.2116 
14 0.2628 0.1951 
15 0.2389 0.1778 
16 0.2213 0.1634 
17 0.1867 0.1493 
18 0.1660 0.1371 
19 0.1408 0.1242 
20 0.1362 0.1104 
21 0.1286 0.1016 
22 0.1062 0.0811 
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Table A5.38 Survivor rates, by industry growth 
Time, GROWTH =<-0.01 GROWTH >-0.01 
1 0.8939 0.8364 
2 0.8046 0.7098 
3 0.7286 0.6168 
4 0.6586 0.5354 
5 0.6008 0.4713 
6 0.5438 0.4200 
7 0.4811 0.3765 
8 0.4450 0.3383 
9 0.4134 0.3042 
10 0.3769 0.2774 
11 0.3400 0.2529 
12 0.3124 0.2295 
13 0.2875 0.2116 
14 0.2628 0.1951 
15 0.2389 0.1778 
16 0.2213 0.1634 
17 0.1867 0.1493 
18 0.1660 0.1371 
19 0.1408 0.1242 
20 0.1362 0.1104 
21 0.1286 0.1016 
22 0.1062 0.0811 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This thesis has investigated: 1) the importance of plant entry and exit in UK 
manufacturing sectors during the 1974-97 period; 2) the determinants of entry decision; 
and 3) the determinants of exit decision. Using a newly released UK database, it proved 
possible to uncover some important facts regarding these aspects. 
It was found that the importance of entry and exit cannot be fully captured by using 
raw figures alone. Various other aspects such as the size of entrants and exitors and 
entrants' growth after entry have to be taken into consideration i f one wishes to examine 
the role played by entrants and exitors in UK manufacturing industries. It was found 
that the annual entry rates were increasing over the 1974-97 period and that the majority 
of entrants were small in size. At the same time the annual exit rates were also 
increasing. The variations in entry and exit rates at the four-digit manufacturing level 
were found to be of transitory nature. This implies that they were due mainly to the 
inter-temporal shocks. The highest entry and exit rates were observed during the periods 
of economic boom (the late 1970's period), which shows that entry and exit rates may 
be pro-cyclical. 
It was found that the maturation process was a difficult one for entrants as almost 44% 
of them exited by their f i f th year. This could be due to the fact that entrants were mainly 
small in size and the costs of adjustment to increase market penetration can be very 
high. Overall, this finding reveals that survival was not as easy as entry in UK 
manufacturing industries over the period under study. By dividing the study time period 
into 5-year intervals, it was found that: 1) survival was easier for entrants prior to 1984 
and became increasingly difficult afterwards and 2) exit was not evident only among the 
entrants and incumbents' life was also threatened by the intensity of competition. This 
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finding specifically reveals that the notion of "creative destruction" is of particular 
relevance to UK manufacturing industries1. 
The results in Chapter 4 revealed that entry decision is a complex one and is affected 
by various (plant, industry, geographical and time-specific) factors. Therefore, a suitable 
model is one that is capable of accommodating them all. The results showed that taking 
entrants as a homogenous group of plants can result in biased estimates of the 
coefficients, as different types of entrants responded differently to similar industrial, 
geographical and time specific factors. Therefore, entrants have to be divided into 
different groups based on their common characteristics. It was found that the industrial 
and geographical specific factors play equally important roles in the entry decision and 
both have to be considered. 
At the same time, it became evident that the role that industry life cycle plays in 
determining the entry rates should not be downplayed. It was found that the type of 
entrants and their incentives were different for industries in different stages in their life 
cycle and, therefore, the entry rates varied from the early stages to the later stages. At 
the same time, the effect of certain industry-specific and geographical-specific variables 
on entry appeared to be different across the two different stages. Having such important 
impact upon entry rates, it can be concluded that industry life cycle has to be taken into 
account in any study of the entry decision. 
On the other hand, it was found that in the context of UK manufacturing sectors, the 
fundamental differences between the northern and the southern regions of the UK also 
have to be taken into account. It could directly affect the entry rates, as the type of 
entrants and their motivations can vary across the northern and the southern regions of 
the UK. At the same time, it was found that the effect of certain variables (both industry 
1 It is important not to overstate the importance of churning, as for example in 1995, 71% of total 
manufacturing output was produced by plants that have been in operation for more than 5 years. 
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and geographical specific) on entry rates varied based on whether the opened plant was 
located in the north or the south of the UK. 
In studying the exit decision of plants, it was found that various factors (e.g. plant, 
industry and owner-enterprise specific factors) were important. The history attached to a 
specific plant was found to have significant implications on its likelihood of failure . 
This highlighted the salient feature of the chosen model (time varying Cox model), as it 
was capable of: 1) accommodating all these factors and 2) taking account of the changes 
that occurred in their values as the plants aged. The most important plant specific 
factors, with a positive impact upon the hazard rate of closure of plants, appeared to be 
cohort dummies and change in ownership. On the other hand, variables which had the 
highest negative impact upon the hazard rate of closure of plants were; being owned by 
a South-East-Asian country, being a single-unit plant, employment (number of 
employees), being located in the regions of East-Anglia, Northern, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland and efficiency. At the same time, it became evident that displacement 
effect and growth at the industry level were also very important in determining the 
plants' likelihood of failure. 
Another important finding in this chapter was that the age of plants had a crucial role 
in determining their hazard rate of closure as the effect of some variables, such as start-
up employment, displacement and growth changed as plants aged. Overall, the findings 
from Chapter 5 depicted that the exit decision is a multi-dimensional one, which can be 
affected by many different factors and any study that attempts to examine this decision 
inevitably has to take account of these factors. 
2 For example plants that changed ownership had significantly higher likelihood of closure compared to other plants. 
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Recommendations for future research 
1. Chapter 3 examined the entry and exit decision at the plant level. However, 
looking at the entry and exit of firms can also reveal important facts and raise 
interesting questions. Therefore, future research can examine the importance of 
firm entry (either through plant creation or acquisition) and exit (either through 
plant closure or divesture), and their growth and decline in UK manufacturing 
industries. 
2. The entry decision has been studied here at more detailed level than was 
previously done. Therefore, not only has special care to be taken in differentiating 
between entrants based on their characteristics, but also the role of the industry 
life cycle should not be ignored. Hence, future research needs to explore the type 
of entrants and their magnitude in UK manufacturing industries in different stages 
of the industry life cycle. 
3. Special attention in future research should be given to the role of change in 
ownership in determining the risk of closure of plants and why this characteristic 
appears to be so important. 
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